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Chapter 1  | Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, laboratory experiments have become an important source of data 
within economics. For most of the twentieth century, the majority of economists held the 
view that it is impossible to use experiments in order to test the predictions made by 
economic theory (Friedman, 1953; Lipsey, 1979; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985). 
Although seminal economic experiments were conducted throughout the last centuries, 
for a considerable period these studies remained largely isolated pieces of work (Bardsley 
et al., 2010).  This is no longer the case today. Experimental papers are published 
frequently even in the most general top journals and many economic departments 
around the world have computer laboratories suited to perform the most complex forms 
of experiments. 
Despite this strong increase in experimental work, many economists remain skeptical 
about the value of laboratory experiments. The main concern remains that of external 
validity: the degree to which findings from experiments can be generalized to other 
environments. Binmore (1999), for example, argues that the conditions in the typical 
experiment are such that economic theory cannot reasonably be expected to work well. 
In particular, he suggests that economic theory should only hold when incentives are 
adequately high and learning opportunities are sufficient, which is arguably not the case 
in many experiments. Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b, 2008) make similar arguments. They 
state that incentives in experiments tend to be considerably smaller than those in many 
naturally occurring settings, that subjects are often less familiar with the decision task in 
the laboratory than with those in everyday life, and that they have no opportunity to seek 
outside advice. They also stress that selection mechanisms in the laboratory differ from 
those in the field, that experiments are completed over short durations whereas real life 
decision are made over longer time frames, and that the nature and extent of scrutiny 
that subjects face in the laboratory is unparalleled in the field. Such scrutiny can be 
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expected to induce greater levels of social behavior in the laboratory than in many field 
settings. 
While the above arguments clearly have their merit, some nuances are in order. First, it 
should be stressed that (most of) the criticisms above do not uniquely apply to laboratory 
experiments. Binmore (1999) acknowledges that if economic theories only hold when 
stakes are adequately high and learning opportunities are sufficient, then we should also 
not expect them to hold in field settings that do not satisfy these conditions. Levitt and 
List (2007a) acknowledge that the arguments they put forth “apply with equal force to 
generalizing from data generated from naturally occurring environments” (p. 170). As a 
result, it is not obvious whether data from a laboratory experiment are less informative 
than field data to predict behavior in a different and unrelated field environment (Falk 
and Heckman, 2009). Second, the impact of the aforementioned factors on behavior and, 
therefore, the external validity of experiments are in the end empirical questions. Not just 
that, these questions can be well studied by employing experimental methods (Starmer, 
1999). As noted by Camerer (2011), most conclusive evidence suggesting that the factors 
above impact behavior comes from laboratory data. 
As a result, rather than disregarding laboratory data out of hand, a more constructive 
approach is to actively investigate whether laboratory findings are robust. Two obvious 
approaches to do so present themselves. First, one can try to study questions that are 
typically investigated in the behavioral laboratory in the field, either by conducting field 
experiments (Harrison and List, 2006) or by locating unique naturally occurring data that 
can be used for this purpose. Observing behavior under widely different conditions can 
be an important step in identifying which patterns are robust and which are not. Second, 
one can use experimental methods to map the effect of the abovementioned factors on 
decision-making. Such an approach can ultimately inform the construction of models that 
can provide a framework to transport findings between different environments or 
populations (Levitt and List, 2007a; Falk and Heckman, 2009).  This thesis incorporates 
both approaches.  
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Chapter 2 and 3 use naturally occurring data from TV game shows in order to test 
behavioral hypotheses that are generally difficult to test outside of the controlled 
laboratory. Chapter 4 and 5 employ experiments to investigate the effect of public 
scrutiny on behavior. Finally Chapter 6 takes a slightly different focus. This chapter 
introduces a new and easily applicable method to measure utility and loss aversion, both 
under risk and under uncertainty and employs this method to study whether utility is the 
same under risk and uncertainty. 
1.1 Game Shows as Natural Experiments 
Since the early 90s, numerous papers have used game show data in order to test 
behavioral hypotheses or estimate parameters of behavioral decision models. Due to the 
fact that many game shows include risky and strategic decisions, it is not surprising that 
most of these papers study either risk preference (Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Beetsma 
and Schotman, 2001; Post et al., 2008) or strategic behavior (Bennett and Hickman, 1993; 
Berk, Hughson, and Vandezande, 1996; Tenorio and Cason, 2002). More recently, game 
shows have also been used to study social interaction, most notably discrimination (Levitt, 
2004; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2005) and cooperative behavior (List, 2004, 
2006; Belot et al., 2010; Oberholzer-Gee et al., 2010). 
The reason for economists’ interest in game shows is that they allow researchers to study 
behavior in well-designed decision problems when the stakes are large. Due to their 
uncontrolled nature, field data rarely allow for a clean discrimination between competing 
theories. Laboratory experiments do allow researchers to construct such controlled tests, 
but the incentives that can be offered to subjects are limited by the researcher’s budget. 
Game show data can help breach this gap.  
In addition to employing large and widely ranging stakes, game shows differ from 
laboratory experiments on many other dimensions as well. Participants in the laboratory 
tend to be volunteering students with no experience with the abstract task that they will 
be represented with. They have no opportunity to gain advice from friends and know that 
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their decisions will be used with the aim of testing scientific hypotheses. Game shows 
differ on all these aspects. The selection mechanisms differ from show to show, but are 
very different from those in the laboratory. In general, there is much more diversity in 
demographic characteristics as participants in many shows appear to be a reasonable 
(middle-class) cross section of the population. Furthermore, contestants tend to be 
familiar with the task at hand and thus had the opportunity to prepare themselves. While 
they are being watched on TV, this type of scrutiny is of a different scope and nature than 
the scrutiny faced in laboratory experiments. From the vantage point of studying the 
robustness of behavioral findings outside of the laboratory, these differences have 
important implications. The downside is that if behavior in a game show differs from that 
in the laboratory, it is difficult to pinpoint which factors underlie this difference. If, 
however, decisions from the laboratory are replicated in the very different environment 
of a TV game show, this provides a strong signal regarding the robustness of these 
findings. 
In Chapter 2, we study cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, 
using data from the British TV game show “Golden Balls”. At the end of each episode, 
contestants play a variant of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma for large and widely ranging 
stakes averaging over $20,000. The variation is large: from a few dollars to about 
$175,000. 
On average, contestants cooperate 53 percent of the time. This rate is similar to that 
observed in prior experimental work (Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Sally, 1995). With respect 
to demographic characteristics, we observe that young males are less cooperative than 
young females and that this differences changes with age. Older men are more 
cooperative than younger men, while such an age effect is absent for women. As a result, 
from about 46 years onwards men in this game show are more likely to cooperate than 
women. 
The dynamic nature of the show allows us to test a number of interesting behavioral 
hypotheses. In support of the claim that people have reciprocal preferences, we find that 
contestants are significantly less likely to cooperate if their opponent in the final has 
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previously attempted to vote them of the show. Furthermore, we find that cheap talk is 
predictive of behavior. Making a promise is the strongest predictor of behavior in the 
show: those who make a promise are 31 percentage points more likely to cooperate. In 
spite of the predictive power of promises, contestants do not condition their choices on 
the promises made by their opponent. More generally, we find that contestants do not 
appear to condition their choice on any factor that predicts the cooperation likelihood of 
their opponent. This implies that contestants either lack the ability or ignore the 
possibility to reliably interpret information about the expected behavior of others, or do 
not have a preference for matching the other’s choice. Given our finding that people do 
reciprocate votes against them, the former explanation seems more likely. 
Finally, our results provide support for the view that attitudes are strongly influenced by 
context. We find unusually high rates of cooperation when the luck of the game reduces 
the stakes to “merely” a few hundred Pounds. Such amounts are tiny in the light of the 
thousands and even tens of thousands the game is often played for, but would be 
considered very large in any laboratory setting. Supporting the view that contestants 
evaluate money amounts in relative rather than absolute terms, we find that in the early 
days of the show, when the contestants have not had an opportunity to watch the show 
on TV and are still learning what kind of stakes are to be expected, cooperation rates 
appear to be influenced by the salient but normatively irrelevant value representing the 
sum they could have been playing for with a lucky selection of balls. In particular, the 
higher this maximum jackpot, and thus the smaller the actual jackpot appears, the 
greater the likelihood that contestants cooperate. Across episodes, this effect vanishes, 
suggesting that expectations about the stakes become well informed. 
Chapter 3 investigates bargaining behavior using data from the British TV game show 
“Divided”. In Divided, three contestants collectively build up a jackpot through answering 
general quiz questions. Across episodes, their jackpot ultimately ranges from 
approximately $10,000 to $185,000, and averages over $50,000. In the second phase of 
the game, the team’s accumulated money amount is divided into three unequal parts of, 
for example, 60, 30 and 10 percent. Contestants in turn have to claim one of these shares. 
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If they do not immediately agree on who takes which share, they have 100 seconds to 
negotiate and reach consensus. With each second they take they lose one percentage 
point of the initial jackpot, and after 100 seconds there is nothing left. This final stage can 
thus be seen as a natural bargaining experiment where the “subjects” have to 
unanimously decide on the allocation of three indivisible shares, in a format that allows 
face-to-face communication and incorporates (close to) continuous costs to bargaining. 
Overall, 50 percent of the jackpot value is lost in bargaining. Because the jackpot is 
determined by teams’ answers to trivia questions, we are able to investigate the 
influence of entitlements on bargaining. We find that equity concerns play an important 
role in the bargaining process. Contestants that contributed more to the communal 
jackpot claim a larger share, are less likely to lower their claim during the bargaining 
process, and end up with a larger fraction of the jackpot. 
Contestants making hardball announcements, by adding a statement to their initial claim 
that they will not back down from it, act accordingly. These contestants are less likely to 
back down from their initial claim. As a result, they increase their likelihood of taking the 
top share home. Due to the increased bargaining costs, however, this strategy does not 
increase their earnings in an absolute sense and lowers the earnings of their opponents. 
There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage: the order in which contestants get to 
make their claims does not influence the claims they stake, nor the outcomes reached. 
Finally, there is little evidence that behavior and outcomes are related to demographic 
characteristics. 
1.2 Public Scrutiny 
Over recent years, the nature and degree of scrutiny that laboratory subjects face has 
been a major point of criticism of experiments in economics (Levitt and List, 2007a). 
Interestingly enough, scrutiny has thus far predominantly been considered as a disturbing 
factor in tasks in which morality and wealth are competing objectives (Levitt and List, 
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2007a, 2007b). The two chapters investigate whether public scrutiny also influences 
behavior in economic tasks that do not incorporate a moral component. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of public scrutiny on risky choice. It presents the results 
from two incentivized experiments that mimic the game of the TV show Deal or No Deal. 
Both experiments include laboratory and limelight treatments. In the laboratory 
treatments, subjects make their decisions anonymously under conditions typically 
employed in economic experiments. In the limelight treatments, subjects make their 
choices in a simulated game show environment, including a live audience, game show 
host, and video cameras.  
Comparing behavior between the laboratory and limelight treatments, we find that 
subjects are more risk averse in the limelight than in the anonymity of a typical behavioral 
laboratory. Estimates of structural choice models indicate that the impact of the limelight 
on risk preference parameters is substantial. At the same time, however, subjects in both 
treatments show path dependent behavior; they take more risk if the game develops 
either substantially worse or substantially better than expected. As a result, under both 
conditions our simple prospect-theory inspired model with a path-dependent reference 
point outperforms expected utility of wealth in explaining subjects’ choices.  
In addition, three other findings emerge. First, exploiting a design difference between the 
sets of experiments we find that ambiguity aversion depends on being in the limelight. 
Although we find substantial evidence for ambiguity aversion in the limelight, we do not 
observe it in the laboratory. Second, passive experience gained by watching others play 
the game does not affects loss aversion in particular or risk aversion in general. Finally, 
estimates from all treatments suggest that preferences are based on imperfectly updated 
expectations. 
Chapter 5 investigates the effect of social cues on behavior in both individual choice and 
interaction tasks. Recent literature has shown that even subtle cues of being watched can 
influence behavior in tasks have a moral component. The presence of pictures of a pair of 
eyes, or an eye-like stimulus, in an otherwise anonymous experimental setting leads to 
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increased donations to strangers (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Rigdon et al., 2009; Oda et al., 
2011; Nettle et al., 2013), increased donations to public goods (Burnham and Hare, 2007), 
and induces greater disapproval of moral transgressions (Bourrat et al., 2011). The fact 
that relatively subtle social cues can influence behavior is significant for the 
experimentalist as it suggests that, even in anonymous laboratory settings, pro-social 
behavior cannot be viewed as being purely intrinsic (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Jaeggi et al., 
2010). 
Thus far, the effect of pictures of eyes has only been investigated in tasks that include a 
moral component. The fact that actual public scrutiny also influences behavior in 
individual choice tasks that have no moral component begs the question whether 
pictures of eyes will also affect behavior in such tasks. Furthermore, it remains unclear 
whether the effect of eyes is something special or whether pictures of eyes constitute 
one among many social cues that produce the same effect.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of an internet experiment designed to acquire a better 
understanding of the effect of pictures of eyes on human behavior. First, in order to 
investigate whether the effect of eyes is limited to interaction tasks, we expand the range 
of tasks to include individual choice tasks that have no moral component.  Second, in 
order to investigate whether different social cues have similar effects, we compare the 
effect of pictures of eyes with a different condition in which we present subjects with 
pictures of other students (peers). 
Our results suggest that the effect of pictures of eyes is limited to interaction tasks that 
include a moral component and that eyes should be considered as distinct from other 
social cues, such as reminders of peers. Whereas pictures of eyes uniformly enhanced 
pro-social behavior in our experiment, this is not the case for reminders of peers. 
Furthermore, reminders of peers trigger more rational behavior in individual choice tasks 
that have no moral component, whereas pictures of eyes do not affect behavior in such 
tasks.  
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1.3 Measuring Utility 
Chapter 6 introduces a new and easily applicable method to measure utility and loss 
aversion, both under risk and under uncertainty. This method extends the trade-off 
method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996) by allowing standard sequences (sequences of 
outcomes for which the utility differences between successive elements is constant) to 
pass through the reference point. Thus, we make the trade-off method robust to sign 
dependence and allow for standard sequences that include gains, losses, and the 
reference point. As with the traditional trade-off method, our method requires no 
simplifying assumptions about utility or event weighting. 
We employ our method to test whether the utility function has the same shape under risk 
and uncertainty. This test is critical for models that capture ambiguity aversion through a 
difference in event weighting between risk and uncertainty, such as multiple priors and 
prospect theory. We cannot reject the hypothesis that utility and loss aversion are the 
same for risk and uncertainty, suggesting that utility primarily reflects attitudes towards 
outcomes. Under both risk and uncertainty, we find S-shaped utility (concave for gains, 
convex for losses) and substantial loss aversion. 
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Chapter 2  | Split or Steal? 
Cooperative Behavior when the Stakes are Large 
 
 
 
This chapter examines cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at 
stake, using data from the TV game show “Golden Balls”. At the end of each 
episode, contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma for large 
and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly 
high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look 
tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. 
Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people 
have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional 
cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to 
cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we 
replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this 
gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly 
cooperative as their age increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper “Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior when the Stakes Are Large”, co-
authored by Martijn J. van den Assem and Richard H. Thaler, and published in Management Science (van 
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2.1 Introduction 
Cooperation is vital for the functioning of society, and the organizations and communities 
that form its fabric. Not surprisingly, cooperative behavior is the focus of many studies 
across a wide range of scientific disciplines, including psychology (Dawes, 1980; Dawes 
and Messick, 2000), sociology (Marwell and Ames, 1979, 1980; Raub and Snijders, 1997), 
economics (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2000a; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), 
political science (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992) and biology (Gardner and West, 
2004; West, Griffin and Gardner, 2007). The key question in this literature is why humans 
cooperate even in situations in which doing so is not in line with their material self-
interest. 
While cooperation is ubiquitous in social life and an important topic for all kinds of 
economic interaction, field data rarely allow for a clean discrimination among competing 
theories. Because carefully designed laboratory experiments do allow for such rigorous 
comparisons, laboratory experiments have provided numerous important insights into 
cooperative behavior, and the resulting rich literature forms the basis of most of our 
knowledge on human cooperation. Still, laboratory settings inevitably have limitations 
that some argue may hinder the generalization of findings to situations beyond the 
context of the lab (Levitt and List, 2007a, 2008). Subjects are often volunteering students 
who thus constitute a non-random sample of the population at large. Also, they generally 
have less familiarity with decision tasks in the laboratory than with those in everyday life, 
no opportunity to seek advice from friends or experts, and they know that their behavior 
is examined in detail. 
From an economic perspective, another obvious drawback to lab studies is that the 
financial stakes employed tend to be relatively small. Even those experiments that utilize 
relatively large payoffs do not involve amounts in excess of a few hundred dollars (e.g., 
Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996a; List and Cherry, 2000; Carpenter, Verhoogen and 
Burks, 2005), giving rise to the question to what extent findings will generalize to 
situations of significant economic importance. One solution is to perform experiments in 
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low-income countries, where small nominal amounts carry a larger value. In the domain 
of social interaction, such experiments are, for example, employed by Slonim and Roth 
(1998), Cameron (1999), Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva (2002), Munier and Zaharia 
(2002), Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud and Martinsson (2005), and Kocher, Martinsson 
and Visser (2008). While this might appear an ideal approach, it has its own drawbacks. 
Culture, for example, has been shown to play an important role in social interaction 
(Henrich et al., 2001, 2004; Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008), making it difficult to 
generalize findings from low-income countries.1 And while the stakes in these experi-
ments are larger than commonly employed, they still rarely exceed a few months’ wages. 
In the current chapter, we study cooperative behavior using another source of data, 
namely the behavior of contestants on the British TV game show “Golden Balls”. Although 
the game show setting is an unusual environment, it has the benefit of employing large 
and varying stakes. Furthermore, game shows are markedly different from laboratory 
experiments in terms of participant selection, scrutiny, and familiarity of participants with 
the decision task. Combined with the strict and well-defined rules, game shows can 
therefore provide unique opportunities to investigate the robustness of existing 
laboratory findings. 
Because game shows are often competitive in nature and ask contestants to make risky 
or strategic choices, is it not surprising that they have mostly been used to study decision 
making under risk (e.g., Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Beetsma and Schotman, 2001; Post 
et al., 2008) or strategic reasoning (e.g., Bennett and Hickman, 1993; Berk, Hughson and 
Vandezande, 1996; Tenorio and Cason, 2002). More recently, however, game shows have 
also been used to study social interaction, in particular discrimination (Levitt, 2004; 
Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2005) and cooperative behavior (List, 2004a, 2006; 
Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven, 2010a; Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White, 2010). The 
current chapter is in the latter category. 
                                                     
1
 Interestingly, though not generally acknowledged, this argument at the same time questions the universal 
applicability of the many findings from higher-income countries, including ours. We refer to Henrich, Heine 
and Norenzayan (2010) for a discussion on this issue. 
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In the final stage of “Golden Balls”, contestants make a choice on whether or not to 
cooperate in a variant of the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma. In particular, the two final 
contestants independently have to decide whether they want to “split” or “steal” the 
jackpot. If both contestants choose “split”, they share the jackpot equally. If one chooses 
“split” and the other chooses “steal”, the one who steals takes the jackpot and the other 
gets nothing. If they both “steal”, both go home empty-handed. On average, the jackpot 
is over $20,000. The variation is large: from a few dollars to about $175,000. 
If we assume that each player only cares about maximizing her immediate financial 
payoff, the choice problem in “Golden Balls” can be labeled as a “weak” form of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.2 Where in the classic form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma defecting 
strictly dominates cooperating, here defecting only weakly dominates cooperating: 
choosing “steal” always does at least as well, and sometimes better than choosing “split”. 
Of course, contestants may consider other factors aside from their own monetary payoff 
when deciding which choice to make. Much experimental research suggests that people 
have social preferences in the sense that the payoffs to others enter their utility 
functions. For discussions, see, for example, Fehr and Gächter (1998, 2000b), Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Camerer (2003), 
Fehr and Gintis (2007), and Cooper and Kagel (2009). 
The fact that the show is aired on TV of course creates a set of rather special 
circumstances that could affect our results, although there is little existing theory to 
suggest what the effect of a large TV audience would be. One might argue that players 
would not want to be seen as a “jerk” on national television and so would be more likely 
to cooperate, but one can also argue that a player would not want to been seen as a 
“sucker” (or someone who cannot detect the weakly dominant solution to a simple game) 
in public.3 The public nature of the choice could also magnify subtle features created by 
                                                     
2
 Rapoport (1988) introduced this terminology. For the sake of brevity, we will simply use the term 
Prisoner’s Dilemma to refer to the game studied here. 
3
 Most studies related to the issue of observability indicate that people display more other-regarding 
behavior when they are or feel more subject to public scrutiny (see, for example, Hoffman, McCabe and 
Smith, 1996b; Rege and Telle, 2004; Haley and Fessler, 2005), but there is also contradictory evidence 
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the fact that the game is a “weak” form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, if a player 
thinks that the other player will steal, she might decide to split on the grounds that it 
costs her nothing to appear “nice” on TV. These complications do not render our results 
uninteresting, but do need to be incorporated in any attempt to evaluate how our results 
should be interpreted in the context of existing theories and experimental findings on 
cooperation. 
Although “Golden Balls” is unique in its format, the show shares the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
element with a few game shows from other countries including “Friend or Foe” (US, aired 
in 2002-2003) and “Deelt ie ‘t of deelt ie ‘t niet?” (in English: “Will he share or not?”; 
Netherlands, 2002). These two shows have been studied in four different papers. List 
(2004a, 2006) and Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White (2010) analyze data from 
“Friend or Foe”, and Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven (2010a) use the Dutch show. List 
focuses on the effects of demographic variables such as gender, race and age. Studying 
the same game show, Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White compare the behavior in the 
first season of the show with later seasons in which the contestants have had a chance to 
observe prior episodes. Finally, Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven find that making a promise 
to cooperate prior to the decision is positively related to cooperation if the promise was 
voluntary, but not if the host has elicited it. 
In this chapter we replicate many of the earlier investigations, but also undertake several 
novel analyses that are possible due to some unique features in the format of “Golden 
Balls”. The way the stakes are determined and the very wide range they cover provide the 
basis for new insights into the effect of stakes and context. The dynamic setting of the 
show enables us to look at reciprocity in cooperative behavior, and also at the effect of 
earlier deceitful behavior. 
In our sample, individual players on average cooperate 53 percent of the time. Although 
this rate is similar to earlier findings from the experimental literature (Dawes and Thaler, 
                                                                                                                                                                
(Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006). Kerr (1999) suggests that the effect depends on conditions related to social 
expectations and sanctions. 
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1988; Sally, 1995), direct comparisons are hampered by systematic differences in the 
stakes, the visibility of decisions, characteristics of the subjects, and preceding 
opportunities for communication or other social interaction. 
We find only limited support for the notion that cooperation will decrease if the stakes 
get significant. The cooperation rate is unusually high when the stakes lie in the low range 
of our sample, perhaps because contestants think that for so little money (relatively 
speaking) they might as well cooperate in public. Cooperation does decline with the 
stakes for stakes below the median, but plateaus at around 45 percent for medium to 
large amounts. 
The high cooperation rate for relatively small stakes suggests that context can convert 
money amounts that would normally be considered consequential or “big” into amounts 
that are perceived to be small, just “peanuts”. This idea is supported by our finding that 
cooperation is not only based on the actual stakes but also on what the jackpot 
potentially could have been. This effect is especially pronounced for those who appeared 
in the earlier episodes of the show and had no or little opportunity to watch the show on 
TV and learn what sizes are large or small in the context of this game. 
A special property of “Golden Balls” is the interaction that occurs among contestants 
prior to the final. Utilizing the dynamic setting, we find evidence that contestants show 
some tendency toward reciprocity. Among contestants whose final opponent has 
attempted to vote them off the show, the propensity to cooperate is significantly lower. 
Contestants do not appear to reciprocate against opponents who have lied earlier in the 
game. Lying seems to be accepted here, similar to bluffing in poker. A possible reason for 
this is that, in contrast to a vote cast against someone, lying is a defensive act that is not 
aimed at anyone in particular. 
Surprisingly, we find little evidence that contestants’ propensity to cooperate depends 
positively on the likelihood that their opponent will cooperate. While an opponent’s 
promise to cooperate is a strong predictor of her actual choice, contestants appear not to 
be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Our final 
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main result is that young males cooperate less than young females. This difference 
decreases and even reverses as age increases and men become increasingly cooperative. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the game show in more detail, 
discusses our data and presents descriptive statistics. Sections 2.3 – 2.7 cover the various 
possible factors behind cooperative behavior included in our analysis. Each of these 
sections provides related literature and other background, explains the variables that we 
use, and discusses the results of our Probit regression analyses. Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2 Game Show and Data 
Description of “Golden Balls” 
The TV game show “Golden Balls” was developed by the Dutch production company 
Endemol. It debuted on the ITV network in the United Kingdom in June 2007 and ran until 
December 2009. Each episode consists of four rounds and starts with four contestants, 
usually two men and two women. 
In Round 1, twelve golden balls are randomly drawn from the “Golden Bank”, a lottery 
machine containing one hundred “golden” balls. Each of these balls has a hidden cash 
amount inside, ranging from a minimum of £10 to a maximum of £75,000.4 Contestants 
know that this is the range for the amounts in the balls, but they do not know the precise 
distribution (though this becomes clearer over time as the show is aired). At a later stage 
of the game, a subset of the cash balls drawn will contribute to the final jackpot. Also, 
four balls hiding the word “killer” inside are mixed with the twelve cash balls. Killer balls 
are undesirable in a way we will explain below. From the sixteen balls, each contestant 
receives four balls at random. For each contestant, two are placed on the front row with 
their contents - either a cash amount or the word “killer” - openly displayed; the other 
two are placed on the back row and their contents are known by the particular contestant 
alone. (Poker players can think of this as two “up” cards and two “down” cards.) The 
                                                     
4
 Values in British pounds can be translated into US dollars using a rate of $1,75 per pound, an approximate 
average of the exchange rate during the period in which the show ran. 
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contestants now have to decide by vote which player will be kicked off the show. Because 
the balls of voted-off contestants are removed from the game and the remaining 
contestants’ balls matter for the ultimate jackpot, there is a strong incentive to retain 
players with high value balls and kick off players with low value balls or killer balls. 
Before the voting starts, each contestant publicly announces the contents of the balls on 
her back row (knowing that these values will subsequently be revealed, but only after the 
vote). Then, the four contestants together have an open discussion in which they can 
voice their evaluation of other players’ statements and their opinion of who should be 
voted off. Each player then anonymously casts a vote against one specific opponent. After 
the votes are tallied, the player who received the most votes leaves the game.5 Lastly, all 
the players reveal the values of their back row balls, and differences between the actual 
values and the previous claims are noted. 
In Round 2, two additional cash balls from the lottery machine and one extra killer ball 
are added to the twelve remaining balls from Round 1. The fifteen balls are then 
randomly allocated to the three contestants. Each of them receives two balls on her front 
row and three on her (hidden) back row. Similar to Round 1, contestants make (cheap 
talk) statements on the balls on their back row, a round of banter follows, votes are cast 
anonymously and tallied, the player who receives the most votes leaves the game, and all 
hidden ball values are revealed.6 Two players and their ten balls proceed to Round 3. 
Round 3 determines the size of the final jackpot. First, one additional killer ball is mixed 
with the ten balls from Round 2. Then five of the balls are selected sequentially at 
random. If a ball selected is a cash ball, its face value is added to the jackpot. If a killer ball 
is drawn, the current cumulative jackpot is divided by ten. For example, if the first two 
                                                     
5
 If two contestants receive two votes each, their opponents openly discuss who they want to keep in the 
show. If they cannot decide, a decision is made at random. If all four contestants receive one vote each, 
contestants openly attempt to form a coalition against one specific contestant. Again, if they cannot decide, 
a decision is made at random. 
6
 The procedure in the case of a tie is similar to that in Round 1. Tie-breaking occurs by discussion or by 
random draw if no agreement is reached. 
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balls were £50,000 and £1,000 and the third is a killer ball, the level of the jackpot is 
reduced from £51,000 to £5,100. A killer ball does not affect the jackpot contribution of 
cash balls drawn thereafter. If the fourth and fifth ball in our example were another killer 
ball and £25,000, respectively, then the actual jackpot would be £25,510. Note that this 
round is a completely stochastic process, and that contestants have full information on 
the balls that are in play. Before the five balls are drawn, special attention is always paid 
to the highest possible jackpot (that is, the sum of the five largest cash values). This value, 
and the number of killer balls, are explicitly stressed by the game show host. 
After Round 3 determined the jackpot, the contestants play a variant of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in the fourth and final round. Each contestant receives two golden balls. One of 
the balls says “split” and the other says “steal” on the inside. The contestants then 
simultaneously have to decide which ball they want to play. If both choose “split”, they 
share the jackpot equally. If one chooses “split” and the other chooses “steal”, the 
contestant who steals takes the whole jackpot and the other gets nothing. If they both 
choose “steal”, both go home empty-handed. Before each contestant makes her actual 
decision, a brief time period is reserved for a discussion between the players in which 
they can make non-binding promises, ask about intentions, or attempt to get assurances 
of cooperative behavior. This is the final round of cheap talk. Importantly, the contestants 
have not met before the game starts, and have no opportunity before or during the show 
to make any kind of collusive agreement. 
A relevant question is how the contestants are selected. A spokeswoman of Endemol 
informed us that anyone can apply to be on “Golden Balls” by submitting a detailed 
application form. Shortlisted contestants are then invited to an audition in order to 
determine their skills at playing the game, their character and their suitability to appear 
on a TV show such as Golden Balls. Producers watch tapings of these auditions and put 
together shows such that, according to the producers, “a good mix of characters” is 
represented on each show. Thus while the contestants are not a random sample of 
society, the selection process does not seem to create any obvious confounds with the 
analyses we conduct here. 
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Data and Descriptive Game Characteristics 
We examine the “split” and “steal” decisions of 574 final contestants appearing in 287 
episodes aired between June 2007 (when the show was introduced) and December 2009. 
During this period, 288 episodes were aired, and, at the time of writing, no further 
episodes were aired thereafter. Recordings from the show and additional information 
such as recording and airing dates were kindly provided by Endemol’s local production 
company Endemol UK. The one missing episode could not be supplied because it was not 
present in their archives.7 
For each episode we collected data on the relevant observables in the show, such as the 
hidden and visible ball values, statements made by contestants, the votes, the jackpot 
size, and the decision to “split” or “steal” at the end. Some variables were estimated 
based on contestants’ physical appearance and on information provided in the 
introductory talk and other conversations during the show. 
Table 2.1 displays some descriptive characteristics of the game. Cash balls drawn from the 
lottery machine during the first two rounds have a mean value of £5,654 and a median of 
£1,500. Clearly, the distribution is positively skewed. The mean value of the cash balls 
taken to Round 3 is £6,775, which is statistically significantly greater than the average 
value of all cash balls in the show, implying that the contestants are successful in using 
their votes to keep high-value balls in play and eliminate small ones. The average number 
of killer balls in the game at the start of Round 3 is 3.14, significantly less than the 3.67 we 
would statistically expect if voting was random. Contestants thus also seem successful in 
eliminating killer balls from the game. Unreported analyses of contestants’ voting 
behavior clearly show that contestants indeed try to vote off the opponents that have the 
worst set of balls on their front row. 
                                                     
7
 Sixteen episodes in our data set feature returning contestants. In twelve of these, players who previously 
had lost in the final (opponents “stole” while they themselves chose to “split”) get a second chance. In four, 
unlucky players who had been voted off in the first game round receive a second chance. We do not find 
that returning contestants behave differently, and, unless stated otherwise hereafter, excluding them from 
our analyses does not materially affect our results. 
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At the start of Round 3, special attention is paid to the highest possible jackpot. 
Dependent on the cash balls and killer balls taken to this stage, this maximum varies 
between £5,000 and £168,100, with a mean of £51,493 and a median of £41,150. The 
actual jackpot for which contestants play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is generally 
considerably smaller due to the skewed distribution of cash ball values and the effect of 
killer balls, but still has a mean size of £13,416 and a median of £4,300. These amounts 
are many times the amounts typically used in laboratory experiments, and also large 
sums relative to the median gross weekly earnings of £397 in the UK in April 2009 (Office 
for National Statistics 2009). About half of the time, the jackpot in our show exceeds 
three months of median UK earnings, and 21 percent of the contestants decide over a 
jackpot that is even larger than a median annual salary (the third quartile in our sample is 
at £18,350). The stakes are also large compared to the two other game shows employed 
in earlier analyses of cooperative behavior: in “Friend or Foe”, the average is about 
$3,500 (List, 2004a, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White, 2010), and for the 
Dutch show, Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven (2010a) report a median of €1,683. The wide 
range of the jackpot in our sample is caused by its random construction, by the highly 
skewed distribution of cash ball values, and by the effect of killer balls. The largest jackpot 
was played for in an exhilarating episode from March 2008; trainee accountant Sarah 
stole the entire jackpot of £100,150 from collection agent Stephen.8 
  
                                                     
8
 A video clip of this episode is widely available on the Internet, for example through YouTube. 
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Table 2.1: Selected Game Show Characteristics 
The table shows selected characteristics for the British TV game show “Golden Balls”, extracted from our 
sample of 287 episodes. Cash ball (overall) is the monetary value of a cash ball drawn from the lottery 
machine in the first or second round of the game. Cash ball (Round 3) is the monetary value of a cash ball 
that is in play at the start of the third round. No. of killer balls (Round 3) describes the number of killer balls 
that are in play at the start of the third round. Potential jackpot (Round 3) is the jackpot size that is attained 
during the third round if the best-case scenario would occur. Jackpot describes the actual size of the 
jackpot. Decision is a contestant’s decision in the Prisoner’s Dilemma at the end of the show, with a value of 
1 for “split” and 0 for “steal”. Prize won (if non-zero) records the take home prize for a contestant who 
made it to the final (if she did not leave empty-handed). All monetary values are in UK Pounds (£1.00 ≈ 
$1.75). 
 
 N Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
Cash ball (overall) 4,018 5,653.92 10,478.49 10.00 1,500.00 75,000.00 
Cash ball (Round 3) 2,257 6,775.15 12,204.39 10.00 1,600.00 75,000.00 
No. of killer balls (Round 3) 287 3.14 0.90 1.00 3.00 6.00 
Potential jackpot (Round 3) 287 51,493.08 31,386.69 5,000.00 41,150.00 168,100.00 
Jackpot 287 13,416.09 19,182.98 2.85 4,300.00 100,150.00 
Decision (split=1) 574 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Prize won 574 4,850.55 11,821.06 0.00 38.75 100,150.00 
Prize won if non-zero 303 9,188.82 15,004.52 1.83 2,175.00 100,150.00 
 
For the jackpot to be awarded, at least one player needs to cooperate. We find that 52.8 
percent of the contestants decide to “split”. While this might seem high, the rate is 
actually remarkably similar to earlier experimental evidence (see, for example, Sally, 
1995). In our sample, both players split the jackpot 31 percent of the time, one splits 
while the other one steals occurs in 44 percent of the shows, and in the remaining 25 
percent of the shows both players steal. The efficiency rate in terms of the percentage of 
jackpots that is actually awarded thus amounts to 75 percent. The efficiency rate 
obtained by dividing the sum of earnings across all episodes by the sum of all jackpots is 
slightly lower at 72 percent. (The difference in efficiency results from contestants’ lower 
propensity to cooperate when the stakes are larger; we explore this effect in detail later.) 
These simple statistics are a first indication that contestants do not condition their 
behavior on that of their opponent. Given the average cooperation rate, we would expect 
to observe (split, split) in 28 percent of the cases and (steal, steal) 22 percent of the time 
if the individual decisions in our sample were randomly matched. Although the actual 
percentages are higher (31 and 25), the differences are relatively small considering that 
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each pair of contestants operates under highly similar conditions (same jackpot, same 
potential jackpot, and many shared unobserved conditions). 
On average, a finalist goes home with £4,851, but the median prize is only £39 because 47 
percent of the contestants get nothing. The 303 contestants who end up with a non-zero 
prize take home £9,189 on average, with a median of £2,175. It is worth noting that 
would we have run this show as an experiment ourselves, the total costs in subject 
payoffs alone would have been £2.8 million. 
Modeling the Decision to “Split” or “Steal” 
In the following sections, we will analyze the decisions to “split” or “steal” the jackpot 
using a binary Probit model. We assume that when people enter the final round they 
have a latent propensity to “split” *y , where ),(* y . Furthermore, we assume that 
this latent propensity is a linear function of personal demographic characteristics x  and 
context characteristics z , in the form uzxy   ''* , where   and   are parameter 
vectors and u  represents an unobserved stochastic component. We do not observe the 
latent propensity to “split” directly, but only the actual decision y , where 1y  if a 
contestant chooses “split” and 0y  if a contestant chooses “steal”. We impose the 
observation criterion )0*(  yy 1 , where (.)1  is the indicator function taking the value 
of 1 if 0*y  and 0 otherwise. Assuming that the stochastic component has a standard 
normal distribution, or )1,0(~ Nu , leads to the binary Probit model of the form 
)''(),|1Pr(  zxzxy  , where (.)  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. Using this framework we estimate the parameter vectors   and   using 
maximum likelihood estimation. We allow for the possibility that the decisions of 
contestants within the same episode are correlated by performing a clustering correction 
on the standard errors (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2003). 
Because coefficients in a Probit model do not have an immediate intuitive economic 
meaning due to the inherent nonlinearities, we will follow the common approach of 
reporting marginal effects instead. More specifically, the marginal effects we report apply 
to the medians of the explanatory variables, with two exceptions. To highlight some of 
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the interaction effects that we find in our data, we set Age to be 20 and Transmissions 
(the number of times the show has aired at the time of recording) to be 0. The resulting 
“representative agent” is a 20 year old white female without higher education, who lives 
in a relatively small town and plays the final of our game for a jackpot of £4,300, which 
potentially could have been £41,150. For dummy variables we consider the effect of a 
discrete change from 0 to 1. As noted by Ai and Norton (2003), the traditional way of 
calculating marginal effects and their standard errors is not valid for interaction terms, 
and we therefore apply the alternative method they propose. For the sake of consistency, 
we report significance levels that apply to the marginal effects, though these levels do not 
differ materially from the significance levels for the original regression coefficients. 
Original coefficients and their significance levels are available from the authors upon 
request. 
2.3 Demographic Characteristics 
First, we investigate how various demographic characteristics are related to the 
propensity to cooperate. Our later analyses include these demographic variables as 
control variables. 
In previous studies examining the relations between demographic characteristics and 
cooperative behavior, most attention has been directed to gender. Psychologists have a 
long history when it comes to investigating the relation between gender and behavior, 
and, over the past decade, economists have become increasingly interested in gender 
effects as well. The standard finding is that women act more pro-socially than males, but 
the reverse is also found.9 For contextual settings similar to ours, List (2004a, 2006), 
Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White (2010) and Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven (2010a) 
                                                     
9
 One possible cause for the varying results is that males and females respond differently to specific 
contextual settings of the experiments (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). For example, if women are more risk 
averse than men, this may lead to different social behavior in situations in which risk is involved (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008). 
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report that women are more cooperative than men, although some results are only 
marginally significant. 
For other demographic characteristics, the experimental findings are also mixed. 
Carpenter, Daniere and Takahashi (2004), for example, run public good experiments with 
symbolic but costly punishment in Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City. They find that in 
Bangkok males and higher educated subjects contribute more, while there is no 
significant age effect. The same experiment in Ho Chi Minh City, however, shows the 
opposite findings: males and higher educated subjects cooperate less and age increases 
cooperation. Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni (2004) find no influence of background 
characteristics in a one-shot public good experiment with Russian subjects. 
In order to add to this literature we will explore the effect of various demographic 
characteristics on cooperative behavior. We employ the following set of variables: 
- “Gender” is a dummy variable indicating whether a contestant is male (1) or female 
(0). 
- “Age” is a continuous variable measuring the contestant’s age in years. In many 
instances the contestant’s age is not explicitly mentioned during the show. In these 
cases we estimate age on the basis of physical appearance and other helpful 
information such as the age of children. 
- “Race” is a dummy variable indicating whether a contestant is white (1) or non-white 
(0). We apply such a broad distinction because the large majority of contestants are 
white. 
- “City” and “London” are two dummy variables that are constructed in order to 
distinguish contestants that live in major urban areas from those that reside in more 
rural surroundings. Contestants’ city or county of residence is always an integral part 
of the introductory talk. City indicates whether a contestant lives in a large urban 
area (1) or not (0). We define a large urban area as a conurbation with a population 
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exceeding 250,000 inhabitants.10 For some contestants we only know their region 
and not their exact town or city; we then assume a small domicile. London indicates 
whether a contestant lives inside (1) or outside (0) the Greater London Urban Area. 
- “Education” is a dummy variable for the level of education and differentiates 
between those with at least a bachelor degree (1) and those without (0). Players 
generally do not talk about their education during the show. We therefore estimate a 
contestant’s level of education on the basis of her occupation, which is always 
explicitly mentioned when she is introduced, and on the basis of other information 
given in talks. Contestants who are currently enrolled in higher education and people 
whose job title suggests work experience equivalent to the bachelor level or higher 
are included in the higher education category. From the information that we have 
about each contestant, the proper binary values are generally clear. 
- “Student” is a dummy variable indicating whether the contestant currently is a higher 
education (undergraduate or postgraduate) student (1) or not (0). 
Estimates for Age and Education are based on the independent judgments of three 
research assistants, where each value is based on the assessments of two of them. When 
the estimates for Education were different, we decided on the most appropriate value 
ourselves. For Age we took the mean of the two judgments, and included our own 
assessment as a third input if the values of the coders diverged more than five years. 
We have also attempted to collect data on contestants’ marital status and the existence 
of children. These topics were, however, not systematically discussed in the program and 
values would therefore be unknown for the large majority of our contestants. Table 2.2 
summarizes all the variables that are included in our analyses, including the demographic 
characteristics.  
                                                     
10
 For England and Wales, the population data and the definitions of conurbations are taken from the UK 
Office for National Statistics (www.statistics.gov.uk). Similar information for Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Ireland is from the General Register Office for Scotland (www.gro-scotland.gov.uk), the Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency (www.nisra.gov.uk) and the Central Statistics Office Ireland (www.cso.ie), 
respectively. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in our analyses of cooperative behavior 
based on the decisions of 574 contestants to either “split” or “steal” the jackpot in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
at the end of the British TV game show “Golden Balls”. Age is the contestant’s age measured in years. 
Gender, Race, City, London, Education and Student are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the 
contestant is male (Gender), is white (Race), lives in a conurbation with a population exceeding 250,000 
inhabitants (City), is a resident of the Greater London Urban Area (London), has completed or is enrolled in 
higher education (bachelor degree or higher) or has equivalent working experience (Education), or is a 
student (Student), respectively. Actual stakes is the natural logarithm of the size of the jackpot in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Potential stakes is the natural logarithm of the highest possible jackpot at the 
start of the third round. Transmissions expresses the number of episodes that was already aired when the 
current episode was recorded in the studio. Vote received from opp. is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the contestant’s final opponent has tried to vote her off the program at an earlier stage of the game. 
Promise is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant explicitly promised her opponent to 
“split” (or not to “steal”) the jackpot. Lie Round 1 (Round 2) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
contestant has misrepresented her back row balls – either by overstating a cash ball or by hiding a killer ball 
– in the first (second) round. Lie cash (killer) ball Round 1 (Round 2) is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if the contestant has overstated a cash ball (hidden a killer ball) in the first (second) round. Standard 
deviations for the two stakes variables and the transmissions variable are calculated across episodes (N = 
287) to avoid the effect of clusters at the episode level. All monetary values are in UK Pounds (£1.00 ≈ 
$1.75). 
 
 Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
Demographic Characteristics      
  Age 36.78 11.76 18.00 34.40 73.00 
  Gender (male=1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Race (white=1) 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  City (large=1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  London (London=1) 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Education (high=1) 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Student (student=1) 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 
      
Stakes and Context      
  Actual stakes (log) 8.19 2.08 1.05 8.37 11.51 
  Potential stakes (log) 10.68 0.60 8.52 10.62 12.03 
  Transmissions 111.68 74.18 0.00 109.00 214.00 
      
Reciprocal Preferences      
  Vote received from opp. (yes=1) 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 
      
Expectational Conditional Cooperation      
  Promise (promise=1) 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
      
Past Deceitful Behavior      
  Lie Round 1 (lie=1) 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Lie Round 2 (lie=1) 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Lie cash ball Round 1 (lie=1) 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Lie cash ball Round 2 (lie=1) 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Lie killer ball Round 1 (lie=1) 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Lie killer ball Round 2 (lie=1) 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2.3: Binary Probit Regression Results [1/2] 
The table displays results from the Probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to “split” (1) or 
“steal” (0) the jackpot in the Prisoner’s Dilemma at the end of the British TV game show “Golden Balls”. 
First (Second) half is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if less (more) than 50 percent of the episodes in 
our sample were already aired when the current episode was recorded in the studio. Definitions of other 
variables are as in Table 2.2. For each explanatory variable, the marginal effect is shown for a 
representative agent who takes the median value on all variables, except for Age and Transmissions, which 
are set to 20 and 0, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the episode level, p-values 
are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 
           
Demographic Characteristics           
  Age 0.002 (0.422) 0.002 (0.345) 0.003 (0.311) 0.002 (0.352) 0.002 (0.403) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.221 (0.002) -0.241 (0.000) -0.233 (0.001) -0.236 (0.001) -0.233 (0.001) 
  Race (white=1) 0.134 (0.101) 0.143 (0.082) 0.139 (0.091) 0.142 (0.089) 0.149 (0.065) 
  City (large=1) -0.039 (0.396) -0.043 (0.359) -0.045 (0.335) -0.039 (0.405) -0.036 (0.439) 
  London (London=1) 0.059 (0.402) 0.066 (0.348) 0.059 (0.400) 0.054 (0.444) 0.058 (0.406) 
  Education (high=1) 0.088 (0.062) 0.093 (0.053) 0.094 (0.050) 0.094 (0.049) 0.091 (0.058) 
  Student (student=1) 0.012 (0.888) -0.002 (0.983) -0.008 (0.923) -0.013 (0.884) -0.007 (0.933) 
  Age x Gender 0.011 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 0.011 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 
           
Stakes and Context           
  Actual stakes (log)   -0.043 (0.000) -0.048 (0.000) -0.049 (0.000) -0.048 (0.000) 
  Potential stakes (log)     0.057 (0.139) 0.174 (0.006)   
  Transmissions       -0.000 (0.722)   
  Potential stakes x Transmissions       -0.001 (0.037)   
  Second half (second=1)         0.030 (0.508) 
  Potential stakes x First half         0.139 (0.005) 
  Potential stakes x Second half         -0.035 (0.543) 
           
Wald chi
2
 (df) 34.87(8) 51.61(9) 52.57(10) 57.87(12) 62.35(12) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -379.78 -371.55 -370.42 -368.29 -367.51 
McFadden R
2
 0.043 0.064 0.067 0.072 0.074 
N 574 574 574 574 574 
Number of clusters 287 287 287 287 287 
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Figure 2.1: Age and the Propensity to Cooperate for Males and Females 
The figure displays the relative frequency of contestants who decide to “split” across various 
age intervals. Bars depict the percentage of cooperators within specific age brackets for 
males, females and the aggregate, respectively. For each category, the number of contestants 
is displayed at the bottom of the bar. 
 
Table 2.3, Model 2.1 shows the regression results for a model that includes demographic 
characteristics only. To be able to distinguish both general gender and age effects as well 
as a possible interaction effect, the interaction of gender and age is also included. The 
results show that, relative to our representative 20 year-old female agent, young males 
are 22 percentage points less likely to cooperate (p = 0.002). In line with past results by 
List (2004a) and Carpenter, Connolly and Myers (2008), this difference disappears when 
age increases. The effect of age is significantly different for males and females (p = 0.001). 
Women do not become significantly more or less cooperative when age increases 
(p = 0.422). Men, on the other hand, do have a higher propensity to cooperate as they are 
51  44  95 45  52 97 79 117 196 94  92 186 
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older: their cooperation rate increases by more than one percentage point per year 
(p = 0.000; untabulated). 11 Contrary to the two previous studies, we find that the gender 
difference not only disappears as age increases, but actually reverses; males become 
significantly more likely to “split” from age 46 onwards. Figure 2.1 displays observed 
cooperation rates at different age levels for males, females and aggregates, clearly 
depicting an age effect for men. Further analyses show that there is no evidence of a 
quadratic age effect, neither for men nor for women. We have also experimented with 
specifications where the (semi-) continuous age variable is replaced by a set of dummy 
variables that represent various age groups. The results are economically and statistically 
similar. 
When it comes to race we find weak evidence that whites are more likely (about 13 
percentage points) to cooperate than non-whites (p = 0.101; p < 0.10 in the models 
discussed hereafter). List (2004a, 2006) and Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White (2010) 
report a similar pattern, yet in more conventional experiments the reverse is often found 
(see, for example, Cox, Lobel and McLeod, 1991). Since possible but unobservable wealth 
effects could contribute to this result, it should be interpreted with caution.  
Higher educated contestants are about 9 percentage points more cooperative (p = 0.062), 
although this effect is only marginally significant in the current model and not 
consistently significant across the various regression models discussed hereafter (0.041 < 
p < 0.070). Similar to the effect of race, the effect of education could be spurious due to 
an unobservable wealth effect. 
Students are frequently used as subjects in experiments, and the reliance on such a 
specific subject pool is often criticized. Sears (1986), for example, extensively describes 
how the use of student subjects might produce misleading or mistaken conclusions about 
social behavior. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether there is evidence that 
                                                     
11
 The effect of age for males could be related to increasing dependence on others (van Lange et al., 1997), 
or to hormonal or neurological changes as men grow older, but we are hesitant to draw conclusions in 
these directions for we cannot exclude that a generational effect (van Lange et al., 1997; List, 2004) or a 
wealth effect is (partly) driving our finding. 
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students behave differently from others, holding other observable characteristics 
constant. This turns out not to be the case. Controlling for demographics such as age and 
education, our regression results yield no indications of a different attitude toward 
cooperation among students (p = 0.888).12 
None of the residence dummy variables have a significant effect. Possibly, relatively small 
social differences between urban and more rural areas in the UK explain this null result.13 
2.4 Stakes and Context 
Economists typically argue that behavior will converge toward the prediction of rational 
self-interest if the stakes increase (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Telser, 1995; Levitt and List, 2007a). 
The evidence from lab and field experiments is, however, not generally supportive of this 
view. Except for the finding that people seem to become more willing to accept relatively 
low offers in ultimatum bargaining games when the stakes are high, empirical research 
generally finds no evidence that stake size affects behavior, even when the stakes are 
increased up to several months’ wages.14 
Given that the stakes in “Golden Balls” are widely ranging, and, on average, considerably 
larger than in previous studies, the show provides an excellent opportunity to re-examine 
the relation between cooperation and stakes. In addition, compared to earlier game-
show studies on cooperation, an advantage of “Golden Balls” is that the stakes are mainly 
built up by a random process and not by contestants’ answers to trivia questions. The 
                                                     
12
 In a similar vein, van Lange et al. (1997) and Bellemare and Kröger (2007) do not detect a difference, 
whereas Carpenter, Connolly and Myers (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) do report a negative bias. 
13
 In experiments conducted in a region of Russia where there is a large gap, Gächter and Herrmann (2011) 
do find that rural residents are more cooperative than urban residents. 
14
 See, for example, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996a), Slonim and Roth (1998), Cameron (1999), List and 
Cherry (2000, 2008), Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva (2013), Munier and Zaharia (2002), Carpenter, 
Verhoogen and Burks (2005), Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud and Martinsson (2005), and Kocher, 
Martinsson and Visser (2008). For TV game show data, List (2004, 2006) and Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel 
and White (2010) also find that cooperative behavior is practically invariant to the stakes. Belot, Bhaskar 
and van de Ven (2010a) report some counter-intuitive evidence that cooperation actually increases with 
stakes. 
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latter may lead to a spurious correlation because the ability to answer trivia questions 
may be related to unobserved background characteristics such as income, which in turn 
may well be related to the propensity to cooperate. 
The variable that we use in our regressions is labeled “Actual stakes” and defined as the 
natural logarithm of the size of the jackpot. 
Model 2.2 in Table 2.3 displays the regression results when the stakes are included. 
Clearly, cooperative behavior in our show is sensitive to the amount that is at stake. To 
illustrate this effect, Figure 2.2 depicts the actual and estimated cooperation rates for 
different stake levels. The fitted line based on our full regression model (Model 2.6 
presented later on) appears to capture the pattern rather well. Cooperation is high when 
the stakes are relatively small: for amounts up to £500, people on average cooperate 73.4 
percent of the time. The rate drops to approximately 45 percent as the stakes increase 
and remains relatively stable for the largest amounts. An unreported test shows that we 
cannot reject that the relation becomes essentially flat for stakes larger than £1,500. 
While the absolute level of the stakes thus appears to have some influence on the 
propensity to cooperate, behavioral research suggests that people do not always evaluate 
prospects just in absolute terms, but rather they sometimes use relative comparisons to 
determine subjective values. This way, what comprises the context can strongly influence 
choices (Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade, 1999). In choice tasks, for example, one can 
increase the likelihood that a given option is chosen by adding an alternative to the 
choice set that is dominated by the given option but not by the other alternatives 
available (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982). Also, as a consequence of the use of relative 
judgments, seemingly irrelevant anchors can influence how people value goods of various 
kinds (Green et al., 1998; Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003; Simonson and Drolet, 
2004) and even (risky) monetary prospects (Johnson and Schkade, 1989). 
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Figure 2.2: Stakes and the Propensity to Cooperate  
The figure displays the relative frequency of contestants who decide to “split” across various 
stake intervals. Tick mark values represent the endpoints of the intervals. Each bar depicts the 
percentage of cooperators within a specific stake bracket. The dashed line reflects the 
average cooperation rate across our full sample, while the solid line connects the average 
estimate of the propensity to cooperate for each stake bracket. The estimates are computed 
using our “full model”, which is Model 2.6 in Table 2.4. For each interval, the number of 
contestants is displayed at the bottom of the bar. 
 
For our purposes, the question of interest is whether the game show influences the 
contestants’ perceptions of what constitutes “serious money”. Suppose that some 
contestants decide that for “serious” money they are willing to bear the reputational 
costs, if any, of defecting on national TV, but if the stakes are small, so-called “peanuts”, 
then they will just cooperate to look good. In this scenario, we would observe the pattern 
of cooperation in our data: high cooperation rates for low stakes and lower cooperation 
for high stakes. The interesting point, however, is that the “small” stakes on this show, 
several hundred Pounds, are quite large relative to most experiments. Even when the 
contestants are playing for what seems to be peanuts, these are big peanuts indeed. 
 36 36 22 28 46 38 22 66 58 48 42 38 56 38 
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In “Deal or No Deal”, another game show that has even larger stakes than Golden Balls, 
Post et al. (2008) also find strong evidence of such a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Namely, 
when unlucky contestants faced decisions near the end of the show that were “merely” 
for thousands of euros, they displayed little or no risk aversion. In fact, some of their 
contestants made risk-seeking choices in such situations. The authors provide further 
evidence for this behavior in classroom experiments designed to mimic the show at two 
levels of stakes, call them “low” and “medium”. In the low stakes treatment the average 
prize was €40 with a maximum of €500, while in their medium stakes treatment the 
average prize was €400 with a maximum of €5,000. While risk aversion increased with 
stakes within each treatment, such an effect was not found across treatments: despite 
the very different money amounts, risky choices were similar for the low and medium 
stakes session. Choices in both conditions were even remarkably similar to those made in 
the actual TV show, despite the huge stakes used there (average €400,000, maximum 
€5,000,000). 
These results suggest that a context can convert a sum of money that would normally be 
considered consequential into perceived peanuts. In the “Golden Balls” scenario, earlier 
expectations about the jackpot size or a specific value from the game might operate as an 
anchor or reference value by which the actual size of the jackpot is evaluated.15 The most 
obvious benchmark contestants may use seems to be the maximum possible jackpot at 
the beginning of Round 3. Though the expected jackpot size might be an alternative 
candidate, it is neither salient nor easily calculated. In fact, even a rough assessment is 
rather complicated, particularly because of the influence of killer balls. The maximum 
potential jackpot, however, is always visually displayed and explicitly stressed by the 
game show host. 
In order to test for such an effect, we include the variable “Potential stakes” in our 
analyses, defined as the highest possible jackpot at the start of Round 3. As with the 
                                                     
15
 We intentionally do not use the term “reference point” in order to avoid associations with prospect 
theory here, since we are hesitant to translate the elements of prospect theory to preferences in this game 
and to derive testable predictions. 
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actual stakes, we take the natural logarithm. Not surprisingly, the actual and the potential 
stakes variable are significantly correlated, but due to the effect of killer balls and the 
skewed distribution of cash balls the degree is rather limited; the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is ρ = 0.30. 
Model 2.3 shows the new results. The positive sign of the potential stakes coefficient is in 
line with what we would expect, but the effect is statistically insignificant for the entire 
sample (p = 0.139). Interestingly, the effect becomes marginally significant if we exclude 
the (returning) contestants who already appeared in a previous episode of the show 
(p = 0.066; untabulated). This gives rise to the idea that the anchoring effect of the 
potential jackpot may decrease over time as contestants become more familiar with the 
show by watching it on TV. Prior shows will give contestants an impression of expected 
payoffs, which may help them to evaluate whether the stakes they face themselves are 
high or low in the context of the game and reduce the role of an episode-specific 
reference value such as the maximum possible jackpot size. 
We explore the effect of experience by testing whether the effect of the potential jackpot 
changes as contestants have watched more episodes on TV. As a (noisy) proxy for how 
many shows a contestant has watched, we define the variable “Transmissions” as the 
number of different episodes broadcast on TV prior to the studio recording of the current 
episode. Model 2.4 in Table 2.3 displays the results. There is no significant main effect of 
this variable (p = 0.722), indicating that there is no evidence of a trend in the cooperation 
rate over time. However, the interaction effect of the number of transmissions and the 
potential stakes is significantly negative (p = 0.037), and implies that the anchoring effect 
of the maximum possible jackpot decreases by 0.10 percentage point for each previously 
aired episode. Controlling for this interaction effect, the effect of the maximum potential 
jackpot is highly significant in the early episodes (p = 0.006), where doubling the 
maximum potential jackpot increases cooperation by more than 12 percentage points.16 
                                                     
16
 Because the potential stakes and the actual stakes are correlated, the interaction of Potential stakes and 
Transmissions might pick up an effect of the interaction of Actual stakes and Transmissions. As a robustness 
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The pattern of a pronounced effect of the potential jackpot size in the earlier but not in 
the later shows also becomes apparent if we include dummy variables that subdivide our 
sample. Model 2.5, for example, uses a natural subdivision and employs a dummy 
variable for the first 149 episodes (0-112 transmissions prior to the recordings) and for 
the remaining 138 (149-214 prior transmissions). Clearly, the effect is significant across 
the first half our data (p = 0.005) and insignificant thereafter (p = 0.543). 
2.5 Reciprocal Preferences 
Reciprocity refers to a tendency to repay kindness with kindness and unkindness with 
unkindness. Reciprocal behavior in the field is generally embedded in long term social 
interaction, and reputation concerns therefore form a plausible explanation for virtually 
all instances where people reciprocate (Sobel, 2005). Reciprocal actions can sometimes 
also be explained by preferences over outcome distributions, most notably by a desire for 
equity or equality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Interestingly, 
laboratory experiments in which such motivations are controlled for have convincingly 
demonstrated that people also have a real intrinsic preference for reciprocity.17 
“Golden Balls” provides a neat opportunity to investigate the presence of reciprocal 
preferences outside of the laboratory and for substantial stakes. In particular, in the first 
two rounds contestants cast votes to determine who has to leave the show. Each vote 
carries a significant weight due to the small number of contestants, and voting against 
somebody can be viewed as unkind, particularly when the other votes were cast against 
other players. If people indeed have reciprocal preferences, we would expect that a 
                                                                                                                                                                
check, we have therefore also added the latter to Model 4. The effect of this additional control variable is 
insignificant (p = 0.573; untabulated), confirming our interpretation. 
17
 See, for example, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Blount (1995), Brandts and Solà (2001), Kagel 
and Wolfe (2001), McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003), Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox (2002, 2004), Falk, 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, 2008), Offerman (2002), Charness (2004), de Quervain et al. (2004). For 
theoretical accounts, see, for example, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2010). 
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contestant who makes it to the final in spite of her opponent’s vote against her, has a 
lower propensity to cooperate.18 
Although the voting is anonymous, it is often straightforward to deduce who has voted 
against whom. If a contestant in Round 1 (Round 2) receives three (two) votes it is 
obvious that all others have voted against her and that she herself has voted against the 
contestant who received one vote. For the other possible distributions of votes, we can 
usually deduce the individual votes from the banter preceding the vote, or, in the case of 
a tie, from the discussion following the vote. In the banter leading up to a vote, 
contestants generally make abundantly clear whom they intend to vote against (possibly 
out of an attempt to coordinate voting with other contestants). In the case of a tie, 
contestants openly discuss whom they want to leave the program; if it was not already 
clear from the banter whom they had originally voted against, this post-vote discussion 
generally makes it apparent. This procedure allows us to determine a contestant’s vote 
95 percent of the time. For various reasons it is much more difficult to determine clear 
instances of someone going out of their way to be nice to another player, so we limit our 
analysis to negative rather than positive reciprocity. 
Based on the voting information, we create a dummy variable entitled “Vote received 
from opponent”, taking the value of one if a contestant received a vote from her final 
opponent and zero otherwise. If we could not establish whether a contestant received a 
vote from her final opponent, she is assigned the value of zero as well (exclusion of these 
cases does not change our results). Since contestants who receive votes often do not 
make it to the next round, relatively few contestants qualify: as displayed in Table 2.2, 5 
percent (28 subjects) of the final-round contestants received a vote from their opponent. 
Model 2.6 in Table 2.4 includes the new dummy variable. In line with the idea that people 
have reciprocal preferences, the likelihood of a contestant to cooperate with her final 
                                                     
18
 Studying voting patterns in the internationally successful TV game show “The Weakest Link”, both Levitt 
(2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2005) find evidence that people reciprocate against people 
who voted against them in past rounds. However, because players in this show have an incentive to vote off 
players that are more likely to vote against them, they cannot rule out that this strategic concern drives the 
effect. 
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opponent plummets by approximately 21 percentage points if this opponent has voted 
against her earlier in the game (p = 0.019). There are, however, three alternative 
explanations for such a behavioral pattern that are unrelated to a genuine preference for 
reciprocity. Although we cannot rule out that these alternative explanations explain part 
of the effect, they do not appear particularly strong. 
First, the causality may not run from receiving a vote to cooperativeness, but the other 
way around, players voting against contestants with a less cooperative disposition. This 
would imply that cooperation is also related to the number of votes received from other 
players, which appears not to be the case (p = 0.231; untabulated). 
Second, a contestant may like to match her opponent’s choice for reasons other than 
reciprocal concerns, and interpret the earlier vote against her as a signal that her 
opponent dislikes her and will not cooperate. However, her interpretation would 
generally not be legitimate: players do not cooperate less with someone they voted 
against (p = 0.403; untabulated). Moreover, the next section finds little support for such 
expectational conditional cooperation. 
Last, a contestant’s lower propensity to cooperate with someone who voted against her 
may be out of reputation concerns (“I am not to be messed with”) instead of an intrinsic 
preference for reciprocity. However, when asked to explain their choice after the final 
decisions, contestants never use this costless opportunity to strengthen their message 
and point to their reciprocal nature. 
2.6 Expectational Conditional Cooperation 
There is considerable evidence that many people have a preference for conditional 
cooperation, defined as the desire to match the cooperation of others. In laboratory and 
field experiments, about half of the subjects are more willing to cooperate if others do so 
as well (e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). Conditional 
cooperation can arise from reciprocal preferences, but also for other reasons. Social 
norms or a desire for conformity might account for it, and, especially in the laboratory, 
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egalitarian motives can often explain conditional cooperative behavior because equality 
in payoffs generally only arises if players coordinate on their level of cooperation, as is 
also the case in our show. 
Experimental studies typically investigate conditional cooperation in settings where 
subjects have the possibility to condition their behavior directly on the behavior of 
others. In everyday life, such clear-cut conditioning is usually not possible, especially in 
one-shot situations. Conditional cooperation then has to be based on expectations about 
the behavior of others, and the degree of coordination would depend on the predictive 
power of available information and on whether and how this information is interpreted. A 
natural question is whether conditional cooperation can be observed when the 
conditioning is only on an expectation of cooperation rather than on actual cooperation. 
In “Golden Balls” it is not possible for a contestant to condition directly on her opponent’s 
behavior since the two are playing a simultaneous move game. However, we can 
investigate whether contestants condition their behavior on factors that form reliable 
predictors of their opponent’s behavior. That is, we can investigate the joint hypothesis 
that players make rational forecasts of their opponent’s behavior and then condition their 
behavior on those expectations. 
The first step in such an analysis is determining the factors that a contestant could use to 
form an expectation about their opponent’s likelihood of cooperation. One such factor is 
whether an opponent made a promise to “split”. While the literature on conditional 
cooperation is rather recent, literature investigating the role of communication and, 
especially, promises in social dilemma situations already pointed towards tendencies of 
conditional cooperation. In a meta-analysis of Prisoner-Dilemma experiments, Sally 
(1995), for example, finds that cooperation occurs more often when the other player 
makes an explicit though non-binding promise that she will cooperate. The combination 
of a preference for conditional cooperation and a reluctance to lie (e.g., Charness and 
Dufwenberg, 2005, 2006; Gneezy, 2005) can explain why promises have such an effect: 
people like to cooperate if others do, and a promise is a reliable signal of others’ behavior 
if they have a reluctance to lie. 
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Table 2.4: Binary Probit Regression Results [2/2] 
The table displays results from the Probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to “split” (1) or 
“steal” (0) the jackpot in the Prisoner’s Dilemma at the end of the British TV game show “Golden Balls”. The 
opponent variables measure the demographic characteristics of the contestant’s opponent and are defined 
similar to the contestant’s own demographic variables. Other definitions are as in previous tables. 
 
 Model 2.6 Model 2.7 Model 2.8 Model 2.9 Model 2.10 
  Age 0.002 (0.387) 0.003 (0.283) 0.002 (0.457) 0.002 (0.372) 0.002 (0.355) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.249 (0.001) -0.292 (0.000) -0.258 (0.001) -0.252 (0.001) -0.247 (0.001) 
  Race (white=1) 0.149 (0.079) 0.162 (0.077) 0.146 (0.078) 0.147 (0.089) 0.148 (0.083) 
  City (large=1) -0.034 (0.467) -0.027 (0.552) -0.035 (0.463) -0.034 (0.463) -0.037 (0.433) 
  London (London=1) 0.041 (0.565) 0.039 (0.540) 0.050 (0.501) 0.042 (0.551) 0.037 (0.597) 
  Education (high=1) 0.088 (0.068) 0.089 (0.041) 0.089 (0.067) 0.089 (0.065) 0.089 (0.066) 
  Student (student=1) 0.001 (0.988) -0.025 (0.768) 0.008 (0.924) -0.002 (0.983) 0.001 (0.988) 
  Age x Gender 0.011 (0.000) 0.008 (0.010) 0.010 (0.009) 0.011 (0.001) 0.011 (0.001) 
  Actual stakes (log) -0.050 (0.000) -0.054 (0.000) -0.052 (0.000) -0.051 (0.000) -0.052 (0.000) 
  Potential stakes (log) 0.183 (0.004) 0.174 (0.004) 0.170 (0.006) 0.180 (0.004) 0.186 (0.004) 
  Transmissions -0.000 (0.660) -0.000 (0.106) -0.000 (0.608) -0.000 (0.584) -0.000 (0.497) 
  Potential stakes x Transmissions -0.001 (0.026) -0.001 (0.022) -0.001 (0.030) -0.001 (0.025) -0.001 (0.029) 
           
Reciprocal Preferences           
  Vote received from opp. (yes=1) -0.215 (0.019) -0.237 (0.015) -0.202 (0.020) -0.214 (0.026) -0.216 (0.025) 
           
Exp. Conditional Cooperation           
  Promise (promise=1)   0.311 (0.000)       
  Promise opp. (promise=1)   -0.080 (0.053)       
  Age opp.     0.001 (0.732)     
  Gender opp. (male=1)     -0.118 (0.140)     
  Race opp. (white=1)     -0.026 (0.775)     
  City opp. (large=1)     0.051 (0.288)     
  London opp. (London=1)     0.027 (0.713)     
  Education opp. (high=1)     0.116 (0.017)     
  Student opp. (student=1)     0.069 (0.442)     
  Age opp. x Gender opp.     0.004 (0.279)     
           
Past Deceitful Behavior           
  Lie Round 1 opp. (lie=1)       -0.013 (0.782)   
  Lie Round 2 opp. (lie=1)       -0.027 (0.578)   
  Lie cash ball Round 1 opp. (lie=1)        0.037 (0.491) 
  Lie cash ball Round 2 opp. (lie=1)        -0.064 (0.295) 
  Lie killer ball Round 1 opp. (lie=1)        -0.055 (0.330) 
  Lie killer ball Round 2 opp. (lie=1)        0.007 (0.894) 
           
Wald chi
2
 (df) 59.65(13) 98.03(15) 62.40(21) 59.19(15) 62.72(17) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -365.86 -343.31 -359.26 -365.64 -364.52 
McFadden R
2
 0.078 0.135 0.095 0.079 0.082 
N 574 574 574 574 574 
Number of clusters 287 287 287 287 287 
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In the conversation prior to the decision to either “split” or “steal”, many contestants 
explicitly promise to “split” or otherwise make a definitive statement of their intention to 
do so. Based on the statements made in this small talk, we create a dummy variable 
labeled “Promise”, indicating whether the contestant made an explicit, unambiguous 
promise or announcement that she will choose “split” (1) or not (0).19 As shown in Table 
2.2, about half (53 percent) of the contestants make such a promise. We investigate both 
whether observing a promise is predictive of the cooperative behavior of the contestant 
making the promise, and whether a contestant conditions her behavior on whether or 
not her opponent made a promise. 
As shown in Table 2.4, Model 2.7, a player’s promise is a highly significant predictor of her 
propensity to cooperate (p = 0.000). Those who make a promise are about 31 percentage 
points more likely to cooperate. In fact, an explicit promise is the single most reliable 
predictor of whether someone will cooperate.20 
While a promise is a strong signal of cooperation, contestants whose opponent made a 
promise do not have a higher propensity to choose split. In fact, as Model 2.7 also shows, 
if an opponent promises to be cooperative, the other player even displays a marginally 
significant decrease in the likelihood of choosing “split”. Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven 
(2010a) obtain a similar result. 
An explicit promise is the strongest predictor of cooperation, but, as we have previously 
shown, there are also demographic factors that a contestant could use to forecast 
cooperation. For example, we have seen that young males cooperate less than young 
females. However, inferences from this sort of analysis have to be tentative since there 
                                                     
19
 If a contestant responds affirmative to a question whether she will choose “split” or if she announces that 
she will not choose “steal”, Promise takes the value of one as well. The value is zero in all other cases, 
including when people give the impression that they plan to split but do not explicitly express themselves as 
such, when they just refer to earlier intentions (for example, “I came here to split”), when they confine 
themselves to statements like “you can trust me” and “I will not let you down”, and when they only express 
their preference for a coordinated outcome (“I want us to split”; “I do not want both of us to go home 
empty-handed”). 
20
 Of course, we do not interpret the promise as causing the cooperation. The direction of the causation 
could go the other way. 
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could be an additional confound if opponents have a taste for cooperating with someone 
with particular demographic characteristics. 
As Table 2.4, Model 2.8 shows, we find little evidence that contestants condition their 
behavior on their opponents’ background characteristics. The only weak evidence for 
conditional cooperation is that people cooperate significantly more frequently with 
higher educated opponents (p = 0.017), but education is not a very strong predictor of 
behavior. If we assess the joint significance of the various opponent background 
characteristics, we also find that they collectively do not have a significant effect on 
cooperation.21 Analyzing the show “Friend or Foe?”, Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and 
White (2010) find no conditioning on opponent background characteristics in the first 
season, but they do find it in later seasons. They interpret this as conditional cooperation 
on the basis of learned expectations. We too have investigated whether conditioning 
arises as more episodes were transmitted, but we find no indication for such an effect. 
As an alternative to the two models discussed above, we also examined a two-step 
approach. We first estimated each opponent’s propensity to cooperate given her 
background characteristics and promise behavior, and then added the estimated 
propensity of opponents as an explanatory variable to our regression model. Again, we 
found no indication of conditionally cooperative behavior. 
In summary, we find no evidence of expectational conditional cooperation. Apparently, 
either players cannot or do not forecast the behavior of their opponents, or they do not 
have conditionally cooperative preferences. Our evidence for reciprocal preferences in 
the previous section hints that it is the former rather than the latter interpretation that 
underlies this result. 
Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven (2010b) also provide evidence that predicting one’s 
opponent’s behavior is difficult. They had subjects watch clips from the Dutch 
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 We also looked at more complex mechanisms related to the similarity of the contestant’s own 
background characteristics and those of her opponent, such as whether people cooperate more with those 
who are more similar to them (“social-distance” effects). In our data, there is no evidence of such behavior. 
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counterpart to “Golden Balls” and asked them to assess the likelihood of each 
contestant’s cooperation. While the estimated likelihood for cooperators was significantly 
higher than for defectors, the difference was only seven percentage points. 
2.7 Past Deceitful Behavior 
In this section, we investigate whether lies influence opponents’ willingness to cooperate. 
In the early rounds of the show, contestants have numerous opportunities to lie about 
the values on their hidden balls, lies that are quickly revealed to everyone. These lies can 
be consequential. If someone hides low value and killer balls and in so doing manages to 
remain in the game, she will have reduced the potential payoff to the remaining 
contestants. 
In the final, contestants might be less likely to cooperate with opponents who have lied, 
either out of reciprocal concerns (e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2003) or because they 
interpret lying as evidence of a self-interested nature and a sign of an imminent “steal” 
decision (e.g., van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). Thus, past deceitful behavior is not a 
separate possible determinant of cooperation, but rather a special case of either 
reciprocity or conditional cooperation, or both. 
We collected data on the statements made by contestants and the actual values of the 
balls that they possessed, allowing us to specify various measures for deceitful behavior. 
The analyses reported here are restricted to the use of dummy variables. We have also 
tried more complex, continuous variables for lying, but these approaches yielded similar 
results. 
We apply separate variables for each game round. The general variables take the value of 
one if the contestant lied, irrespective of whether she overstated the monetary value of a 
cash ball or failed to disclose a killer ball. To distinguish between these two types of lies, 
we also use specific variables for each type separately. It is not obvious which type of lie 
would be considered more objectionable. On the one hand, lying about killers is much 
more harmful to others than exaggerating the value of a cash ball, and, assuming a 
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preference to reciprocate, doing so could then be expected to have a greater negative 
effect on an opponent’s propensity to cooperate. On the other hand, lying about killer 
balls might also be more understandable, since killer balls have a much greater impact on 
a contestant’s chances to be voted off the show. Players may realize that nearly everyone 
will fail to disclose a hidden killer ball, and thus not be inclined to punish such behavior. 
Lying about cash ball values might be more like gratuitous lying and be viewed more 
harshly, and, consequently, have a greater effect on cooperation. 
As shown in Table 2.2, lying is rather common on the show: 41 percent of the contestants 
who made it to the final lied about their back row balls in Round 1, while 36 percent lied 
in Round 2 (some did both). Furthermore, in the first round, 24 percent overstated the 
value of a cash ball, while 21 percent hid a killer ball (some did both). For the second 
round, these figures are 15 and 24 percent, respectively.22 
Table 2.4 displays the regression results when we add the general dummy variables 
(Model 2.9) and the dummy variables that distinguish between lying about killer balls and 
lying about cash balls (Model 2.10). We find that past lies of an opponent do not affect a 
contestant’s propensity to cooperate: each of the six variables is insignificant 
(0.295 < p < 0.894). In addition to these simple tests, we also investigated whether lying is 
considered less fair and has more impact the more it is unexpected or “abnormal” given 
the circumstances, but again we found no significant effect.23 Lying neither predicts a 
contestant’s own cooperative behavior.24 One plausible interpretation of these results is 
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 Conditional on having at least one killer ball on their back row, contestants hid a killer ball 50 (43) percent 
of the time in Round 1 (Round 2). 
23
 We used a two-stage procedure to express the abnormality of a lie. For each round, we estimated a 
regression model that explains a contestant’s propensity to lie, given the ball values on her back row, the 
ball values on her front row, and the rank of her front row balls relative to those of the other players. For 
each final contestant, the “abnormality” of a lie we then measured as the difference between unity and this 
estimated lie propensity. 
24
 Such a relation might be expected if the propensity to be honest and the propensity to cooperate are 
influenced by a similar preference for “pro-social”, “kind” or “fair” behavior. It has, for example, been 
argued that the reluctance to lie is driven by guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2005, 2006; Gneezy, 
2005), and empirical analysis suggests that guilt aversion is also a strong driving force behind cooperative 
behavior (Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt, 2010). 
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that lying is seen as an inherent part of “Golden Balls” and therefore unobjectionable 
behavior, much as bluffing is considered in the game of poker (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2005). 
2.8 Conclusions and Discussion 
“Golden Balls” provides us with the possibility to examine cooperative behavior outside 
the conventional context of the laboratory with large sums of money at stake. 
Our results provide support for the view that attitudes are strongly influenced by context. 
We find unusually high rates of cooperation when the luck of the game reduces the 
stakes to “merely” a few hundred Pounds. Such amounts are tiny in the light of the 
thousands and even tens of thousands the game is often played for, but would be 
considered very large in any laboratory setting. In the early days of the show, when the 
contestants have not had an opportunity to watch the show on TV and are still learning 
what kind of stakes are to be expected, cooperation rates appear to be influenced by the 
salient but normatively irrelevant value representing the maximum they could have been 
playing for with a lucky selection of balls. Over time, this effect vanishes, suggesting that 
expectations about stakes become well-informed. 
We label the tendency to be unusually cooperative for what would normally be 
considered high stakes a “big peanuts” result. Players seem to feel that when making a 
choice about a few hundred dollars when they might otherwise have been dividing tens 
of thousands, they are playing for “peanuts”, and cooperate, perhaps thinking that it is 
not worth stealing for what they perceive to be so little money. This finding reinforces a 
similar result for risk taking behavior in another game show, “Deal or No Deal”. In that 
context, where the stakes were even higher, amounts of money in the tens of thousands 
of dollars became perceived as peanuts, since hundreds of thousands of dollars had been 
on the line. These are very big peanuts indeed. 
Using the interaction that occurs among contestants prior to the final, we also examined 
the effects that past opposition and lying have on cooperation. Using the votes we find 
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evidence to support the view that people have reciprocal preferences. Contestants are 
less likely to cooperate if their opponent has tried to vote them off the show at an earlier 
stage of the game. Lying on the other hand has no significant effect. We investigated 
several measures, but none was significantly related to cooperation. Lying is evidently not 
frowned upon in “Golden Balls”, perhaps because it is expected. The different impact of 
opposition and lying might be related to their different nature in this game. Voting is a 
directed and aggressive act towards one specific contestant. Lying, on the other hand, is 
an undirected and defensive act. 
With “Golden Balls” we are also able to investigate an interesting, expectational form of 
conditional cooperation. Specifically, since explicit promises to cooperate are strong 
predictors of actual cooperation, we can see whether players are more likely to 
cooperate with someone who has made such a promise. We find no evidence of such 
behavior. More generally, we find that players do not appear to condition their choice of 
whether to cooperate on factors that predict the cooperation likelihood of their 
opponent. Players may lack the ability or ignore the possibility to reliably interpret 
information about the expected behavior of others, or they may not have a preference 
for matching the other’s choice. Given our finding that people reciprocate votes against 
them, the former explanation seems more likely. For situations beyond the context of our 
game these results suggest that conditional cooperation is not a very important 
phenomenon, at the least when direct conditioning is not possible and people would 
need to form expectations about the behavior of others. 
We conclude with some comments on the generalizability of our results. There are three 
primary concerns. First, selection procedures may have affected the average cooperation 
rate in our study. Subjects self-select into auditions, are then selected by the producer, 
and during the game they themselves have the opportunity to vote off opponents they 
would rather not play the final with. For some demographic variables, selection may 
perhaps also have affected the correlation with cooperation. Unfortunately, we cannot 
substantiate our intuition that such effects are negligible, nor could we have prevented 
them if they would exist. Note, however, that selection procedures are inevitable in any 
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lab experiment or field setting. Moreover, the subjects in our sample vary widely in terms 
of their demographic characteristics and as a group they seem to resemble a (middle-
class)25 cross-section of the general population more closely than subjects in most 
conventional experiments. 
Second, subjects’ behavior in a game show might be influenced by what could be called 
“a drive to win the contest”. However, an important but hard to answer question would 
then be what “winning” actually means in this context. After all, it seems like a matter of 
personal social preferences whether winning is equivalent to a successful stealing 
attempt or to a successful coordination attempt. 
Last, our contestants are not strictly playing a one-shot game. In the setting we study 
decisions are made on national TV, under the scrutiny of a studio audience and millions of 
viewers. This undoubtedly influences the behavior we observe. However, we do not feel 
that these special circumstances render our findings less interesting or less predictive of 
behavior in other settings. The truth is that every setting is, in some way, special. Subjects 
in a laboratory experiment know that their behavior is being scrutinized to some extent 
as well. Field settings are also “special”; bargaining over the price of a car or a house is 
different from negotiating compensation with a new employer or the division of 
household chores with a spouse. Although it would be fascinating for researchers to be 
able to surreptitiously study the outcomes of these sorts of interactions from the “real 
world”, the researchers would still only be able to speculate on how their results would 
generalize to different real world settings. TV game shows offer a unique opportunity to 
study theoretically interesting behavior at stakes that are impossible to replicate in the 
lab. How the results compare with other contexts will be determined by future research. 
In the absence of an ability to conduct such surreptitious field experiments in many 
domains, researchers are left with two alternatives: run experiments in the lab or the 
field, or study naturally occurring behavior in an interesting setting. This chapter is an 
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 For whatever reason, whether it is the interest in applying or the preferences of the producers, 
contestants are rarely very rich or very poor. 
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example of the latter strategy. Although a game show may seem like a strange 
environment, we think it may be closer to the situations that occur in the workplace than 
many other settings in which cooperation has been studied. Co-workers often must 
choose whether to cooperate, and their actions are often at least semi-public. 
Finally, the big peanuts phenomenon, perhaps the most interesting finding in this 
chapter, is one that does not appear to depend in any important way on the specific 
game show environment. As a US Senator once famously said, “a billion here, a billion 
there, pretty soon you’re talking real money.” 
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Chapter 3  | Standing United or Falling Divided? 
High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game 
show where contestants bargain over a jackpot that is split into three unequal 
shares and ranges from about $10,000 to $185,000. In contrast to the 
commonly held view that fairness concerns will be unimportant when 
monetary incentives are sufficiently high, we find that individual behavior and 
outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed 
more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, 
and take home larger amounts. Threatening to play hardball is ineffective. 
Although contestants who announce that they will not back down do well 
relative to others, they do not secure larger absolute amounts and harm 
others. In addition, there is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little 
evidence that demographic characteristics matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper “Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show”, co-
authored by Martijn J. van den Assem, Colin F. Camerer, and Richard H. Thaler (van Dolder et al., 2013). We thank 
developer and format holder Talpa for granting the right to use copies of Divided for our study, and producer Endemol 
UK and in particular Tara Ali, Gillian Bristow and Marie-Josee Grenier for providing us with recordings and background. 
The chapter benefited from discussions with seminar participants at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, 
the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and Maastricht University, and with participants of the Behavioral Decision 
Research in Management (BDRM) 2012 conference in Boulder, the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral 
Economics (SABE) 2012 conference in Granada, the Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER) 2012 
conference in Tilburg, and the Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making (SPUDM) 2013 conference in 
Barcelona.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Bargaining is ubiquitous in our professional and private lives. In politics, negotiations form 
the basis of coalitions between political parties in multi-party systems and between 
countries in international relations. In business, negotiations determine wage 
compensation schemes for employees, the division of surpluses between trading firms, 
and the terms of mergers and acquisitions. In our private lives, negotiations underlie the 
division of household chores between our partner and ourselves, and the division of 
property after a divorce if we fail to do so properly. Not surprisingly, bargaining has 
received considerable attention in both economics and psychology. 
Economists have been particularly interested in the efficiency and distribution of 
bargaining outcomes (Muthoo, 1999). In theoretical accounts, the emphasis is on models 
invoking stylized representations of bargaining settings that facilitate the derivation of 
equilibrium predictions, with Rubinstein’s alternating-offers bargaining model being 
especially influential (Rubinstein, 1982). As a result of this emphasis, bargaining 
experiments in economics typically employ fixed bargaining protocols and are conducted 
anonymously using computer terminals. Psychologists have studied a much wider range 
of topics. Examples include people’s perceptions about the bargaining situation and the 
possible outcomes, their behavior during the bargaining process, and the roles of values, 
culture and communication (Thompson, 1990; Bazerman et al., 2000). In contrast to the 
stylized bargaining settings in economics, psychological experiments often have subjects 
participate in free-form face-to-face negotiations. 
While bargaining has been extensively studied from various perspectives, most empirical 
evidence on bargaining behavior and outcomes derives from laboratory experiments. 
Real-world data generally entail a lack of control, making it difficult—if not impossible—
to distinguish between competing hypotheses. It is still an open question, however, to 
what extent findings from the laboratory generalize to real-world environments (Levitt 
and List, 2007a, 2008; Camerer, 2011). One of the concerns arises from the fact that 
volunteering students are a non-random sample of the population. Also, experimenters 
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are mostly unable to employ high stakes, begging the question whether or not results will 
generalize to situations of significant economic importance. In the present study, we 
examine high stakes bargaining using data from the British TV game show Divided. This 
setting has the unique property that it allows for the study of bargaining behavior in a 
controlled setting where the stakes are high, for a diverse subject pool. 
There is a growing literature that uses game shows to study decision-making. TV shows 
can offer unique research opportunities, because contestants often face relatively well-
defined choice problems for high stakes. Prior studies have focused on risky choice, 
strategic decision making, discrimination, and cooperative behavior (Bennett and 
Hickman, 1993; Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Berk, Hughson and Vandezande, 1996; 
Beetsma and Schotman, 2001; Tenorio and Cason, 2002; Fullenkamp, Tenorio and 
Battalio, 2003; Levitt, 2004; List, 2004a; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2005; List, 
2006; Post et al., 2008; Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven, 2010a; Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel 
and White, 2010; van den Assem, van Dolder and Thaler, 2012). The present chapter is 
the first to exploit the favorable combination of features of a game show to study 
bargaining. 
In Divided, three contestants collectively build up a jackpot through answering general 
quiz questions. Across episodes, their jackpot ultimately ranges from approximately 
$10,000 to $185,000, and averages over $50,000. In the second phase of the game, the 
team’s accumulated money amount is divided into three unequal parts of, for example, 
60, 30 and 10 percent. Contestants in turn have to claim one of these shares. If they do 
not immediately agree on who takes which share, they have 100 seconds to negotiate 
and reach consensus. With each second they take they lose one percentage point of the 
initial jackpot, and after 100 seconds there is nothing left. This final stage can thus be 
seen as a natural bargaining experiment where the “subjects” have to unanimously 
decide on the allocation of three indivisible shares, in a format that allows face-to-face 
communication and incorporates (close to) continuous costs to bargaining. 
Overall, we find that 10 percent of the teams agree immediately, 71 percent do so while 
the timer counts down, and 19 percent fail to reach agreement and go home empty-
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handed. The efficiency rate, or the average fraction of the jackpot that is actually 
awarded, is approximately 50 percent. 
Because the jackpot is determined by teams’ answers to trivia questions, we are able to 
investigate the influence of entitlements on bargaining behavior and outcomes. In real 
world settings, entitlements can potentially arise from a wide range of sources, including 
history, custom, status quo, and contributions (Gächter and Riedl, 2005). In Divided, 
however, the only and apparent source of entitlements are contestants’ individual 
contributions to the communal jackpot. Equity theory suggests that contestants prefer 
outcomes to be proportional to inputs (Homans, 1958; Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid 
and Walster, 1973). To the best of our knowledge, all tests of equity theory thus far have 
relied on survey data or experiments employing relatively low stakes. With our data, we 
are able to test equity theory in a controlled bargaining setting where the stakes are high. 
We find that equity concerns play an important role in the bargaining process. 
Contestants who contributed more to the communal jackpot claim a larger share, are less 
likely to lower their claim during the bargaining process, and end up with a larger fraction 
of the jackpot. 
At the start of the bargaining process, contestants have 15 seconds to make their case 
and stake their claim to one of the shares. About one in four use this opportunity to make 
a hardball announcement, by adding a statement to their initial claim that they will not 
back down from it. We find that contestants who use this threat do well relative to 
others. However, as a result of increased bargaining costs, hardball announcements do 
not generate higher earnings in an absolute sense and lower the earnings of others. 
The effect of the stakes on behavior in our data is twofold. First, when the stakes are 
relatively high, contestants are more likely to make a hardball announcement. Second, 
the effect of the stakes on the likelihood of concessions is U-shaped: concessions occur 
relatively often at the low and high stake levels, and less so in between. These two effects 
together suggest that at some point, for higher stakes, the increased bargaining costs are 
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outweighing the increased incentive to try and fight for the top share and the possible 
disutility of being worse off than opponents. 
Finally, we obtain a number of potentially interesting null results. There is no evidence of 
a first-mover advantage: the order in which contestants are to make their initial claims 
has no influence on these claims and is neither related to contestants’ subsequent 
behavior nor to their payoffs. Furthermore, we find little evidence that behavior or 
outcomes are related to demographic characteristics including age or gender. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the game show in greater 
detail and discuss our data material. Section 3.3 explains the various explanatory 
variables that we use and discusses related literature. Section 3.4 presents our analyses 
and results. Section 3.5 discusses the results and concludes. 
3.2 Game Show and Data 
Description of Divided 
The format of Divided was developed by the Dutch media firm Talpa, and produced for 
the ITV network in the United Kingdom by Endemol UK. The show debuted on British TV 
in May 2009 and ran until May 2010. A total of 53 episodes were aired, and, at the time 
of writing, no further episodes were aired thereafter. 
Each game is played with three contestants who are strangers to each other, and consists 
of two stages: one in which the contestants team up to accumulate a communal jackpot 
through answering quiz questions, and one in which they have to divide the jackpot 
between them. 
 The first stage lasts for a maximum of five rounds. Round 1 has five questions that are 
worth up to £3,000 each.26 In the subsequent four rounds the number of questions and 
the maximum value per question are 4, 3, 2, 1 and £7,500, £15,000, £30,000, £75,000, 
                                                     
26
 Values in British pounds can be translated into US dollars using a rate of $1,60 per pound, an approximate 
average of the exchange rate during the period in which the show ran. 
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respectively.27 In theory, the maximum potential jackpot is £225,000. How much a 
question actually contributes to the jackpot depends on the team’s speed of answering: 
they have one hundred seconds to agree on an answer, and with each second that passes 
the value of a correct answer falls by one percentage point of its initial value. Incorrect 
answers halve the jackpot, and after three mistakes the team is out of the game. At the 
end of each round, the team can decide to stop and divide the jackpot, but only if they 
make that decision unanimously and within 15 seconds – otherwise, the next round starts 
automatically. Figure 3.1 presents a schematic overview of the first stage of the game. 
The second stage comprises the bargaining element of the game that is central to our 
analysis. The jackpot is split into three unequal shares representing, for example, 60, 30 
and 10 percent of the total jackpot. The largest prize is marked share A, the middle B, and 
the smallest C. The players unanimously have to decide who gets which. First, they each 
receive 15 seconds to make their case and stake their claim to one of the shares. The 
order in which they are asked to do so is determined by their positions on the stage (from 
left to right, for viewers). If they do not agree immediately, they have 100 seconds to 
reach consensus in a free-form discussion. With each second that passes before they 
agree they lose one percentage point of the initial jackpot, and after 100 seconds there is 
nothing left. Halfway, after 50 seconds, there is a time-out. In this brief pause, the 
contestants keep silent and the game show host summarizes the situation by bringing to 
their attention how much they have lost and what is left, or by enumerating the 
remaining values of the three different shares.  
                                                     
27
 Most questions are general knowledge questions of the multiple choice type with one out of three 
answers being correct (such as “which of these flags is the flag of the Netherlands”). In some cases, three 
alternatives need to be put in a particular order (e.g., “starting with the youngest, put these actresses into 
age order”). In the fifth round, the question can have multiple correct alternatives and out of a list of three 
the team must select all of them (e.g., “which of these countries has a currency named the pound”). 
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Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 1: 5 questions, 
each worth max. £3,000 
  
     
 
 
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 2: 4 questions, 
each worth max. £7,500 
  
     
  
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 3: 3 questions, 
each worth max. £15,000 
  
     
  
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 4: 2 questions, 
each worth max. £30,000 
  
     
  
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 5: 1 question, 
worth max. £75,000 
  
     
  
Dividing stage   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Flow Chart of the First Stage of the Game 
Three contestants first play a maximum of five rounds of quiz questions in which they team 
up to accumulate a jackpot. Correct answers increase the jackpot, while incorrect answers 
halve it. A third mistake ends the game, and all contestants then leave empty-handed. At the 
end of each of the first four rounds, the team can voluntarily decide to proceed to the second 
stage. In this final part of the game they have to divide the money they accumulated between 
them. 
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The producer has applied a standard procedure to select contestants. A spokeswoman of 
Endemol informed us that anyone could apply to be on Divided by submitting a detailed 
application form. Shortlisted contestants were then invited to an audition in order to 
determine their skill in playing the game, their character, and their suitability to appear 
on a TV game show. Producers watched tapings of these auditions and put together 
teams of three that they deemed to be “good mixes of characters”. Contestants and 
teams were thus not randomly drawn from the general population, but at the same time 
the selection process does not seem to create any obvious confounds in our analyses. 
Data and Summary Statistics 
With permission from Talpa we received copies of all episodes from producer Endemol 
UK. For each episode we collected data on the relevant observables in the show, 
including demographic characteristics of the contestants, the results for each quiz 
question and the individual contributions to the team’s answers, the decisions at the end 
of each round to play on or stop and divide the money, contestants’ claims and how 
these changed during the bargaining phase, whether and when agreement was reached, 
and the individual payoffs. 
Combined, the 53 episodes comprise the games of 56 teams, with some starting in one 
episode and continuing their game in the next. Because 13 teams leave the show early 
after three incorrect answers, only 43 games are used in our analyses. In terms of 
observable demographic characteristics, the composition of the eliminated teams is not 
significantly different from those who did play the bargaining game. Most of the 43 
included teams are mixed-gender teams. Only in 4 exceptions the three contestants are 
all female. Men and women each represent half of the contestant pool. The average 
contestant is 36 years of age, with the youngest being 18 and the oldest 70. The large 
majority (94%) are white, a small minority (9%) are students, about half (49%) are from a 
conurbation with a population exceeding 250,000 inhabitants, and the majority (91%) are 
from outside the area where the recording studios were located (Greater Manchester). 
  
GAME SHOW AND DATA 
 
57 
Table 3.1 displays some descriptive characteristics for Divided. Quiz questions become 
harder with each round. Even though more skillful teams are more likely to play the later 
rounds, the fraction of correct answers monotonously decreases from 90 percent in 
Round 1 to only 29 percent in Round 5. Out of the thirteen teams not reaching the 
bargaining stage, seven are eliminated in Round 3 (and one or two in each of the other 
four rounds). On average, successful teams decide to start the bargaining over the 
division of the jackpot after three rounds of trivia questions. Mostly, playing on would 
have implied a high risk of losing it all: the modal number of incorrect answers when 
teams voluntarily decide to move to the second stage is two (72%). 
On average, the final jackpot is £33,512. The variation is large: from £7,282 to £115,755. 
In two-thirds of all cases the three shares in the jackpot – A, B, and C – represent close to 
60, 30, and 10 percent, respectively. Only two other subdivisions occur: 70/20/10 and 
65/25/10, both in 16 percent of the cases. The smallest share thus always represents 
about ten percent of the prize money, but the largest and the middle share vary in size. 
The average initial value per jackpot share of £11,171 is many times the amounts typically 
used in laboratory experiments, and also a large sum relative to the median gross weekly 
earnings of £404 in the UK in April 2010 (Office for National Statistics 2010). Overall, 58 
percent of the shares exceed three months of median UK earnings, and 13 percent are 
even larger than the median annual salary. 
Most contestants initially claim the largest share: 79 percent opt for A, 16 percent pick B 
and only 5 percent content themselves with C straight away. As a result, the three 
contestants all claim A about half the time (51%). Only four teams (9%) agree 
immediately. In the end, 22 teams (51%) manage to reach agreement within 50 seconds 
and 35 (81%) reach agreement before the timer has counted down and all the money is 
gone. Eight (19%) fail completely and go home empty-handed. Including the teams that 
agree immediately or leave empty-handed, the average bargaining process lasts 50 
seconds. Correspondingly, the average efficiency rate amounts to 50 percent. Figure 3.2 
displays the distribution of the bargaining duration. 
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Table 3.1: Selected Game Show Characteristics 
The table shows selected characteristics for the British TV game show Divided, extracted from our sample of 
53 episodes. Answer in Round r (r = 1, 2, … ,5) is the status of the team’s answer to a question in Round r, 
with a value of 1 (0) for a correct (incorrect) answer. Jackpot change Round r (r = 1, 2, … ,5) records the 
difference between the size of jackpot at the end and at the start of round r for all teams still in play at the 
end of the round. Quiz rounds measures the number of quiz rounds completed before elimination or 
entering the bargaining stage. Mistakes is the accumulated number of incorrect answers when the team 
enters the bargaining stage. Jackpot describes the size of the jackpot. Prize A (Prize B, Prize C) / jackpot 
expresses the size of the largest (middle, smallest) share as a fraction of the jackpot. Initial claim indicates 
the share that the contestant claims before the timer starts counting down, with a value of 3 (2, 1) for A (B, 
C). Final claim is the share that the contestant claims at the end of the bargaining process, with a value of 3 
(2, 1) for A (B, C). Resolution before t=0 (t=50, t=100) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the team 
reaches agreement before the timer starts (before 50 seconds have passed, before 100 seconds have 
passed). Time to resolution measures the duration of the bargaining process in seconds. Prize won (if non-
zero) records the prize the contestant takes home (if she did not leave empty-handed). Prize won (if non-
zero) / initial jackpot records her prize as a fraction of the initial jackpot (if she did not leave empty-
handed). All monetary values are in UK Pounds (£1.00 ≈ $1.60). 
 
 N Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
All teams       
  Answer Round 1 (correct=1) 280 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 2 219 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 3 119 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 4 37 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 5 7 0.29 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Jackpot change Round 1 55 9,010 3,135 2,963 9,360 13,170 
  Jackpot change Round 2 54 14,170 8,112 -5,648 16,125 25,500 
  Jackpot change Round 3 34 9,665 19,762 -25,342 5,293 37,950 
  Jackpot change Round 4 17 5,698 31,528 -51,919 -2,280 53,400 
  Jackpot change Round 5 5 -6,319 28,695 -41,040 -17,887 27,750 
Teams eliminated after three mistakes      
  Quiz rounds 13 2.23 1.09 0.00 2.00 4.00 
Teams playing bargaining stage       
  Quiz rounds 43 3.16 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
  Mistakes 43 1.70 0.51 0.00 2.00 2.00 
  Jackpot 43 33,512 26,154 7,282 23,288 115,755 
  Prize A / jackpot 43 0.62 0.04 0.59 0.60 0.70 
  Prize B / jackpot 43 0.27 0.04 0.19 0.30 0.30 
  Prize C / jackpot 43 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.12 
  Initial claim (A=3, B=2, C=1) 129 2.74 0.53 1.00 3.00 3.00 
  Final claim (A=3, B=2, C=1) 129 2.14 0.83 1.00 2.00 3.00 
  Resolution before t=0 (resolution=1) 43 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Resolution before t=50 43 0.51 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Resolution before t=100 43 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Time to resolution (in seconds) 43 50.26 35.39 0.00 50.00 100.00 
  Prize won 129 5,633 8,616 0 2,615 56,895 
  Prize won if non-zero 105 6,921 9,075 135 4,030 56,895 
  Prize won / initial jackpot 129 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.66 
  Prize won if non-zero / initial jackpot 105 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.66 
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Figure 3.2: Bargaining Duration 
The histogram shows the distribution of bargaining duration for the 43 teams in our sample, 
where the time frame is divided into ten-second intervals. The leftmost (rightmost) bar 
corresponds to the teams that reach immediate agreement (fail to reach agreement). The 
number of teams not yet in agreement immediately prior to a given duration category is 
displayed at the bottom of the bar. 
 
The stakes-weighted efficiency rate obtained by dividing the sum of earnings across all 
games by the sum of all jackpots is also equal to 50 percent. On average, a contestant 
who plays the bargaining game goes home with £5,633. The 105 contestants who end up 
with a non-zero prize take home £6,921 on average, with a median of £4,030. Would we 
have run this show as an experiment ourselves, the total costs in subject payoffs alone 
would have been £726,706, or about $1.16 million. 
3.3 Variables of Interest and Background 
Demographic Characteristics 
Psychologists have devoted considerable attention to studying individual differences in 
negotiation, especially during the 1970s and the early 1980s. The general picture arising 
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from studies into the roles of demographic and personality characteristics is one of 
contradictory findings, frequent null results, and low explanatory power (Rubin and 
Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990). For gender, meta-analyses indicate that males are more 
competitive in bargaining (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998) and better in acquiring 
favorable outcomes (Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999), but the differences are slim and 
sensitive to the specific experimental conditions employed. 
A more recent study by Elfenbein et al. (2008) does show substantial individual 
differences in bargaining performance between individuals. They had subjects participate 
in multiple negotiations with different counterparts, and find that individual differences 
are persistent but unrelated to a wide range of personality and background variables. 
Bowles, Babcock and McGinn (2005) study the role of structural ambiguity, defined as the 
degree of uncertainty regarding the economic structure of the negotiation. They find that 
gender differences are only present under a high level of structural ambiguity. Such 
ambiguity is largely absent in our show. Altogether, prior work suggests that it is not very 
likely that there are strong effects of demographic characteristics in our data. 
The demographic variables that we study are gender, age and education. Gender is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the contestant is male, Age is a continuous 
variable measuring the contestant’s age in years, and Education is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the contestant has at least a bachelor degree. Contestants 
normally mention their age when they introduce themselves at the start. By contrast, 
they generally do not talk about their education during the show. We therefore estimate 
their level of education on the basis of their occupation and other information they 
provide. Contestants who are currently enrolled in higher education and contestants 
whose job title suggests work experience equivalent to the bachelor level or higher are 
also included in the higher education category. The proper binary values are generally 
clear.28 We have also distinguished between student/non-student, urbanite/villager and 
                                                     
28
 In eight exceptions, we had to estimate a contestant’s age on the basis of her physical appearance and 
other information given in the introductory talk. Seven contestants provided no job or other relevant 
information that we could use to assess their education level; we included these in the lower education 
category. 
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white/non-white contestants, but omit these characteristics from our analyses. There are 
relatively few students (9%) and non-white contestants (6%), and the results for the three 
variables would be insignificant throughout. 
Entitlement Measures 
Entitlements are subjectively-held fairness judgments that people perceive as rights they 
wish to defend, and can arise from history, custom, the status quo, or from the 
contributions that people made to the bundle that has to be divided (Schlicht, 1998). In 
an experiment, Gächter and Riedl (2005) show that such entitlements influence 
bargaining behavior and outcomes in the absence of legal property rights. 
In our show, the three contestants similarly have no legal rights to any of the shares. Still, 
they may feel entitled to a certain share of the jackpot due to their contributions. 
Sociologists and social psychologists have stressed the role of equity as a criterion for 
distributive justice in situations of social interaction (Homans, 1958; Adams, 1965; 
Walster, Berscheid and Walster, 1973). Equity theory states that outcomes are only fair if 
they are proportional to inputs. Imagine two actors, A and B, and denote their outcomes 
by O and their inputs by I, then according to the equity formula a distribution is fair if 
OA/IA = OB/IB. Empirical studies have largely confirmed the idea that people care about 
equity. Many show that inputs and outcomes are positively related (Konow, 2003), and 
some even demonstrate that fairness judgments follow the exact proportionality of 
inputs and outputs posited by equity theory (Schokkaert and Overlaet, 1989; Konow, 
1996; Clark, 1998; Konow, 2000). 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the role of equity 
concerns in a controlled environment with high stakes. Prior work used surveys or 
experiments with no or relatively low performance-based financial incentives. The high 
stakes of Divided are especially interesting in the light of the argument that fairness 
considerations will be unimportant if the stakes are sufficiently high (Rabin, 1993; Telser, 
1995; Levitt and List, 2007a). 
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Unfortunately, there is not just one single way in which contestants’ contributions to the 
jackpot can be objectively quantified in our game. In fact, there are numerous 
possibilities. As a result, different contestants may adopt different definitions, which 
could be detrimental to the explanatory power of individual measures. Moreover, the 
possible lack of consensus about contributions is potentially aggravated by self-serving 
bias in contestants’ attributions (Camerer and Loewenstein, 1993; Loewenstein et al., 
1993; Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein, 1996; Babcock and 
Loewenstein, 1997). Consequently, even if contributions determine entitlements, we may 
not necessarily find strong correlations between contribution measures and behavior and 
outcomes. 
The results we present are for relatively simple contribution measures, in which we credit 
(in)correct answers by the team to the players who argued for (against) the correct 
answer. We distinguish between a composite measure that combines the credits for 
correct and incorrect answers into one metric, and measures that isolate the 
contributions to correct and incorrect answers. We have also investigated various 
measures that account for the money won or lost with a specific question, but the results 
are insensitive to such alternative approaches. 
More specifically, if the group gave a correct answer, the credit for this answer is divided 
equally over all contestants who argued in favor of it. For example, if all three contestants 
argued for the correct answer, then each contestant receives one-third of the credit. If 
two did so, then both receive half of the credit, and if only one argued for the correct 
answer she receives the full credit. Those who did not argue for any particular answer, 
argued for a wrong one, or argued for multiple answers (including or not including the 
correct one) receive no share of the credit.29 If the group gave an incorrect answer, the 
credit is divided equally over those who argued in favor of one of the incorrect answers. 
                                                     
29
 There are three exceptions to this rule: (i) if all contestants argued both for and against the correct 
answer but managed to come to the correct answer together, they are each assigned one-third of the 
credit; (ii) if two contestants argued both for and against the correct answer and came to the correct 
answer together while the third remained silent, then these two share the credit; (iii) if contestants made a 
random guess and this guess turned out to be correct, then they share the credit. 
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Those who did not argue for any particular answer or argued for the correct one only are 
not assigned any credit in this case. 
Based on these credits, we create the following contribution measures: 
- Contribution overall: a contestant’s overall contribution, calculated by adding up 
all credits of a contestant for questions answered correctly and subtracting all 
credits of a contestant for questions answered incorrectly. We normalize by 
dividing by the total number of correct answers minus the total number of 
incorrect answers of the team. 
- Contribution correct: a contestant’s contribution to the team’s correct answers, 
calculated by adding up all credits of a contestant for questions answered 
correctly. We normalize by dividing by the total number of correct answers. 
- Contribution incorrect: a contestant’s contribution to the team’s incorrect 
answers, calculated by adding up all credits of a contestant for questions 
answered incorrectly. We normalize by dividing by the total number of incorrect 
answers. 
Situational Variables 
In addition to the demographic and contribution variables discussed above, we also 
consider the influence of the stakes, the variance across the percentage shares to be 
divided, and the order in which contestants make their initial claims. 
A priori, the effect of stakes can go either way. On the one hand, higher stakes give a 
stronger incentive to fight for the top share and so might lead to bigger claims and more 
impasses. On the other hand, the costs of bargaining are in direct proportion to the 
stakes, which might create an additional incentive to strive for a speedy resolution and to 
easily succumb to others’ pressure if the stakes are high. In addition, contestants may 
experience (dis)utility from being better (worse) off than others and feeling victorious 
(deprived), and it is unclear how these non-monetary costs and benefits are traded off 
against the monetary costs and benefits of bargaining. For flexibility and ease of 
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interpretation we use dummy variables representing the different quartiles of the stake 
distribution. (A quadratic specification yields similar results.) 
Generally, consensus will be more difficult to achieve if the difference between the shares 
is larger. If share A increases relative to the other shares, contestants will have a stronger 
incentive to attempt to take this top share home. Furthermore, the distribution of the 
percentage shares tends to be more unequal than the distribution of the contributions. If 
contestants care about equity, and especially if they care about receiving at least what 
they deserve, larger differences between the shares are likely to make bargaining more 
difficult. As a measure for the divergence between the prizes we use the variance across 
the percentage shares (the standard deviation leads to similar results). 
The order in which contestants express and motivate their initial claim can affect the 
bargaining process. By claiming share A, the first contestant may “force” the others to 
pick a smaller share if they wish to avoid an impasse and the risks and costs it entails. 
Alternating-offer bargaining models and experiments in economics point at the existence 
of such a strategic advantage for the first mover (Rubinstein, 1982; Sutton, 1986; Ochs 
and Roth, 1989). Although structures with offers and counteroffers are often considered 
intuitively appealing because they resemble most real-life negotiations (Muthoo, 1999), 
the strict alternating-offer protocol is a considerable abstraction. It is therefore 
interesting to investigate whether a first-mover advantage also occurs in our setting, 
where contestants’ initial claims are followed by free-form bargaining. We use a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the contestant was the first to make her case and 
stake her claim to one of the shares. 
Claim Variables 
Finally, we look at contestants’ announcements to play hardball by stating not to back 
down from their initial claim. We investigate the possible determinants of handball 
announcements, and examine the relations between such statements and actual 
behavior and outcomes. In his influential paper on bargaining, Schelling (1956) stresses 
the importance of commitment strategies. Later work has incorporated the notion of 
commitment into formal bargaining models (Crawford, 1982; Kambe, 1999; Muthoo, 
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1996; Abreu and Gul, 2000; Compte and Jehiel, 2002; Ellingsen and Miettinen, 2008). In 
our bargaining setting, contestants cannot formally commit themselves in the sense that 
they are always free to adjust their claim without incurring monetary costs. However, 
contestants may attempt to convince others that they feel internally committed to a 
specific share. In our analyses of the effect of hardball announcements we control for 
contestants’ initials claims. 
3.4 Analyses and Results 
In this section, we first analyze the determinants of contestants’ initial claims. Next, we 
examine the correlates of hardball announcements and actual concession behavior. Last, 
we analyze the factors driving bargaining outcomes. Table 3.2 presents descriptive 
statistics for variables not yet included in Table 3.1. 
Initial Claims 
Table 3.3 shows the ordered probit regression results for contestants’ decisions to initially 
claim share A (3), B (2) or C (1). We find that a contestant’s contribution to the jackpot 
determines the share that she chooses: those who contributed more are significantly 
more likely to claim a large share. Interestingly, the results for Model 3.2 suggest that 
there is an asymmetry between the types of contributions. When we distinguish 
contributions to correct answers from contributions to incorrect answers, we find that 
the effect is driven by the positive contributions only. The influence of a contestant’s role 
in mistakes is insignificant. Neither the demographic characteristics nor the situational 
variables influence the initial claims. 
Due to the inherent nonlinearities of a probit model, the sizes of the coefficients are not 
easy to interpret. Transformed into marginal effects at the covariate means, we find that 
a 10 percentage-point increase of Contributions overall (correct) increases the likelihood 
of claiming share A by 8.2 (11.1) percentage points, and decreases the likelihood of 
claiming share B or C by 6.0 (8.2) and 2.2 (2.9) percentage points, respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics for our sample of 129 contestants who bargain over their share of the 
jackpot in the final stage of the British TV game show Divided. Age is the contestant’s age measured in 
years. Gender is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant is male. Education is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant has completed or is enrolled in higher education (bachelor 
degree or higher) or has equivalent working experience. Variance shares denotes the variance across the 
three percentage shares to be divided. The contribution variables measure the contestant’s entitlement to 
the communal jackpot. Contribution overall measures her contribution across all quiz questions. 
Contribution correct (incorrect) measures her contribution to the team’s correctly (incorrectly) answered 
questions only. Announce hardball, Opp. announce hardball and Concession are dummy variables taking the 
value of 1 if the contestant stated not to back down from her initial claim, faced at least one opponent who 
had stated not to back down, or gave in during the bargaining process, respectively. Concession is not 
defined if the team agrees immediately or if the contestant initially picked share C. All monetary values are 
in UK Pounds (£1.00 ≈ $1.60). 
 
 N Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
  Age 129 36.16 12.23 18.00 34.00 70.00 
  Gender (male=1) 129 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Education (high=1) 129 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Variance shares 129 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 
  Contribution overall 129 0.33 0.12 0.07 0.33 0.70 
  Contribution correct 129 0.33 0.09 0.10 0.33 0.56 
  Contribution incorrect 129 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.33 1.00 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1) 129 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1) 129 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Concession (concession=1) 115 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Hardball Announcements and Concessions 
When agreement is not reached immediately, contestants have to negotiate to 
determine who gets which share. During this negotiation, some will have to make 
concessions to bring agreement within reach. Here we will analyze the behavior of 
contestants during this negotiation process. First, we investigate what determines 
whether contestants make hardball announcements by stating not to back down from 
their initial claim. Second, we investigate the likelihood that a contestant actually makes a 
concession during the bargaining process. 
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Table 3.3: Ordered Probit Regression Results on Initial Claims 
The table displays results from the ordered probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to initially 
claim share A (3), B (2), or C (1) in the bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. First mover is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant was the first to make her claim. The stakes quartile 
dummies are used as a flexible specification for the effect of stakes. Definitions of other variables are as 
inTable 3.2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 
Demographic characteristics     
  Age -0.012 (0.233) -0.013 (0.227) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.187 (0.517) -0.230 (0.428) 
  Education (high=1) 0.005 (0.988) -0.008 (0.980) 
Situational variables     
  First mover (first=1) 0.018 (0.949) 0.007 (0.981) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile 0.279 (0.529) 0.288 (0.510) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile 0.082 (0.820) 0.090 (0.799) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile -0.235 (0.515) -0.208 (0.558) 
  Variance shares 12.265 (0.313) 11.742 (0.335) 
Contribution variables     
  Contribution overall 3.007 (0.002)   
  Contribution correct   4.133 (0.004) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.660 (0.206) 
α1 -0.311 (0.654) -0.218 (0.803) 
α2 0.649 (0.345) 0.750 (0.386) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -74.45 -73.71 
McFadden R
2
 0.075 0.084 
N 129 129 
Number of teams 43 43 
 
 
The columns labeled Model 3.1 and Model 3.2 in Table 3.4 contain the results from the 
probit regression analyses of the decision to make a hardball announcement (1) or not (0) 
at the start of the bargaining stage. The two models are estimated for the subset of 
contestants who initially claimed share A.30 The results for the stakes dummy variables 
indicate that contestants are less likely to make hardball announcements if the jackpot is 
relatively small. The raw frequencies also demonstrate this pattern. In the bottom jackpot 
quartile, where the stakes are €15,195 or lower, only 13 percent of the contestants who 
                                                     
30
 Only one of the contestants who claimed share B made a hardball announcement. Including contestants 
who claimed share B does not influence our results. 
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claim share A accompany their claim with a hardball announcement. For the second, third 
and fourth quartile, this percentage is 32, 25 and 39 percent, respectively. Furthermore, 
the results for Variance shares indicate that hardball announcements are more likely if 
the differences between the shares are larger. If the share distribution is 60/30/10, 
roughly 17 percent of the contestants make a hardball announcement. For the more 
extreme 65/25/10 and 70/20/10 divisions, the proportions of hardball announcements 
are 24 and 48 percent, respectively. Demographic and contribution variables do not 
influence the likelihood that a contestant makes a hardball announcement. 
We now turn to contestants’ actual concession behavior. Models 3 through 6 display the 
results from the probit regression analyses on contestants’ decisions to lower their claim 
(1) or not (0). Model 3.3 and Model 3.4 are restricted to variables that are exogenous to 
the bargaining stage, while Model 3.5 and Model 3.6 also include initial claims and 
hardball announcements. The analysis is performed for the subset of contestants who 
initially claimed share A or B and did not reach agreement immediately, as only these 
contestants have the opportunity to lower their claim. 
The coefficients for the stakes dummies suggest a U-shaped effect of the jackpot size. For 
observations from the second and third quartile, the likelihood of a concession is 
significantly smaller than for observations from the first. In the first and fourth quartile, 
concessions are approximately equally likely. The proportions of contestants lowering 
their claims in the four quartiles are 63%, 43%, 41% and 55% respectively. 
The way the jackpot is divided across the three shares A, B, and C has no significant 
influence here. The demographic variables are also insignificant. For the effect of 
contributions, however, we find an interesting asymmetry. While the initial claims are 
especially driven by positive contributions, concessions turn out to be mostly determined 
by negative contributions. The Contribution overall variable does not reach significance, 
but when we distinguish between positive and negative contributions, we find that 
Contribution incorrect is significant. In terms of marginal effects, a 10 percentage-point 
increase in Contribution incorrect implies a 7.2 percentage-point increase in the likelihood 
of a concession. 
  
Table 3.4: Probit Regression Results on Hardball Announcements and Concessions 
The table displays results from the probit regression analyses on contestants’ hardball announcements (Model 3.1 and 2) and concessions (Model 3.3, 4, 5 and 
6) in the bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. The hardball (concession) analyses are performed on the subset of contestants who initially 
claimed share A (who initially claimed share A or B and did not reach agreement immediately). Definitions of variables are as in the previous tables. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Hardball announcements  Concessions 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2  Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6 
Demographic characteristics              
  Age -0.008 (0.553) -0.007 (0.625)  0.000 (0.998) -0.007 (0.562) -0.003 (0.798) -0.009 (0.433) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.161 (0.576) -0.123 (0.696)  0.080 (0.773) -0.096 (0.715) 0.005 (0.987) -0.184 (0.522) 
  Education (high=1) 0.011 (0.972) 0.033 (0.920)  -0.003 (0.992) -0.057 (0.852) 0.064 (0.847) 0.034 (0.920) 
Situational variables              
  First mover (first=1) -0.106 (0.701) -0.121 (0.664)  0.179 (0.559) 0.300 (0.359) 0.154 (0.623) 0.278 (0.394) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile 0.942 (0.040) 0.934 (0.044)  -0.529 (0.029) -0.532 (0.032) -0.503 (0.056) -0.535 (0.046) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile 0.767 (0.092) 0.746 (0.106)  -0.583 (0.009) -0.545 (0.018) -0.541 (0.013) -0.508 (0.022) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile 1.032 (0.015) 1.009 (0.021)  -0.239 (0.302) -0.156 (0.514) -0.175 (0.479) -0.090 (0.720) 
  Variance shares 30.679 (0.033) 31.002 (0.032)  -6.632 (0.524) -9.183 (0.385) -4.396 (0.639) -7.050 (0.461) 
Contribution variables              
  Contribution overall -0.006 (0.996)    -1.273 (0.273)   -1.620 (0.201)   
  Contribution correct   -0.533 (0.772)    0.085 (0.961)   -0.539 (0.764) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.005 (0.994)    1.801 (0.035)   2.001 (0.027) 
Claim variables              
  Initial claim A (A=1)          0.388 (0.239) 0.524 (0.143) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)          -0.985 (0.002) -1.000 (0.003) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)         0.491 (0.098) 0.499 (0.099) 
Constant -2.696 (0.008) -2.538 (0.029)  0.993 (0.151) 0.097 (0.914) 0.701 (0.316) -0.273 (0.750) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -53.84 -53.79  -76.59 -74.24 -69.87 -67.48 
McFadden R
2 
0.102 0.103  0.039 0.069 0.123 0.153 
N 102 102  115 115 115 115 
Number of teams 43 43  39 39 39 39 
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Model 3.5 and Model 3.6 also incorporate the effects of initial claims and hardball 
announcements. Contestants who make hardball announcements turn out to put their 
money where their mouth is. A hardball announcement indeed decreases the likelihood 
of making a concession. A player who says that she will not budge is approximately 37 
percentage points less likely to make a concession. Hardball announcements are also 
considered as credible threats: when contestants face an opponent who made a hardball 
announcement, they are approximately 20 percentage points more likely to make a 
concession. Further, concessions are equally likely for players who initially picked the top 
prize and for those who picked the middle prize. 
Final Payoffs 
A contestant’s bargaining outcome can be defined in two different ways: relative to 
others and relative to the initial size of the jackpot. First, we consider payoffs relative to 
those of the opponents. That is, we look at the share (A, B or C) that a contestant ends up 
with. Players who fail to reach agreement and go home empty-handed are excluded from 
this analysis. Note that the stakes and the differences between the three percentage 
shares cannot influence the likelihood of receiving a particular share, given the fact that 
all shares are awarded and that these factors are constant at the team level. 
Table 3.5 displays the results. Model 3.1 and Model 3.2 are restricted to variables that are 
exogenous to the bargaining stage, while Model 3.3 and Model 3.4 also include initial 
claims and hardball announcements. In line with previous analyses, the restricted models 
show that those who contributed more to the jackpot are more likely to end up with a 
larger share. This effect is driven by both positive and negative contributions. The 
extended models similarly demonstrate the relation between contributions and 
bargaining outcomes. Because the effect of positive contributions on the bargaining 
process is reflected in the initial claims, including initial claims in the model reduces the 
significance of the measure for positive contributions. As before, we find no effect of 
demographic characteristics and there is no first-mover advantage. 
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Table 3.5:Ordered Probit Regression Results on Share Won 
The table displays results from the ordered probit regression analyses on contestants’ final claims A (3), B 
(2) or C (1) when agreement is reached in the bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. 
Definitions of variables are as in the previous tables. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 
team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Demographic characteristics         
  Age -0.011 (0.357) -0.010 (0.386) 0.000 (0.979) 0.002 (0.887) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.011 (0.956) 0.066 (0.748) 0.138 (0.521) 0.245 (0.275) 
  Education (high=1) -0.020 (0.925) -0.003 (0.989) -0.146 (0.590) -0.120 (0.659) 
Situational variables         
  First mover (first=1) -0.132 (0.687) -0.181 (0.590) -0.115 (0.735) -0.160 (0.639) 
Contribution variables         
  Contribution overall 2.871 (0.002)   2.300 (0.030)   
  Contribution correct   2.969 (0.037)   2.216 (0.167) 
  Contribution incorrect   -1.260 (0.049)   -1.243 (0.043) 
Claim variables         
  Initial claim A (A=1)     6.302 (0.000) 5.927 (0.000) 
  Initial claim B (B=1)     5.780 (0.000) 5.511 (0.000) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)     0.889 (0.011) 0.869 (0.017) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)    -0.522 (0.018) -0.547 (0.014) 
α1 0.438 (0.186) 0.069 (0.910) 6.288 (0.000) 5.504 (0.000) 
α2 1.357 (0.000) 0.996 (0.107) 7.393 (0.000) 6.622 (0.000) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -110.10 -109.52 -94.37 -93.70 
McFadden R
2
 0.046 0.051 0.182 0.188 
N 105 105 105 105 
Number of teams 35 35 35 35 
 
The results for Model 3.3 and 4 show that contestants who announce to play hardball 
fare better than others. In terms of marginal effects, those who announce not to back 
down are approximately 30 percentage points more likely to go home with the top share 
and 29 percentage points less likely to go home with the bottom share. At the same time, 
if an opponent makes a hardball announcement, this has a negative effect on a 
contestant’s final share. More specifically, it decreases the likelihood of receiving the top 
share by 15 percentage points, and increases the likelihood of ending up with the bottom 
share by 21 percentage points. 
These analyses of contestants’ final claims ignore the efficiency of the bargaining process. 
A contestant may feel like a winner if she secured more money than her opponent after 
fighting for share A for 70 seconds, but if she could have won more money in an absolute 
sense by directly going for share B, then objectively the latter approach would have been 
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the better strategy (ex-post). Next, we therefore analyze the money that players take 
home as a fraction of the initial jackpot. 
Table 3.6 shows the results, again for two models with exogenous variables only and for 
two extended models with variables for initial claims and hardball announcements. As in 
the previous analyses, those who contributed more to the jackpot secure a larger payoff. 
Again the effect is non-trivial: a 10 percentage-point increase in contribution increases 
earnings by approximately 4 percent of the initial jackpot. 
Hardball announcements clearly frustrate the bargaining process. The previous analysis 
showed that contestants who announce hardball do well relative to others, but the 
present one points out that these players do not go home with larger amounts in an 
absolute sense. Their opponents, however, are significantly worse off from both a relative 
and an absolute perspective. 
The stakes dummy variables point at a U-shaped effect of the initial jackpot: contestants 
generally fare better at the top and bottom stakes quartiles and less so in between. This 
result is in line with the U-shaped pattern for concession behavior: concessions occur 
more often at the top and bottom stakes quartiles, which shortens the time to resolution 
for these quartiles. In addition, contestants are less likely to reach a speedy consensus if 
the differences between the prizes are larger. 
This final analysis is the sole analysis that generates a significant effect for a demographic 
variable: older contestants take home a smaller part of the initial size of the pie. Again, 
there is no evidence of a first-mover advantage. 
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results on Prize Won / Initial Jackpot 
The table displays results from the OLS regression analyses on the fraction of the initial jackpot that the 
contestant takes home in the British TV game show Divided. Definitions of variables are as in the previous 
tables. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Demographic characteristics         
  Age -0.003 (0.022) -0.003 (0.032) -0.002 (0.030) -0.002 (0.041) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.019 (0.484) -0.017 (0.551) -0.014 (0.614) -0.012 (0.682) 
  Education (high=1) -0.017 (0.620) -0.017 (0.641) -0.025 (0.496) -0.025 (0.495) 
Situational variables         
  First mover (first=1) -0.004 (0.899) -0.009 (0.809) 0.002 (0.951) -0.001 (0.963) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile -0.089 (0.056) -0.089 (0.057) -0.083 (0.124) -0.082 (0.127) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile -0.082 (0.063) -0.083 (0.061) -0.079 (0.126) -0.079 (0.123) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile 0.020 (0.655) 0.019 (0.671) 0.033 (0.531) 0.032 (0.543) 
  Variance shares -4.037 (0.009) -4.002 (0.011) -3.769 (0.032) -3.726 (0.036) 
Contribution variables         
  Contribution overall 0.388 (0.000)   0.374 (0.001)   
  Contribution correct   0.437 (0.007)   0.436 (0.003) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.114 (0.092)   -0.115 (0.086) 
Claim variables         
  Initial claim A (A=1)     0.071 (0.059) 0.079 (0.049) 
  Initial claim B (B=1)     0.072 (0.091) 0.089 (0.068) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)     0.053 (0.175) 0.054 (0.170) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)    -0.068 (0.050) -0.070 (0.050) 
Constant 0.285 (0.000) 0.306 (0.001) 0.215 (0.007) 0.223 (0.009) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.123 0.117 0.152 0.148 
N 129 129 129 129 
Number of teams 43 43 43 43 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
The British TV game show Divided offers the opportunity to study high stakes bargaining 
in a controlled setting and for a diverse subject pool. In line with equity theory (Homans, 
1958; Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid and Walster, 1973), we find strong evidence that 
contestants derive entitlements from their contributions to the jackpot. Interestingly, 
positive and negative contributions appear to have different effects: positive 
contributions drive contestants’ opening claims, while negative contributions are 
important for concessions during the subsequent free-form negotiation process. One 
explanation for this asymmetry is that those with negative contributions initially consider 
such contributions to be innocent mistakes for which they should not be held 
accountable, and that subsequent communication works to promote a more objective, 
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less self-biased view. The asymmetry is, however, also in line with query theory (Johnson, 
Häubl and Keinan, 2007): contestants’ initial focus on positive contributions occurs when 
the problem is framed in positive terms (“what share do you deserve?”), but switches to 
negative contributions when the framing becomes negative (“who should move their 
claim downward?”). 
Announcing a hardball strategy of not backing down turns out to not be beneficial. 
Contestants who used this threat do well relative to others, but they do not manage to 
get larger amounts in an absolute sense. Their opponents are worse off, because 
contestants who make a hardball announcement also walk the walk: they are less likely to 
make a concession, and thus frustrate the team’s chances of coming to resolution. The 
inefficacy of a hardball approach is in line with game-theoretic reasoning, as cheap talk 
should not yield any advantage if actors’ interests are not sufficiently aligned (Crawford 
and Sobel, 1982) and neither should simple strategies that anyone can follow. 
We find that contestants are more likely to announce a hardball strategy if the stakes are 
higher. Actual concession behavior appears to be affected by the stakes in a non-
monotonic fashion. The likelihood of concessions in our sample is U-shaped: contestants 
display a higher propensity to make concessions at the lowest and highest stakes 
quartiles, and less so in between. As a result, consensus is more easily reached if the 
jackpot is at the lower or upper quartile, and contestants retain a larger share of the 
jackpot in these cases. 
We find little to no effect of background characteristics on bargaining behavior and 
outcomes. This is in line with earlier results that demographic characteristics hardly 
explain any variance in bargaining performance (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Thompson, 
1990; Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998; Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999; Elfenbein 
et al., 2008), except in situations that have substantial structural ambiguity (Bowles, 
Babcock and McGinn, 2005). Furthermore, there seems to be no first-mover advantage. 
Those who get to make their claim early do not earn more. This suggests that first-mover 
advantages might be restricted to bargaining games of alternating offers. 
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We conclude with some thoughts on the generalizability of our results. There are three 
possible grounds for external validity concerns: the specific bargaining game, possible 
selection effects, and the unusual decision environment. 
First, the bargaining game indeed has some notable characteristics. Presumably, it was 
designed to make reaching consensus relatively difficult in order to promote the 
entertainment value of the show. Four characteristics spring to mind: the unanimity rule 
for reaching a decision, the use of face-to-face free-form communication, the indivisibility 
of the shares to be divided, and the continuous costs to bargaining. These aspects will 
undoubtedly have their effect on the bargaining process. 
The unanimity rule most likely makes it more difficult to reach consensus. Miller and 
Vanberg (2013) conducted an experiment with a highly structured bargaining game in 
which three subjects had to agree on the division of a joint pie by either the unanimity 
rule or the majority rule, and find that the effect of requiring unanimity in itself is 
aggravated by an increased tendency among subjects to reject offers. Communication has 
been found to affect bargaining in several ways. Bazerman et al. (2000) review the 
negotiation literature and conclude that face-to-face communication has the potential to 
foster agreements by development of rapport, decrease misunderstandings, and increase 
truth telling. At the same time, they find that face-to-face communication can lead to 
more pressure tactics and impasses if tensions are high. 
We are unaware of studies that examine the impact of indivisible shares and continuous 
costs to bargaining. For indivisible shares, the effect is probably highly dependent on the 
sizes of the differences between the shares. Dividing three equal shares will lead to 
immediate consensus under all circumstances. The highly unequal shares used in Divided, 
however, are likely to hamper agreement in comparison with less restrictive division 
rules. Continuous costs to bargaining probably increase tension. More discrete rules, such 
as a drop of 10 percentage points every 10 seconds or a once-and-for-all destruction of 
the jackpot after 100 seconds with no destruction in between, would have given subjects 
more time to negotiate before cost had to be incurred. It also seems reasonable to 
assume that the bargaining costs lead to some kind of sunk-cost effect, making players 
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less willing to back down from their initial claim. Overall, these four characteristics of our 
specific bargaining game thus appear to make consensus formation relatively difficult. On 
the other hand, aspects such as the large incentives (as compared to standard 
experiments) and the fact that the team has cooperated before playing the game may 
work to promote or facilitate consensus formation. 
The main focus of our analyses has not been on the general level of consensus. Rather, 
we focused on comparative statics, and it is unclear to what extent the specific bargaining 
game influences the effects of variables such as contributions and stakes. 
Communication, for example, might increase the importance of contributions by allowing 
subjects to reach consensus regarding who has earned which share, but it can also 
hamper the role of contributions because it allows for more pressure tactics. While such 
sensitivities are an interesting domain for further research, face-to-face communication, 
continuous cost to bargaining, and the requirement of a unanimous decision are features 
that our game show environment shares with many real world settings. 
The second generalizability concern relates to possible selection effects. Contestants self-
select into auditions and are then selected by producers of the show to play the game for 
real. It is unclear to which degree such selection processes may have influenced our 
findings. Still, our sample varied widely in terms of background characteristics, seemingly 
forming a cross-section of middle-class society. It is much closer to a cross-section of the 
general population than university students commonly employed in conventional 
laboratory experiments. Furthermore, take note that selection procedures are not unique 
to game shows, and form an intrinsic part of almost any field or laboratory setting. 
Last, a game show setting may impact behavior. While there is no live studio audience, 
contestants know that many people will observe their behavior on TV. This makes that 
the bargaining game is not strictly one-shot, as contestants’ behavior and outcomes 
might affect their reputation. The specific setting provides an incentive to fight harder, as 
one may not want to appear weak on TV. However, being stubborn and then 
consequently loosing (a large fraction of) the jackpot is also an outcome to be avoided. 
Relatedly, the game show format might create a desire to “win the contest” and go home 
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with more money than fellow team members, but contestants may also interpret the 
“contest” as a challenge to come to resolution with the people they teamed up with. 
We do not consider the possible influences of the specific decision environment to render 
our findings less interesting or less predictive of behavior in other settings. In laboratory 
and real-life situations there is normally always some degree or form of scrutiny, and 
each specific setting and contextual aspect will cause particular motives to be more 
prominent than others. For example, people normally approach bargaining for a pay 
increase at work differently from bargaining with a stranger over a second-hand car, and 
differently from bargaining with a spouse over who should do the ironing. That is not to 
say that we cannot learn anything more general from observing behavior in specific 
settings. We cannot study behavior under each and every possible set of conditions, and 
the optimal approach to assess the robustness and generalizability of findings is therefore 
to study behavior in a limited number of diverging settings. The contribution of the 
present chapter should be evaluated in this light. We employed the unique features of a 
TV game show to study bargaining behavior outside the laboratory and for stakes that are 
impossible to replicate in a behavioral laboratory. 
One of our main results is that entitlements derived from contributions are an important 
driving force behind bargaining behavior and outcomes. The importance of moral 
property rights in our high-stakes environment refutes the commonly held view that 
fairness concerns are unimportant when monetary incentives are sufficiently large. 
Another main result is perhaps in the inefficacy of adopting a hardball strategy to obtain a 
bigger share of the pie. Due to bargaining costs, the total pie in our game shrinks such 
that there is no advantage left for the threatening party and others are worse off. The 
recent political impasse in the US may serve as an illustration of the broader relevance of 
this finding. In a very different context than our show, pie-decreasing hardball moves of 
opposing politicians led to a costly shut down of the government and unprecedented 
threats to default on the government’s debt. 
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Chapter 4  | Risky Choice in the Limelight 
 
 
 
This chapter examines how risk behavior in the limelight differs from that in 
anonymity. In two separate experiments we find that subjects are more risk 
averse in the limelight. However, risky choices are similarly path dependent in 
the different treatments. Under both limelight and anonymous laboratory 
conditions, a simple prospect theory model with a path-dependent reference 
point provides a better explanation for subjects’ behavior than a flexible 
specification of expected utility theory. Additionally, our findings suggest that 
ambiguity aversion depends on being in the limelight, that passive experience 
has little effect on risk taking, and that reference points are determined by 
imperfectly updated expectations. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Individual decision-making is at the core of both economics and psychology, and 
continuous research efforts have resulted in a rich literature. Still, a persistent concern 
about empirical research in these fields is that specific contextual aspects may restrict the 
generalizability of findings. Each laboratory or field setting provides its own unique 
context that cannot be disregarded a priori (Loewenstein, 1999; Levitt and List, 2007a, 
2007b; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Camerer, 2011). One particular aspect of the context is 
the degree of public scrutiny under which a decision is made. Psychological research in 
this area indicates that the mere presence of others can facilitate performance in simple 
tasks but impair it in more complex ones (Zajonc, 1965; Bond and Titus, 1983), and that 
the expectation that one may have to justify one’s decisions to observers creates a desire 
to make decisions that others will judge favorably (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). 
Economists have demonstrated relatively little interest in context effects, and their 
studies on public scrutiny have primarily focused on social preferences (Levitt and List, 
2007a, 2007b). Surprisingly, whether and how public scrutiny influences risky choice has 
received relatively little attention from both economists and psychologists.31 In our 
professional and private lives we make decisions under varying degrees of scrutiny, and 
mapping the influence of this contextual aspect is therefore an important step in further 
broadening the scope of our understanding of risky choice. Also, from a methodological 
point of view, it is useful to know to what extent findings on risk preferences from a 
behavioral laboratory generalize to real world situations with more scrutiny, and whether 
risky choices observed in a high-scrutiny field setting resemble those in a situation with 
more privacy. 
                                                     
31
 Weigold and Schlenker (1991) find evidence that subjects display a degree of risk tolerance they believe 
to be judged favorably by observers. Vieider (2009) finds that loss aversion decreases when subjects are 
made accountable. He attributes this finding to the ease with which his subjects could recognize loss 
aversion as a bias and their wish to avoid negative judgments that would result from displaying this bias. 
Neither of these two studies used real incentives, which makes it costless for subjects to make a choice that 
is not truly preferred but thought to be more justifiable in the eyes of onlookers. For hypothetical and 
incentivized tasks, Miller and Fagley (1991), Takemura (1993, 1994), and Vieider (2011) find that the effect 
of framing outcomes as gains or losses decreases when subjects are made accountable. 
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A special example of the relevance of our research question is in the growing literature 
that studies decision making under risk on the basis of television (TV) game shows. Shows 
that have been used include Card Sharks (Gertner, 1993), Jeopardy! (Metrick, 1995), 
Illinois Instant Riches (Hersch and McDougall, 1997), Lingo (Beetsma and Schotman, 
2001), Hoosier Millionaire (Fullenkamp, Tenorio and Battalio, 2003), Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire? (Hartley, Lanot and Walker, 2006), and Deal or No Deal (Post et al., 2008). 
These shows offer unique opportunities to increase our understanding of how individuals 
and households make significant risky decisions such as stock market investments and the 
purchase, insurance, and financing of property.32 The large prizes in game shows enable 
researchers to study behavior for stakes that are considerably more consequential than 
those typically employed in experiments, and the simple and well-defined decision 
problems impose fewer auxiliary assumptions than uncontrolled field data. Also, even 
though selection effects are inevitable, game show contestants generally resemble a 
cross-section of the general population more closely than subjects in most conventional 
experiments. Given the attractive and distinguishing combination of features that game 
shows can have, more game show-based papers are likely to appear. Some critics, 
however, question the external validity of game show research, arguing that contestants’ 
choices might be influenced by pressures from the audience and distress from being in 
the limelight. As noted by Gertner (1993, p.519), for example: “if contestants care about 
the entertainment they provide, they may make riskier decisions than they otherwise 
would.” 
First and foremost, the present chapter contributes to the risky choice literature by 
comparing risky decision making in and out of the limelight. Next to this, it also adds 
some evidence to the literature on ambiguity aversion by comparing the effect of 
ambiguity under these two conditions, and to a recent literature on the effect of 
experience on choices by comparing the behavior of subjects with and without passive 
                                                     
32
 Game shows have been deployed on various other research domains as well, including strategic decision 
making (Bennett and Hickman, 1993; Berk, Hughson and Vandezande, 1996; Tenorio and Cason, 2002), 
discrimination (Levitt, 2004; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2005) and cooperative behavior (List, 
2004a, 2006; Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven, 2010a; Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White, 2010; van den 
Assem, van Dolder and Thaler, 2012). 
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experience. Finally, our estimations of structural models of choice add to the literature on 
reference point formation. 
To analyze how risky choice in the limelight differs from that under standard 
experimental conditions, we conducted two incentivized experiments that mimicked the 
game of the TV show Deal or No Deal (henceforth: DOND). The next section describes 
DOND and explains why we used this particular game. In both experiments, we employed 
laboratory and limelight treatments. In the laboratory treatments, subjects made 
decisions in the anonymity of a standard, computerized laboratory setting as typically 
employed in economic experiments. In the limelight treatments, subjects made their 
choices in a simulated game show environment, which included a live audience, a game 
show host, and video cameras. 
By using a game show environment to create public scrutiny, we also shed light on the 
validity of game shows as natural risky choice experiments. For domains other than risky 
choice, a number of studies have investigated this specific issue before. Tenorio and 
Cason (2002), Healy and Noussair (2004), and Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2009) 
observe how students play The Price is Right and The Weakest Link under laboratory 
conditions and find that their behavior or performance is similar to that of contestants in 
the TV show. 
We consider two ways in which the differences between the treatments can influence 
risky choice. First, we investigate whether the general degree of risk taking differs 
between treatments. Second, we examine whether the pattern of path-dependent risk 
behavior is different. Earlier DOND-based research has found that people show path 
dependency in the sense that they take more risk if the game develops either 
substantially worse or substantially better than earlier expectations (Post et al., 2008). 
These two effects are known as the break-even and house-money effect (Kameda and 
Davis, 1990; Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
If only the general degree of risk taking is affected, this is problematic only in so far as risk 
preferences are measured in one setting and used to derive point predictions about 
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behavior in another setting. It would imply that it is inappropriate to apply the same risk 
preference parameters across different settings. If, however, the pattern in risky choice is 
different, the repercussions are potentially more involved, because it would mean that 
we cannot use the same type of risky choice model across different settings. 
Our results show that subjects are more risk averse in the limelight than in the anonymity 
of a typical behavioral laboratory. Simple statistics, probit analyses, and structural choice 
model estimations consistently lead to this conclusion for both our experiments. The 
estimates for structural choice models suggest that the impact of the limelight on risk 
preference parameters is substantial. 
At the same time, however, we find a similar pattern of path-dependent risk behavior in 
the laboratory and limelight treatments. Under both experimental conditions, our simple 
prospect theory-inspired model (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) with a path-dependent reference point provides a better explanation for subjects’ 
behavior than a flexible specification of expected utility theory. Although our study is not 
designed to point out whether prospect theory or expected utility theory has greater 
descriptive power and any conclusion in this direction would depend on the precise 
empirical implementation of these two theories, it does show that the combination of 
elements included in our prospect theory model comes closer to the appropriate 
descriptive model of risky choice, and that this finding holds both in and out of the 
limelight. 
Three other noteworthy findings from our analyses are related to ambiguity aversion, the 
effect of experience, and reference-point formation. First, a design difference between 
the two sets of experiments that we conducted reveals that the effect of ambiguity 
depends on being in the limelight or not. Under limelight conditions, subjects take less 
risk in tasks where they experience some uncertainty about the distribution of possible 
outcomes than in tasks where the distribution is known. This difference in behavior is 
absent under laboratory conditions. Second, passive experience does not seem to affect 
loss aversion or risk aversion in general. One of our experiments featured a comeback 
treatment with subjects who had seen others perform the experimental task at an earlier 
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occasion. Comparisons between treatments show that their behavior is largely similar to 
that of inexperienced subjects. Last, we find evidence that preferences are based on 
imperfectly updated expectations. For all treatments, the parameter estimates of our 
prospect theory model indicate that subjects’ reference points are influenced by their 
initial beliefs about task outcomes. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the design, procedure and results 
of our first experiment. Section 4.3 reports on our second experiment. Section 4.4 
discusses our results and concludes. 
4.2 First Experiment 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment followed the basic setup of the popular TV game show Deal or No Deal. In 
DOND, contestants are repeatedly asked to make choices between a sure amount and a 
risky lottery. At the start, a contestant chooses one case out of a total of 26 numbered 
(brief)cases. Each closed case contains one of the game’s 26 randomly distributed and 
widely ranging monetary amounts. After selecting this personal case, a contestant has to 
select six of the other cases to be opened. The prizes in these cases are revealed and are 
no longer in play, thereby increasing the information on the prize in the contestant’s 
personal case. After the contents of six cases have been revealed, an imaginary “banker” 
offers to buy the contestant’s case. If the contestant decides “Deal”, she receives the 
amount offered and the game ends. If the contestant decides “No Deal”, the game 
continues and she has to open five additional cases. Based on the then remaining set of 
15 prizes, the banker makes a new offer. The contestant again has to decide either “Deal” 
or “No Deal”. After a “No Deal”, this process continues either until the contestant accepts 
an offer, or until no case other than the contestant’s own case is left and she receives the 
content of this case. The game lasts for a maximum of nine rounds. The number of cases 
to be opened in each round is 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, and 1, reducing the number of 
remaining cases from 26 to 20, 15, 11, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and finally 1. Figure 4.1 presents a 
schematic overview of the course of the game. 
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Figure 4.1: Flow Chart of the Game 
In each of a maximum of nine game rounds, the subject chooses a given number of cases to 
be opened. After the prizes in the chosen cases are revealed, an imaginary banker offers to 
buy the subject’s own case. If the subject accepts the offer (“Deal”), she receives the amount 
offered and the game ends. If the subject rejects the offer (“No Deal”), play continues and she 
enters the next round. If the subject decides “No Deal” in the ninth round, she receives the 
prize in her own case. (Taken from Post et al., 2008.) 
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In the experiment, subjects played DOND for real incentives in either a computer 
laboratory (laboratory treatment) or in a classroom mimicking a TV studio (limelight 
treatment). The prizes in the experiment were equal to the prizes used in the original 
Dutch edition of the TV show, scaled down by a factor of 10,000. The smallest amounts 
were rounded up to one cent. The resulting set of prizes was €0.01 (9 times due to 
rounding up); €0.05; €0.10; €0.25; €0.50; €0.75; €1; €2.50; €5; €7.50; €10; €20; €30; €40; 
€50; €100; €250; €500. The distribution of the prizes was clearly positively skewed, with a 
median of €0.63 and a mean of €39.14. Figure 4.2 demonstrates how the game was 
shown to subjects. 
The laboratory treatment was conducted as a typical economic experiment. Subjects 
played DOND in the quiet, controlled environment of a computerized laboratory, and 
made their choices on a private computer terminal. The setting was designed to minimize 
potential scrutiny from other subjects. In particular, computers surrounding a given 
subject were empty and a sunken screen and dividers were used to ensure privacy. 
The limelight treatment was designed to replicate a TV studio as closely as possible. The 
experiment took place in a theater-style lecture room. Subjects made their decisions on a 
lightened stage in front of a live audience, consisting of fellow students and some 
university employees. They were guided through the experiment by a game show host, 
played by a popular lecturer. Furthermore, video cameras were pointed at the subject on 
stage. The game was shown on a computer monitor in front of the subject and projected 
on a large screen for the audience. Members of the audience were allowed to applaud, 
shout hints, and the like. Before a game started, the host had a brief introductory talk 
with the subject on stage, covering basic topics such as the subject’s name, age, favorite 
sports, and other interests. 
 
FIRST EXPERIMENT  
 
87 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Example of the Game as Displayed on the Experimental Screens  
The various prizes are listed in the columns on the left and right side. Prizes that are 
eliminated are blurred. The current bank offer is shown at the top, and the subject or host 
can select either “Deal” or “No Deal” by clicking on the respective button. The remaining 
cases are shown in the center of the screen, while the subject’s own case is in the bottom 
left-hand part. This example shows the two options open to a subject after opening six cases 
in the first round: accept a bank offer of €5.44, or continue to play with the remaining 20 
cases. Note that a comma is used to separate decimals here, as this is common for our 
subjects. 
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The data from the limelight treatment has previously been analyzed in Post et al. 
(2008).33 To facilitate comparisons with the actual game show in that study, each subject 
replayed one of the first 40 scenarios from the Dutch version of DOND: independent of 
the order in which a subject opened the numbered cases, the order in which the prizes 
and the offers appeared corresponded exactly to the original scenario. In addition, we 
matched the gender of subjects and TV contestants: female (male) subjects were 
randomly assigned to scenarios from female (male) contestants. We did not select these 
40 scenarios to encourage or avoid particular situations or behaviors. In fact, subjects 
played a randomly chosen game that had been generated by chance at an earlier point in 
time.34 The instructions were as similar as possible to those that had been handed out to 
TV show contestants. Subjects received the original Dutch instructions used for the TV 
version, plus a cover sheet explaining the experiment. We did not impose any time 
constraint. 
Subjects were randomly selected from a larger population of business or economics 
students at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam who had applied to participate in 
economic experiments. In total, 40 subjects took part in the limelight treatment, and 40 
took part in the laboratory treatment: one for each of the 40 scenarios in both 
treatments. We subdivided subjects in the limelight treatment across two separate 
sessions. In total, 80 students were invited to the two limelight sessions, approximately 
40 per session. This was done to ensure a sufficiently large audience and to create a 
buffer in case some subjects would not show up. After one subject had finished playing 
the game, a new subject was selected to play, until 20 subjects had played the game. 
Hence, approximately half of the students in each session were selected to play. Subjects 
were paid according to the outcome of their game. Subjects who were not selected 
received no pay. Each game lasted about five to ten minutes, and an entire session lasted 
                                                     
33
 The limelight treatment was employed there to analyze the isolated effect of the amounts at stake. 
(Another treatment was conducted under identical limelight conditions but used stakes that were a factor 
of ten larger.) 
34
 If a subject played on longer than the original contestant, we had no information on eliminated prizes and 
bank offers from that point onward. We then randomly selected the eliminated prizes ourselves (holding 
them constant across treatments) and set the offers according to the pattern observed for the TV episodes. 
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approximately 2.5 hours. The 40 subjects who were selected for the laboratory treatment 
were similarly subdivided across two different sessions. In each session, 20 subjects 
played the game simultaneously. 
Using the game of DOND has several benefits. Its appealing qualities have attracted 
considerable research attention, making it the most frequently studied game show in the 
domain of risky choice (Blavatskyy and Pogrebna, 2010; Brooks et al., 2009a, 2009b; Deck, 
Lee and Reyes, 2008; Post et al., 2008). The game involves only simple stop-go decisions 
(“Deal” or “No Deal”) that require no or minimal skill, knowledge or strategy. Moreover, 
the dynamic nature of the game allows to not only compare general levels of risk taking 
between treatments, but also the pattern of path dependence. In addition, subjects may 
find it relatively natural to make decisions in front of an audience when the task at hand 
is from a TV game show, and the entertainment value of DOND may help to involve the 
audience in the game. The great popularity of the game on TV brings the advantage that 
it is generally well understood by subjects. 
Descriptive Statistics and Probit Analysis 
In total, we observed 579 decisions made by 80 subjects. A crude way to investigate 
differences in risky choice between the treatments is to compare subjects’ stop rounds. A 
stop round is the round in which a subject decides to accept the bank offer (“Deal”), or 10 
if she rejects all nine offers. The bank offer typically starts as a small percentage of the 
average remaining prize, and gradually increases as the game proceeds. Deciding “Deal” 
at a relatively early (late) stage thus implies a relatively high (low) degree of risk aversion. 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the stop round for both treatments. Subjects in the 
limelight treatment decide to “Deal” earlier than subjects in the laboratory treatment. 
The average stop round in the limelight treatment is 6.93, compared to 7.93 in the 
laboratory treatment. The difference of exactly one round is statistically significant (t-test: 
p = 0.019; Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.021). 
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Figure 4.3: Distributions of Stop Rounds (First Experiment)  
The figure depicts the distribution of stop rounds for the two treatments of our first 
experiment. The stop round is the round in which the bank offer is accepted (“Deal”), or 10 
for subjects who rejected all offers. In the laboratory treatment, subjects played the game in 
a standard economic laboratory setting, while in the limelight treatment subjects played the 
game in an environment mimicking a TV studio with live audience. 
 
The stop round is a crude measure as it does not reflect differences in the actual bank 
offer, the stakes, or the risk of continuing play. To control for these factors, we perform a 
probit regression analysis. The dependent variable is the subject’s decision, taking the 
value of 1 for “Deal” and 0 for “No Deal”. We explain subjects’ decisions using the 
following variables: 
- EV/100: included to control for the stakes, and calculated as the current 
average remaining prize (divided by 100 Euros for more convenient regression 
coefficients); 
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Table 4.1: Probit Regression Results (First Experiment) 
The table displays the maximum likelihood estimation results of a probit model aimed at explaining the 
decisions of the subjects in the laboratory (N = 40) and limelight (N = 40) treatment of our first experiment. 
The dependent variable is the subject’s decision, with a value of 1 for “Deal” and 0 for “No Deal”. EV is the 
current average remaining prize in Euros, BO is the bank offer in Euros, Stdev is the standard deviation of 
the distribution of the average remaining prize in the next game round, and Limelight is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 for observations from the limelight treatment. In addition to the maximum likelihood 
estimates for the regression coefficients, the table reports the log-likelihood (LL), McFadden R
2
, and the 
total number of observations (No. obs.). The p-values (within parentheses) are corrected for correlation 
between the responses of a given subject (subject-level cluster correction). 
 
 
Coefficient 
 Constant -1.340 (0.036) 
EV/100  1.836 (0.000) 
EV/BO -1.188 (0.004) 
Stdev/EV  2.186 (0.000) 
Limelight  0.509 (0.004) 
LL -131.1 
 McFadden R
2 
0.355 
 No. obs. 579 
  
- EV/BO: included to control for the expected return of continuing play, and 
calculated as the average remaining prize divided by the bank offer, or the 
expected relative return (+1) from rejecting both the current and all 
subsequent bank offers; 
- Stdev/EV: included to control for the riskiness of continuing play, and 
calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the distribution of the average 
remaining prize in the next round by the current average remaining prize; 
- Limelight: the main variable of interest, a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the choice was made in the limelight treatment and 0 if it was made in 
the lab treatment. 
We do not include the common demographic variables Age and Gender. Our subjects are 
all students of about the same age, and Gender does not have significant explanatory 
power. We allow for the possibility that errors of individual subjects are correlated 
through cluster corrections on the standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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Table 4.1 shows the regression results. As expected for risk-averse individuals, the 
propensity to “Deal” is positively related to the riskiness of continuing play, and 
negatively related to the expected return of continuing play. Furthermore, the “Deal” 
propensity increases with the stakes. Consistent with the simple analysis of stop rounds, 
subjects in the limelight are more likely to “Deal” than those in the laboratory (p = 0.004). 
As mentioned earlier, in the context of DOND, people have been shown to take more risk 
after earlier expectations have been shattered or surpassed. In order to investigate this 
pattern descriptively for our two treatments, we classify subjects as being “losers”, 
“neutrals”, or “winners”. We follow the method of Post et al. (2008), which takes into 
account the downside risk and the upside potential of rejecting a bank offer. In particular, 
we define a subject’s best-case scenario (BCr) and worst-case scenario (WCr) of opening 
another case in round r as: 
(4.1)    
1
min



r
rrr
r
n
xxn
BC  
(4.2)    
1
max



r
rrr
r
n
xxn
WC  
where nr is the number of remaining cases in round r, xr is the average remaining prize in 
round r, and xr
min  and xr
max  stand for the smallest and largest remaining prize, 
respectively. A subject is classified as a “loser” if her BCr belongs to the worst one-third of 
all subjects in that round, and as a “winner” if her WCr belongs to the best one-third. 
Game situations that satisfy neither condition (or both) are classified as “neutral”. If two 
subjects share the same BCr or WCr but one falls below the one-third cutoff and one 
above it, then both are classified as “neutral”. 
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Table 4.2: Decisions after Bad and Good Fortune (First Experiment) 
The table summarizes the decisions of the subjects in the laboratory (Panel A; N = 40) and limelight (Panel 
B; N = 40) treatment of our first experiment. The samples are split based on the fortune experienced during 
the game. A subject is classified as a “loser” (“winner”) if her average remaining prize, after eliminating the 
lowest (highest) remaining prize, is among the worst (best) one-third for all subjects in the same game 
round. The table displays the percentage bank offer (“%BO”), the number of subjects (“No.”) and the 
percentage of subjects choosing “Deal” (“%D”) for each category and game round. 
 
    Loser   Neutral   Winner 
Round   %BO No. %D 
 
%BO No. %D 
 
%BO No. %D 
A. Laboratory 
1   6 14 0   6 12 0   6 14 0 
2 
 
15 14 0 
 
13 12 0 
 
15 14 0 
3 
 
42 13 0 
 
32 14 0 
 
32 13 0 
4 
 
68 14 0 
 
61 12 8 
 
56 14 7 
5 
 
83 13 0 
 
74 12 0 
 
73 13 15 
6 
 
92 12 8 
 
88 12 25 
 
86 12 25 
7 
 
98 9 33 
 
99 11 0 
 
94 9 11 
8 
 
104 6 17 
 
101 13 23 
 
102 6 17 
9 
 
101 5 20 
 
102 10 70 
 
104 5 60 
1-9 
  
100 6 
  
108 13 
  
100 11 
B. Limelight 
1   6 14 0   6 12 0   6 14 0 
2 
 
15 14 0 
 
13 12 0 
 
15 14 0 
3 
 
42 13 0 
 
32 14 0 
 
32 13 0 
4 
 
68 14 0 
 
61 12 25 
 
56 14 14 
5 
 
81 12 0 
 
76 11 18 
 
74 12 17 
6 
 
92 11 9 
 
87 9 44 
 
88 11 55 
7 
 
94 4 25 
 
98 12 25 
 
93 4 0 
8 
 
106 4 0 
 
101 8 50 
 
102 4 75 
9 
 
108 1 0 
 
101 7 29 
 
105 1 100 
1-9 
  
87 2 
  
97 19 
  
87 16 
 
Table 4.2 shows the choices of subjects conditional on the classification of their game 
situation. In both treatments, winners and losers continue play more often than subjects 
in the neutral group. This difference is especially pronounced for losers. 
Structural Models 
We now move to the estimation of structural choice models in order to examine how the 
more risk-averse behavior in the limelight as opposed to the laboratory corresponds to 
differences in risk preference parameters, and to further investigate the pattern of path 
RISKY CHOICE IN THE LIMELIGHT 
 
94 
dependence. We implement two simple structural models: one in the spirit of expected 
utility theory (EU), and the other inspired by prospect theory (PT).35 
Structural choice models allow for a wide range of specifications. For example, there are 
many ways to specify the utility function, the error term, reference point dynamics, and 
probability weighting. We follow the methodology used in the earlier DOND-based 
studies by Post et al. (2008) and Baltussen et al. (2012), and summarize this approach 
below. For further methodological details, background and discussion, we refer to these 
two prior studies. 
For our EU specification, we apply a flexible-form expo-power utility function that allows 
for the combination of increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and decreasing absolute 
risk aversion (DARA): 
(4.3)    

  )exp(1
)(
1

x
xu  
where α and  are the risk aversion coefficients, subject to α ≥ 0 to exclude (more 
exotic) utility functions that combine concavity and convexity. The expo-power function 
reduces to a CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) power function when α → 0, and to a 
CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) exponential function when  = 0.36 
 
 
                                                     
35
 Henceforth, we refer to these models as the EU model and the PT model. We acknowledge that both 
theories can be implemented through numerous different and sometimes overlapping specifications. The fit 
for EU could, for example, be improved with an even more flexible utility function that has both concave 
and convex segments. As explained in the introduction, our study does not aim to point out whether 
prospect theory or expected utility theory has greater descriptive power. 
36
 We do not follow Post et al. (2008) in including initial wealth as a free parameter. This simplification is in 
line with the standard approach in experimental research, and rules out the possibility of erroneously 
capturing differences in risk aversion between randomized treatments by differences in wealth estimates. 
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For PT, we use a simple representation that incorporates loss aversion, uses probabilities 
as decision weights, and has equal curvature for gains and losses. In particular, the value 
function is defined as: 
(4.4)    
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where 0  is the loss-aversion parameter, RP is the reference point, and 0  
represents the curvature of the value function. 
Recent literature suggests that reference points are expectation-based and dynamically 
but partially updated (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007; Abeler et al., 2011; Baucells, Weber 
and Welfens, 2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011). In this spirit, the reference point in round r, 
RPr, is modeled as a function of the current bank offer, Br, and the relative increase of the 
average remaining prize during the game, 
rrr xxxd /)( 0 : 
(4.5)    
rrr BdRP )( 21        
where 
1 < 1 ( 1 >1) indicates that the reference point generally takes a value below 
(above) the current bank offer, and where 
2 ≤ 0 allows for (imperfect) updating of the 
reference point across rounds. 
2  = 0 reflects perfect updating, while 2  < 0 implies that 
the reference point sticks to initial expectations. To illustrate: when 
1  = 1 and 2  = 0, 
the reference point equals the current bank offer; when 
1  = 1 and 2  = -1, the reference 
point corresponds to the amount that would have been on offer if the average prize had 
been at its starting level; when 
1  = 0 and 2  = 0, the reference point is zero and all 
outcomes are considered as gains. Combined with loss aversion and a value function that 
is concave for gains and convex for losses, the reference point model allows for break-
even and house-money effects. 
Post et al. (2008) and Baltussen et al. (2012) also include a separate term for changes 
during the last two rounds. We drop this short-term lag for brevity and convenience. As 
also found by Baltussen et al. (2012), intermediate changes are economically and 
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statistically insignificant for the reference point, and including the term has no material 
effect on the other parameters for each of our treatments.37 Moreover, the use of one 
single stickiness parameter facilitates comparisons between treatments. 
We make the simplifying assumption that subjects look ahead only one round, implying 
that they compare the current bank offer with the distribution of possible bank offers in 
the next round. As explained by Post et al. (2008), assuming a myopic frame rather than 
multi-stage backward induction is behaviorally plausible and does not materially affect 
the results. Post et al. (2008) also show that the percentage bank offer can be adequately 
captured by the simple function: 
(4.6)    )9(1 )1(
r
rrr bbb

      
where br is the percentage bank offer relative to the expected value of the remaining 
prizes in round r, and ρ measures the speed at which it approaches the expected value  
(0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1). Post et al. (2008) estimate ρ to be 0.832 for the 40 episodes of the Dutch 
edition of DOND that we used as scenarios in our experiment. In our analysis, we treat 
this bank offer model as deterministic and known to the subjects. 
We apply maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the unknown parameters. The 
likelihood of each decision is based on the utility difference between the current bank 
offer and future bank offers. We assume that a decision is more difficult if the standard 
deviation of the utility values from continuing play is larger, and set the standard 
deviation of the model error proportional to this measure. To reduce the potential 
influence of individual observations, we truncate the likelihood of each decision at a 
minimum of one percent. 
 
                                                     
37
 The unimportance of recent changes for the reference point in experiments can be explained by the 
shorter duration of a game. The original model was designed to capture the behavior of contestants in the 
TV version of the game, where the recording of a game lasts for about an hour and where recent 
developments are thus more salient. In our experiments, a game lasts no more than ten minutes, increasing 
the likelihood that subjects simply compare their current situation with that at the start of their game. 
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Table 4.3: Expected Utility Model Estimates (First Experiment) 
The table displays the maximum likelihood estimation results of our EU model for the laboratory (Panel A; 
N = 40) and limelight (Panel B; N = 40) treatment of our first experiment. Shown are the risk aversion 
parameters (α and ) of the utility function, and the noise parameter (σ). The table also shows the log-
likelihood (LL), the AIC and BIC statistics, and the number of decisions (No. obs.). The implied certainty 
coefficient (CC; certainty equivalent as a fraction of the expected value) is shown for 50/50 gambles of €0 or 
€10
z
, z = 0, 1, 2, 3. The p-values (within parentheses) are corrected for correlation between the responses of 
a given subject (subject-level cluster correction). 
 
 
Laboratory 
 
Limelight 
α - 
 
 0.021 (0.000) 
 -0.861 (0.022) 
 
0.000 (1.000) 
σ 0.544 (0.000)  0.332 (0.000) 
LL -85.5 
 
-78.7 
AIC 177.0 163.4 
BIC 188.2  174.2 
No. obs. 308   271 
CC (0/1) 1.378   0.995 
CC (0/10) 1.378 
 
0.948 
CC (0/100) 1.378 
 
0.554 
CC (0/1000) 1.378 
 
0.067 
 
Table 4.3 gives the results of the EU model for both treatments. For the laboratory 
treatment, the expo-power function converges to a risk-seeking CRRA power function. In 
terms of explanatory power, this model outperforms a naive model that assumes risk 
neutrality (2(2) = 24.27, p < 0.001). In contrast, the function reduces to a risk-averse 
CARA exponential function for the limelight treatment. This model also fits the data 
better than a risk-neutral model (2(2) = 10.29, p = 0.006). 
The shapes of the estimated utility functions are thus very different for the two 
treatments: one is convex and the other concave. Certainty equivalents (CEs) and 
certainty coefficients (CCs) can help to interpret the degrees of risk aversion implied by 
the models. The values nicely illustrate the substantial differences between the two 
treatments. For a lottery with a 50 percent chance of €100 and €0 otherwise, the implied 
CE under limelight conditions is €27.72. The CC is 27.72 / 50.00, or 55 percent. For the 
laboratory treatment, the CE (CC) of €68.91 (138%) is well above the expected value 
(100%). 
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Table 4.4: Path Dependence (First Experiment) 
The table shows the maximum likelihood estimation results of our EU model for subsamples from the 
laboratory (Panel A) and limelight (Panel B) treatment of our first experiment. For each treatment, the 
sample is split based on the fortune experienced during the game. A subject is classified as a “loser” 
(“winner”) if her average remaining prize, after eliminating the lowest (highest) remaining prize, is among 
the worst (best) one-third for all subjects in the same game round. Definitions are as in Table 4.3. 
 
  Loser   Neutral   Winner 
A. Laboratory 
α - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
  -1.459 (0.070) 
 
-0.459 (0.290) 
 
-0.668 (0.101) 
σ 0.530 (0.000)  0.431 (0.007)  0.577 (0.000) 
LL -22.0   -32.9   -28.5 
No. obs. 100   108   100 
CC (0/1) 1.509 
 
1.244 
 
1.320 
CC (0/10) 1.509 
 
1.244 
 
1.320 
CC (0/100) 1.509 
 
1.244 
 
1.320 
CC (0/1000) 1.509  1.244  1.320 
B. Limelight 
α -2.251 (0.095)   0.018 (0.064)   0.027 (0.000) 
 0.000 (1.000) 
 
0.000 (1.000) 
 
0.000 (1.000) 
σ 0.271 (0.000)  0.374 (0.000)  0.252 (0.000) 
LL -8.3 
 
-34.5 
 
-20.2 
No. obs. 87 
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87 
CC (0/1) 1.473 
 
0.995 
 
0.993 
CC (0/10) 1.938 
 
0.954 
 
0.932 
CC (0/100) 1.994 
 
0.595 
 
0.464 
CC (0/1000) >1.999  0.076  0.051 
 
The EU specification has difficulties to capture the different preferences of losers, 
neutrals and winners (as defined earlier). This is illustrated in Table 4.4, which reports 
separate EU-model estimates for the subsamples. In the limelight, the estimated utility 
function for losers reflects a preference for risk, while neutrals and winners are risk 
averse. In the laboratory, each subgroup is best described by a model of risk-seeking 
preferences, but losers are more risk prone than neutrals and winners. The CCs illustrate 
the differences between the utility functions. 
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Table 4.5: Prospect Theory Model Estimates (First Experiment) 
The table displays the maximum likelihood estimation results of our PT model for the laboratory (Panel A; 
N = 40) and limelight (Panel B; N = 40) treatment of our first experiment. Shown are the loss aversion (λ) 
and curvature (α) parameters of the value function, the two parameters of the reference point model (θ1 
and θ2), and the noise parameter (σ). The table also shows the log-likelihood (LL), the AIC and BIC statistics, 
and the number of decisions (No. obs.). The implied certainty coefficient (CC; certainty equivalent as a 
fraction of the expected value) is shown for 50/50 gambles of €0 or €10
z
, for any z > 0, assuming that the 
reference point equals 0%, 100%, or 200% of the expected value. For λ and α, the null hypotheses are that 
these parameters equal unity, implying no utility curvature and no loss aversion. The other parameters are 
tested relative to zero. The p-values (within parentheses) are corrected for correlation between the 
responses of a given subject (subject-level cluster correction). 
 
 
Laboratory 
 
Limelight 
α 0.554 (0.000)  0.711 (0.001) 
λ 1.505 (0.042) 
 
2.825 (0.000) 
θ1 1.014 (0.000) 
 
1.040 (0.000) 
θ2 -0.045 (0.001) 
 
-0.072 (0.019) 
σ 0.334 (0.000)  0.257 (0.000) 
LL -66.8 
 
-63.6 
AIC 143.7 
 
137.2 
BIC 162.3 
 
155.2 
No. obs. 308 
 
271 
CC (0%) 0.572 
 
0.754 
CC (100%) 0.960 
 
0.796 
CC (200%) 1.428 
 
1.246 
 
Table 4.5 shows the PT estimates. In the laboratory treatment, we find a rather strong 
utility curvature, with an α of 0.554. The loss aversion coefficient, λ, equals 1.505. Both 
values differ significantly from unity (α: p < 0.001; λ: p = 0.042). Furthermore, the 
reference point sticks to earlier expectations, with 
2  = -0.045 (p = 0.001). In the absence 
of changed expectations, it takes a value that is close to the current bank offer  
(
1  = 1.014). 
In the limelight treatment, utility curvature (α = 0.711, p = 0.001) and loss aversion 
(λ = 2.825, p < 0.001) occur as well. Again, the reference point is sticky (
2  = -0.072, 
p = 0.019), and, on average, close to the bank offer (
1  = 1.040). While the curvature and 
reference point parameters are not significantly different between the two treatments, 
loss aversion is stronger in the limelight than in the laboratory (α: p = 0.142; λ: p = 0.003; 
1 : p = 0.166; 2 : p = 0.423). 
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Finally, note that the PT model  which can capture the path dependence of risk attitudes 
through a sticky reference point, loss aversion, and reflection of the value function 
around the reference point  explains subjects’ choices significantly better than the EU 
model. This better fit holds for both the limelight and the laboratory treatment, also 
when we take into account the larger number of parameters as compared to the EU 
model (consider the very different AIC and BIC values). 
4.3 Second Experiment 
Design and Procedure 
To investigate the robustness of the results, we conducted a second experiment. Below 
we list the design differences. In all other respects, the new experiment was the same as 
the previous one. 
First, we used fixed percentage bank offers. Although subjects in the first experiment had 
been informed about the two most important factors that determine the bank offer (the 
bank offer strongly depends on the average remaining prize, and the percentage bank 
offer gradually increases over the rounds), subjects still faced some ambiguity about the 
precise offers. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the treatment effects are related to 
ambiguity rather than risk preferences (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992). In the 
second experiment we therefore used fixed percentage bank offers for each game round. 
That is, the bank offer was a percentage of the expected value of the prize in the subject’s 
case that depended on the round number only. For round 1 to 9, the percentages were 
15, 30, 45, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and 100, respectively. Subjects were informed about this 
precise structure in the instructions. 
Second, we added a third treatment. Subjects in the limelight treatment passively gained 
experience in playing the game by watching the decisions and outcomes of others. In the 
first experiment, a subject in the limelight, on average, had watched 9.5 others play the 
game before she was selected to play herself. In contrast, laboratory subjects did not 
observe any other subject playing prior to their own game. To examine whether 
SECOND EXPERIMENT  
 
101 
differences in such passive experience matter, we also ran a comeback treatment. This 
treatment consisted of subjects who had been audience members in the limelight 
treatment, but had not been selected to play the game on stage themselves. These 
subjects were invited to play the game in the laboratory afterwards. 
An additional benefit of this approach is that subjects in the limelight treatment now 
always had the opportunity to play the game. In the first experiment, this was not the 
case as those who were not selected went home empty-handed. As a result, a sense of 
relief or feelings of luck may have influenced the behavior of those selected. Our 
announcement of the comeback session avoids this possible confound. 
Last, we now used completely random scenarios and more formal experimental 
instructions. Because comparison with the actual game show was not one of the 
objectives of this new experiment, there was no need to replay scenarios from the 
original TV show or to use the instructions that had been handed out to TV show 
contestants. 
The subjects were randomly selected first-year economics students at the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam. Subjects who had taken part in the first experiment could not 
participate. In total, we observed 91 subjects in the laboratory treatment, 40 in the 
limelight treatment, and 51 in the comeback treatment.38 All subjects in the comeback 
treatment had previously watched 20 subjects play the game on stage in our limelight 
treatment. 
 
 
 
                                                     
38
 The laboratory treatment of this second experiment is also used by Baltussen et al. (2012) to investigate 
different types of incentive systems. 
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Figure 4.4: Distributions of Stop Rounds (Second Experiment) 
The figure depicts the distribution of stop rounds for the three treatments of our second 
experiment. In the comeback treatment, subjects played the game in a standard economic 
laboratory setting after viewing others play the game in the limelight treatment. Other 
definitions are as in Figure 4.3. 
 
Analyses 
As with the first experiment, we start with an analysis of the stop rounds.39 Recall that 
deciding “Deal” relatively early (late) indicates a relatively high (low) degree of risk 
aversion. The treatment differences are less pronounced than before. The average stop 
round in the limelight treatment is 7.55, compared to 7.87 in the laboratory treatment 
and 8.27 in the comeback treatment. While the average stop round is thus lowest in the 
limelight treatment, the differences with the two other treatments are not statistically 
significant (vs. laboratory: t-test p = 0.463, Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.406;  
                                                     
39
 Three subjects in this experiment ended up with trivial choice problems involving prizes of one cent only. 
Each rejected all nine offers, implying stop round values of 10. The results are not materially different when 
we set their stop round equal to the number of the first round that had no prizes other than prizes of one 
cent (or to the average of this number and 10). We omit these uninformative choices in the subsequent 
probit regression analyses and structural choice model estimations. 
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vs. comeback: t-test p = 0.109, Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.126). The difference between 
the laboratory and the comeback treatment is not significant either (t-test: p = 0.291; 
Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.362). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the stop round for 
the three treatments. 
The absence of a treatment effect in the stop rounds may be related to the crudeness of 
this analysis. While the 40 subjects in each of the two treatments in the first experiment 
played the same 40 scenarios as TV show contestants, subjects in this experiment faced 
completely random scenarios. Decision problems can thus be markedly different between 
treatments, making it even more important to control for differences in the stakes, bank 
offer, and risk of continuing play. Therefore, we now move to the probit and structural 
model analyses. For background on the methods, we refer to the previous section. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the probit regression. The results closely resemble those of 
the first experiment. The propensity to “Deal” is positively related to the riskiness of 
continuing play and to the stakes, and negatively to the expected return of continuing 
play. After controlling for these variables, subjects in the limelight turn out to be 
significantly more likely to “Deal” than those in the laboratory (p = 0.037) and then those 
in the comeback treatment (p = 0.004). There is no significant difference between the 
laboratory and the comeback treatment (p = 0.414). 
Panel A of Table 4.7 presents the results of the structural model estimations for EU. As in 
the previous experiment, the expo-power function converges to a risk-seeking CRRA 
power function for the laboratory treatment. The same is found for the comeback 
treatment. In both cases the estimated model outperforms a naive model that assumes 
risk neutrality (laboratory: 2(2) = 30.23, p < 0.001; comeback: 2(2) = 15.20, p < 0.001). 
The  parameter is not significantly different between the laboratory and comeback 
treatment (p = 0.359). For the limelight treatment, the expo-power function again 
reduces to a risk-averse CARA exponential function that outperforms risk neutrality  
(2(2) = 11.97, p = 0.003). 
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Table 4.6: Probit Regression Results (Second Experiment) 
The table displays the maximum likelihood estimation results of a probit model aimed at explaining the 
decisions of the subjects in the laboratory (N = 91), limelight (N = 40) and comeback (N = 51) treatment of 
our second experiment. Comeback is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for observations from the 
comeback treatment. Other definitions are as in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Coefficient 
 Constant -1.519 (0.000) 
EV/100 1.090 (0.000) 
EV/BO -0.661 (0.000) 
Stdev/EV 1.267 (0.000) 
Limelight 0.293 (0.037) 
Comeback -0.111 (0.414) 
LL -291.1 
 McFadden R
2 
0.258 
 No. obs. 1367 
  
Certainty equivalents and certainty coefficients can again help to interpret the parameter 
values and treatment differences. The CE (CC) for a lottery with a 50 percent chance of 
€100, for example, is €38.07 (76%) in the limelight. For the laboratory and comeback 
treatment, the values are €63.07 (126%) and €59.43 (119%), respectively. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 presents the estimation results for PT. In the laboratory treatment, 
we find a rather strong utility curvature, with an α of 0.408. Loss aversion is limited, with 
λ equaling 1.259. Both values differ significantly from unity (α: p < 0.001; λ: p = 0.005). 
Furthermore, the reference point sticks to earlier expectations, with 
2  = -0.009 
(p < 0.001), and is, on average, located in the vicinity of the bank offer (
1  = 1.002). For 
subjects in the comeback treatment, we find a curvature of 0.639, a loss aversion of 
1.407, and reference point parameters of -0.067 and 1.015 (all p ≤ 0.005). When we 
compare the various parameters of these two treatments, we find that subjects in the 
comeback treatment demonstrate less curvature and a stickier and more elevated 
reference point than subjects in the laboratory treatment (α: p = 0.001; λ: p = 0.278;  
1 : p = 0.014; 2 : p = 0.015). 
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Table 4.7: EU and PT Model Estimates (Second Experiment) 
The table displays the maximum likelihood estimation results of the EU (Panel A) and PT (Panel B) model for 
the laboratory (N = 91), limelight (N = 40) and comeback (N = 51) treatment of our second experiment. The 
panels follow the format and definitions of Table 4.3 and Table 4.5. 
 
 
Laboratory 
 
Comeback  Limelight 
A. Expected Utility Theory 
α - 
  
-   0.010 (0.000) 
 -0.504 (0.000) 
 
-0.332 (0.006)  0.000 (1.000) 
σ 0.375 (0.000) 
 
0.296 (0.000)  0.196 (0.000) 
LL -165.2 
 
-88.1  -71.3 
AIC 336.5 
 
182.2  148.6 
BIC 350.0 
 
194.1  159.6 
No. obs. 677 
 
401  289 
CC (0/1) 1.261 
 
1.189  0.998 
CC (0/10) 1.261 
 
1.189  0.975 
CC (0/100) 1.261 
 
1.189  0.761 
CC (0/1000) 1.261 
 
1.189  0.140 
B. Prospect Theory 
α 0.408 (0.000)  0.639 (0.000)  0.751 (0.000) 
λ 1.259 (0.005)  1.407 (0.000)  1.863 (0.000) 
θ1 1.002 (0.000)  1.015 (0.000)  1.088 (0.000) 
θ2 -0.009 (0.000)  -0.067 (0.005)  -0.154 (0.000) 
σ 0.223 (0.000)  0.163 (0.000)  0.231 (0.000) 
LL -142.7  -59.9  -61.0 
AIC 295.4  129.8  131.9 
BIC 317.9  149.8  150.3 
No. obs. 677  401  289 
CC (0%) 0.367  0.676  0.794 
CC (100%) 0.996  0.951  0.857 
CC (200%) 1.633  1.324  1.206 
 
 
In the limelight treatment, we similarly find significant values for utility curvature  
(α = 0.751, p < 0.001), loss aversion (λ = 1.863, p < 0.001), and stickiness of the reference 
point (
2  = -0.154, p < 0.001). In the absence of changed expectations, the reference 
point takes a value that is relatively close to the current bank offer (
1  = 1.088). In line 
with the first experiment, subjects in the limelight are more loss averse (p = 0.006) than 
subjects in the laboratory. In addition they now also display significantly less curvature of 
the value function (p < 0.001) and a stickier and more elevated reference point (both 
p < 0.001). Compared to the comeback treatment, subjects in the limelight are again 
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more loss averse (p = 0.040), and they also have a stickier (p = 0.003) and more elevated 
(p < 0.001) reference point. Utility curvature is not significantly different (p = 0.173). 
Similar to the first experiment, the PT model explains subjects’ choices significantly better 
than the EU model. This better fit holds for all three treatments. Further analyses yield 
evidence of the same pattern of path dependence as in the first experiment: in all 
treatments, we find that losers have a greater risk appetite than winners and neutral 
subjects. 
The major difference between the two experiments was that the future bank offers were 
somewhat ambiguous to subjects in the first, and fixed and known to them in the second. 
A comparison of the estimation results can thus give an indication of whether the effect 
of ambiguity on behavior is similar or different in and out of the limelight.40 
Because the bank offer structure differs between the experiments, and the stop round 
and probit analyses cannot take this difference into account, we consider the structural 
model results only. For EU, the expo-power function reduces to a similar CRRA power 
function in the two laboratory treatments; the relevant risk aversion parameter is not 
significantly different (risk:  = -0.504; ambiguity:  = -0.861; p = 0.371). In the limelight, 
however, the risk aversion parameter of the resulting CARA function is marginally 
significantly larger in the experiment with ambiguity than in the one without (risk: 
α = 0.010; ambiguity: α = 0.021; p = 0.066). The differences between the CEs (CCs) for a 
lottery with a 50 percent chance of €100 again illustrate the treatment effects. Under 
laboratory conditions, the values of €63.07 (126%; risk) and €68.91 (138%; ambiguity) are 
relatively similar. Under limelight conditions, the values of €38.07 (76%; risk) and €27.72 
(55%; ambiguity) are clearly more different. 
For PT, the differences in behavior translate into different loss aversion coefficients. For 
the laboratory treatments, there is no significant difference between the two 
                                                     
40
 Admittedly, comparisons between the limelight treatments are potentially confounded by another design 
difference. In contrast to subjects in the other treatments, subjects in the limelight treatment with 
ambiguity (first experiment) were told at the start that only half of them would play the game. A sense of 
relief or feelings of luck might have influenced the behavior of those selected. 
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experiments (risk: λ = 1.259; ambiguity: λ = 1.505; p = 0.349). For the limelight 
treatments, however, the coefficient is larger in the one with ambiguity (risk: λ = 1.863, 
ambiguity: λ = 2.825, p = 0.020).41 
4.4 Conclusions and Discussion 
To analyze how risky choice in the limelight differs from that under more usual 
experimental laboratory conditions, we conducted two incentivized experiments that 
mimicked the game of the TV show Deal or No Deal. In the laboratory treatments of the 
experiments, subjects made decisions in a standard, computerized laboratory setting as 
typically employed in economic experiments. In the limelight treatments, subjects made 
their choices in a simulated game show environment, which included a live audience, a 
game show host, and video cameras. The second experiment also had a comeback 
treatment, in which subjects who had previously gained passive experience by watching 
others play the game made decisions under laboratory conditions. 
We find that subjects are more risk averse in the limelight than in the anonymity of a 
typical behavioral laboratory. In both experiments, subjects in the limelight have a higher 
propensity to opt for the sure alternative. For the EU model, this translates into a more 
concave (risk-averse) utility function. For PT, we observe a higher loss aversion 
coefficient. 
Findings from studies on investor behavior corroborate this result. Barber and Odean 
(2001, 2002) find that investors trade more and more speculatively after switching from 
phone-based to online trading. Konana and Balasubramanian (2005) report that investors 
tend to keep their core investments with traditional brokers and use a small fraction of 
their wealth to speculate online. 
                                                     
41
 In addition, in the laboratory, the reference point is stickier and more elevated under ambiguity than 
under risk, and there is marginally significantly less curvature (1: p = 0.004;2: p = 0.009; α: p = 0.061). In 
contrast, in the limelight, the reference point is less sticky and less elevated under ambiguity than under 
risk, and there is no significant difference in curvature (1: p = 0.015; 2: p = 0.022; α: p = 0.707). 
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A number of psychological studies suggest that our treatment effect could be related to 
the emotions evoked by being in the limelight. Emotional states are likely to be different 
in and out of the limelight, and these differences might bring about differences in risk 
behavior (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). Public scrutiny may 
entail feelings of stress and anxiety, and lead to a state of physiological arousal. Several 
studies indicate that anxiety lowers subjects’ propensity to take risk. Using both student 
and clinical samples, Maner et al. (2007) show that behavioral and self-report measures 
of dispositional anxiety are consistently positively associated with risk aversion. 
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) triggered anxiety in subjects by having them read 
hypothetical scenarios and asking them to experience these events as vividly as possible 
by imagining what they would feel and think in these situations. They find that these 
subjects are more likely to choose a low-risk, low-reward option over a high-risk, high-
reward option than subjects in a control group. Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) report similar 
results. Mano (1994) studies the effect of what he calls “distress” – a combination of a 
negative (unpleasant) emotional state with a high level of arousal – and finds that 
subjects who are more distressed display a lower willingness to take risk. Future research 
could more directly investigate the link between risk tolerance and emotions in and out 
of the limelight through psychological and physiological measurements of emotional 
states. 
Our second experiment indicates that people in the limelight also have a higher reference 
point and adjust it more slowly, and that their value function has less curvature. The 
latter is in line with earlier findings by Miller and Fagley (1991), Takemura (1993, 1994) 
and Vieider (2011). However, the difference is not significant when we compare subjects 
in the limelight with experienced subjects in the comeback treatment, suggesting that it 
may be a spurious effect related to subjects’ experience with the game from watching 
others play. The other results for the comeback treatment reinforce our previous findings 
about the difference between risk attitudes in and out of the limelight. 
While the general degree of risk aversion is affected by the limelight manipulation, the 
dynamic pattern in risk behavior is not. In particular and in line with the break-even 
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effect, subjects in and subjects out of the limelight are more risk prone when the game 
develops substantially worse than expected. Of course, on average, losers faced lower 
stakes, and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) thus appears to be a simple 
explanation for their greater risk appetite. However, IRRA cannot explain that the choice 
patterns resemble those found by Post et al. (2008) for games that used stakes of up to 
10,000 times the size of those used in our experiment. Furthermore, IRRA would also 
imply more risk aversion for winners than for subjects in the middle group, which is not 
what we observe. The risk appetite of winners is in line with the house-money effect: 
when all possible outcomes are in the gain domain, people no longer feel they might be 
losing their “own” money and take more risk. 
Our simple PT model allows for a sticky reference point and can capture these path-
dependent and very different risk attitudes. All five treatments in our experiments point 
out that the reference point is sticky and partly determined by subjects’ (presumed) initial 
beliefs about the task outcome. This finding is in line with recent literature on reference-
point formation that argues that reference points are expectation-based and imperfectly 
updated (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007; Abeler et al., 2011; Baucells, Weber and 
Welfens, 2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011). 
For all treatments, the PT model indeed explains subjects’ choices significantly better 
than the EU model that we employ. The different degree but similar pattern of risk 
aversion under the two conditions is important in the light of the recent debate on the 
external validity of laboratory and field studies (Levitt and List, 2007a, 2007b; Camerer, 
2011). Kessler and Vesterlund (2012) argue that while attention has focused on the 
generalizability of quantitative results, it is much more relevant to focus on the 
generalizability of qualitative results, as most experimental studies are focused on the 
direction rather than the magnitude of effects. Furthermore, they argue that while the 
external validity of quantitative results is highly contested, this is not the case for the 
external validity of qualitative results. Levitt and List (2007b, p.351) for example state 
that: “even for those experiments that are affected by our concerns, it is likely that the 
qualitative findings of the lab are generalizable, even when the quantitative magnitudes 
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are not.” Indeed, a large number of studies suggest that qualitative results generalize 
between lab and field settings, even if quantitative results differ (Kagel and Roth, 2000; 
Tenorio and Cason, 2002; Healy and Noussair, 2004; Isaac and Schnier, 2005; Antonovics, 
Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; Östling et al., 2011; Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels, 2013). 
Our finding of similar patterns of risk taking under different experimental conditions 
supports the positive view on the generalizability of qualitative results. At the same time, 
the different degrees of risk taking across conditions sketch a negative picture on the 
generalizability of quantitative estimates. Where scrutiny has thus far predominantly 
been considered as a disturbing factor in tasks where moral and wealth are competing 
objectives (Levitt and List, 2007a, 2007b), this result suggests that scrutiny also affects 
behavior when moral concerns do not play a role. 
The most important difference between the two sets of experiments in our study was 
that the second used a simple deterministic model for the percentage bank offers that 
was known to subjects, while subjects in the first set were faced with some uncertainty 
about the precise offers. Much empirical evidence shows that people are averse to 
ambiguity, or uncertainty about outcome probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and 
Weber, 1992). When we compare the results of the two experiments, we find that 
subjects under limelight conditions are indeed more adventurous when the bank offer 
structure is deterministic and known rather than ambiguous to them, while we find no 
evidence that behavior under laboratory conditions is affected by this design change. The 
different effect of ambiguity in and out of the limelight is in line with literature that 
suggests that ambiguity aversion is related to the presence of outside observers (Curley, 
Yates and Abrams, 1986; Trautmann, Vieider and Wakker, 2008; Muthukrishnan, Wathieu 
and Xu, 2009). Also, the absence of an effect of ambiguity under laboratory conditions 
corresponds with the findings of Fox and Tversky (1995). Through various experiments 
under conditions of anonymity resembling our laboratory treatments, they find evidence 
that ambiguity aversion does not occur when there is no contrast of the ambiguous event 
with a similar but less ambiguous event. Such a contrast is indeed salient in most studies 
that classify ambiguity aversion as a real phenomenon. In our case, the task did not 
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embed any contrast, and subjects were not aware of any other related experiment with 
differently generated bank offers.42,43 
Comparisons between the results of the comeback treatment and the basic laboratory 
treatment can identify the effect of passive experience on risk tolerance in our 
experiment. Recent literature shows that experience helps to eliminate anomalous 
behavior, in particular loss aversion among market participants (List, 2003, 2004b, 2011; 
Engelmann and Hollard, 2010; Seru, Shumway and Stoffman, 2010). We find no clear 
evidence in this direction, perhaps because the experience of the subjects in the 
comeback treatment was only passive, because learning is slow and subjects observed 
only 20 others, or because their choice problems were of a different nature than those in 
a market context. More specifically, we find that the passive experience that comeback-
treatment subjects acquired by watching others play does not affect the loss aversion 
parameter of our PT model, but we do find evidence for decreased curvature and a more 
elevated and sticky reference point. Interestingly, although the empirical fit of the PT 
model is much better than that of the EU model for every treatment, the improvement is 
strongest for the comeback treatment. This suggests that passive experience strengthens 
rather than weakens prospect-theory like behavior here. A possible explanation is that 
experience from watching others brings along vivid task-specific expectations and 
reference, which in turn guide subjects’ own behavior. The more sticky reference point of 
experienced subjects indeed points in this direction. 
                                                     
42
 Interestingly, the comparative ignorance hypothesis of Fox and Tversky (1995) is grounded on the finding 
of Heath and Tversky (1991) that ambiguity aversion is driven by people’s feeling of (in)competence. 
Possibly, the presence of onlookers in our limelight treatments undermined our subjects’ confidence in 
their capability to perform the task, and this way amplified the effect of the ambiguous bank offer structure 
on choice. 
43
 The uncertainty about the bank offers in our first experiment can be interpreted as a “background risk”, 
although in a strict sense, background risk is mostly regarded and implemented as an additive risk to a 
subject’s overall wealth and not – akin to the uncertainty about future percentage bank offers here – as a 
multiplicative risk to the outcomes of one choice option only. Based on certain assumptions, most 
theoretical accounts predict that individuals take less risk in the presence of background risk (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser, 1987; Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 1996). Experiments by 
Harrison, List and Towe (2007) and Lee (2008) confirm this prediction, whereas the findings of Lusk and 
Coble (2008) and Herberich and List (2012) indicate that background risk has little to no effect on risky 
choice. 
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Using DOND as the experimental task has a number of advantages, most notably that the 
game allows for the study of path dependence. However, at the same time, the stop-go 
nature of DOND might confound the interpretation of our results. In fact, subjects in our 
limelight treatments were asked to either decide to take risk and stay in the limelight, or 
to opt for a safe money offer and step out of the limelight. As a result, subjects are more 
likely to “Deal” if they suffer a fixed disutility from being in the limelight. Although we 
cannot completely rule out this alternative explanation for our results, it does not appear 
particularly strong for several reasons. First, self-reflection suggests that such a disutility 
would rapidly decrease as the game progresses. Many people even get used to being in 
the limelight after a while. When subjects have to make decisions that make a real 
difference, they have already gone through an introductory talk with the host and played 
several trivial game rounds. Second, deciding “No Deal” commits to playing only one 
round more, and rounds last only briefly, especially at the critical stages of the game 
when few or only one case is to be opened. The extra time that would be involved is, in 
fact, negligible in the light of the time already spent on stage. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the data contradict a fixed disutility of being in the limelight. If such a 
disutility existed, the decisions of the most unfortunate subjects in our sample would be 
disproportionately strongly affected by it. In our data, we find that losers have a strong 
tendency to continue play, and this tendency appears to be even stronger in the limelight 
than in the laboratory, not weaker. 
Another potential downside of using DOND is that a game show setting may entail a 
specific demand effect under limelight conditions. As pointed out by Gertner (1993), 
taking risk is more entertaining for spectators and this might lead subjects to make riskier 
choices. In contrast to this intuitive prediction, however, we find that subjects take less 
risk in the limelight than in the laboratory. Apparently, this specific demand effect is 
relatively unimportant. 
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In sum, our findings provide a mixed message about the generalizability of findings from 
one setting to another when the degree of public scrutiny is different. Quantitative 
measurements of risk preferences do not seem to have universal applicability, but the 
qualitative pattern of path dependence in risk behavior appears to be robust. 
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Chapter 5  | On the Social Nature of Eyes: 
The Effect of Social Cues in Interaction and Individual 
Choice Tasks 
  
In this chapter, we apply a dual strategy to better understand the effect of 
pictures of eyes on human behavior. First, we investigate whether the effect of 
eyes is limited to interaction tasks in which the subjects’ decisions influence 
the outcomes of other subjects. We expand the range of tasks to include 
individual choice tasks in which the subjects’ decisions only influence their own 
outcomes. Second, we investigate whether pictures of eyes are one of many 
social cues or are unique in their effect. We compare the effect of pictures of 
eyes with the effect of a different condition in which we present the subjects 
with pictures of other students (peers). Our results suggest that the effect of 
pictures of eyes is limited to interaction tasks and that eyes should be 
considered distinct from other social cues, such as reminders of peers. While 
pictures of eyes uniformly enhance pro-social behavior in interaction tasks, 
this is not the case for reminders of peers. Furthermore, the reminders of peers 
lead to more rational behavior in individual choice tasks, whereas the effect of 
pictures of eyes is limited to situations involving interaction. Combined, these 
findings are in line with the claim that the effect of pictures of eyes on 
behavior is caused by a social exchange heuristic that works to enhance 
mutual cooperative behavior. 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper “On the social nature of eyes: The effect of social cues in 
interaction and individual choice tasks.”, co-authored by Aurélien Baillon and Asli Selim, and 
published in Evolution and Human Behavior (Baillon, Selim, and van Dolder, 2013). The authors are 
grateful to Han Bleichrodt, Rafael Huber, Umut Keskin, Jim Leonhardt, Kirsten Rohde, Joeri Sol, Jan 
Stoop, Martijn van den Assem and anonymous reviewers for their many constructive and valuable 
comments on previous versions of this chapter. The chapter benefited from discussion with seminar 
participants at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, and with participants of the Tiber Symposium 
on Psychology and Economics 2011 at Tilburg University, the Subjective Probability, Utility, and 
Decision Making (SPUDM) 2011 conference in Kingston upon Thames, the Erasmus-Technion 
Workshop on Decisions and Predictions at Ein Bokek, and the Foundations and Applications of 
Utility, Risk and Decision Theory (FUR) 2012 conference at Georgia State University. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Humans frequently behave altruistically, even towards genetically unrelated strangers. 
While some of this altruistic behavior can likely be explained by concerns for the actor’s 
(possible third-party) reputation, it has been argued that this explanation is incomplete. 
Tightly controlled economic experiments have repeatedly shown that subjects behave in 
an altruistic manner towards anonymous strangers, even when opportunities for 
repeated interaction and reputation formation are systematically ruled out (Camerer, 
2003). Recent literature, however, has shown that people are sensitive to subtle cues of 
being watched. In particular, it was demonstrated that, in anonymous experimental 
settings, the mere presence of pictures of a pair of eyes, or an eye-like stimulus, led to 
significant increases in donations to strangers in dictator games (Haley and Fessler, 2005; 
Rigdon et al., 2009; Oda et al., 2011; Nettle et al., 2013), increased donations to a public 
good (Burnham and Hare, 2007), and induced greater disapproval of moral transgressions 
(Bourrat, Baumard, and McKay, 2011). The susceptibility of human beings to these subtle 
cues implies that, even in an anonymous laboratory setting, pro-social behavior should 
not necessarily be viewed as purely intrinsic (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Jaeggi, Burkhart, 
and van Schaik, 2010). 
A number of studies have investigated the generality of the effect of eyes on social 
behavior and have attempted to gain deeper insight into the possible mechanisms 
underlying this effect. A potential concern is that the observed phenomenon may have 
been caused by an experimenter demand effect (Ekström, 2012). Field experiments, 
however, suggest that this is not the case, as eye-like stimuli have induced pro-social 
behavior even when the subjects did not know that they were participating in an 
experiment. Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) studied the effect of pictures of eyes on 
the amount of money that employees at a university psychology department contributed 
to an “honesty box” in the coffee room. The authors found that, when a picture of eyes 
was placed next to the “honesty box”, the employee donations tripled. Ernest-Jones, 
Nettle, and Bateson (2011) showed that placing pictures of eyes in a university cafeteria 
that required diners to clear their own trays halved the odds of littering. However, the 
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effect of eyes was only significant when the cafeteria was relatively quiet. Similarly, 
Ekström (2012) found that pictures of eyes increased the amount of money that was 
donated to charity in Swedish supermarkets by 30% during days on which relatively few 
people visited the stores. On the days on which the stores were busy, the eyes had no 
effect on customer donations. Finally, Powell, Roberts, and Nettle (2012) reported similar 
results to the previous findings. The authors found that displaying pictures of eyes on 
charity collection buckets in a supermarket increased donations and that this effect was 
significantly stronger when the supermarket was quiet rather than busy. 
Although the eye effect appears to be robust in field settings, several studies suggest that 
there are conditions under which these effects will not occur. The field studies discussed 
above suggested that pictures of eyes influence behavior only when the subject is in a 
non-crowded setting. Fehr and Schneider (2009) found that eyes did not influence the 
tendency of trustees to repay trust in a trust game. In Mifune, Hashimoto, and Yamagishi 
(2010), pictures of eyes increased donations in a dictator game when the recipient was an 
in-group member, but not when the recipient was an out-group member. 
The common interpretation of the eye effect is that pictures of eyes trigger feelings of 
being watched, which in turn activate reputation concerns and subsequent behavioral 
changes. Such an argument seems plausible, given that actual opportunities to acquire a 
positive reputation that may pay off in the future have been found to enhance pro-social 
behavior (Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2001; 
Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck, 2002; Rege and Telle, 2004; Seinen and Schram, 2006; 
Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, Oda et al. (2011) 
provided the only direct test of this conjecture. The authors showed that the eye effect 
was mediated by expectations of future reward but not by a fear of punishment.  
In the present chapter, we apply a dual strategy to better understand the effect of eyes 
on human behavior by expanding both the nature of the tasks and the types of social cues 
that were used as stimuli. Firstly, we examine whether the influence of eyes is limited to 
interaction tasks in which the subjects’ decisions also influence the outcomes of other 
subjects, or whether this influence also carries over to individual choice tasks in which the 
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subjects’ decisions influence only their own outcomes. There is good reason to believe 
that eyes may influence decision-making in non-interaction tasks. A long line of 
psychological research has shown that the mere presence of others can facilitate the 
performance of simple tasks but impair the performance of more complex tasks (Zajonc, 
1965; Bond and Titus, 1983). With respect to choice behavior, research on accountability 
suggests that people care about how others view their decisions, even in individual choice 
tasks (Kruglanski and Fruend, 1983; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Vieider, 2011). In particular, 
when subjects know that their decisions will be made public, they adjust their behavior to 
comply with the prevailing view among their audience. If the view of the audience is 
unknown, the subjects engage in pre-emptive self-criticism, by carefully analyzing the 
problem to arrive at a more justifiable decision (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). These findings 
are intuitive as people are unlikely to be exclusively concerned with signaling a 
cooperative disposition; they will, for example, also care about appearing smart, 
conscientious, and successful. Therefore, if eye-like stimuli trigger a feeling of being 
monitored, their impact should not be limited to triggering pro-social behavior in 
interaction tasks, but can be expected to extend to individual choice tasks. 
However, it is not definite that the effect of eyes should extend beyond interaction tasks. 
Cosmides (1989) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989, 1992) argued that humans have evolved 
specialized, domain-specific cognitive modules for solving problems that are encountered 
in social exchange. To support this claim, the authors showed empirical evidence that a 
specialized cheater-detection mechanism existed. Later research suggested that people 
also have a memory bias for cheaters (see Mealey, Daood, and Krage, 1996, Oda, 1997, 
and Oda and Nakajima, 2010; see Barclay and Lalumière, 2006, and Mehl and Buchner, 
2008, for contradictory findings). The ability to detect and remember cheaters may be 
necessary to successfully establish relationships of mutual cooperation. However, this 
ability is not sufficient because people must also aspire to cooperate in the first place. 
Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi (2000) therefore proposed the existence of a “social 
exchange heuristic,” which facilitates the establishment of mutual cooperation by 
encouraging subjects to perceive one-shot prisoner dilemmas as assurance games in 
which mutual cooperation is the most preferable outcome. As argued by Oda et al. 
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(2011), the eye effect may be due to a similar social heuristic that evolved to facilitate 
mutual cooperation. If this social heuristic is the cause, then there is no a priori reason to 
expect pictures of eyes to have any effect in the absence of interaction and thus, no 
reason to believe that eyes will influence behavior in individual choice tasks. 
Secondly, in addition to exploring whether pictures of eyes influenced behavior in 
individual choice tasks, we investigate the nature of that influence by comparing this 
effect with the effect of another condition that is designed to remind the subjects of 
other people in their social group. The literature is somewhat ambivalent regarding 
whether eyes are special cues or simply one among many social cues that could produce 
the same result. For instance, in addition to presenting subjects with pictures of eyes, 
Haley and Fessler (2005) manipulated auditory cues that indicated the presence of others 
by using sound-deafening earmuffs. The authors found that the earmuffs appeared to 
reduce the subjects’ generosity, although the effect did not reach statistical significance. 
Lambda and Mace (2010) studied whether the presence of other students influenced 
decisions in an ultimatum game if the subjects were explicitly guaranteed that their 
decisions would remain anonymous. The authors found that the presence of other 
students did not affect the subjects’ behavior and cited this result as evidence against an 
eye effect. Being reminded of others without being exposed to a direct eye gaze may not 
have the same effect as an eye cue. To investigate whether the effects were the same, we 
also implement a peers condition in which pictures of our subjects’ social group (i.e., 
university students) are displayed during the experiment. 
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Figure 5.1: Screenshot of the University Website as Used in the Experiment 
Placed at the top left of the screen, the pictures randomly rotate every six seconds. The 
picture displayed on the screenshot above is one of the images that were common to all 
conditions.  
5.2 Method 
Subjects 
We conducted an online experiment on 165 students from the Erasmus School of 
Economics (henceforth ESE), Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands (32% 
females, age range = 18–33, mean = 21.1 years, S.D. = 2.06 years). The experiment was 
conducted during the first half of June 2010. We sent an email that contained 
personalized links to the website developed for the experiment to 600 students. The 
students were informed that the deadline to participate was two weeks after receipt of 
the recruitment email and that the payment for their participation could range up to €50; 
they received an email reminder one week after the initial email. The invitation emails 
and instructions can be found Appendix 5.A. The subjects were permitted to withdraw 
from the experiment at any time and their data were analyzed anonymously. 
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Figure 5.2 Pictures Used in Each Condition. 
(A) Eyes, (B) Peers, (C) Control. (In the experiment, the faces of the people in the peers 
pictures were visible. The faces have been obscured here for publication purposes only.) 
 
Procedure 
We constructed a replica of the ESE website (Figure 5.1) for this experiment. After the 
initial login to any computer at the ESE, Internet Explorer opens up automatically. The 
homepage consists of the ESE website, which displays news and important information. 
Students and staff members are required to use this website to look up information and 
for many administrative procedures. Similarly to the ESE website, our experimental 
website was bilingual (Dutch and English) and compatible with most browsers (such as 
Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, Safari, and Chrome) and most screen sizes. 
To present our subjects with pictures of eyes and peers in an unobtrusive manner, we 
used the picture banner from the official ESE website. This banner typically displays 
rotating pictures from the campus. The pictures rotate randomly at an approximate 
interval of six seconds. We constructed three conditions by manipulating the types of 
pictures that rotated in this banner. The banner was visible to the subjects during the 
entire experiment. 
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For the eyes condition, we used pictures of the faces of statues of Erasmus, who is the 
school’s namesake. The students are familiar with images of Erasmus because there are 
multiple statues of him on the campus and his image appears on official university 
documents. Thus, using such pictures would not appear out of the ordinary, and we could 
safely assume that the cues remained sufficiently subtle. Moreover, the neutral facial 
expressions displayed by the statues reduced the risk of accidently priming emotions 
(Figure 5.2A). 
For the peers condition, we used pictures of students who were not looking directly at 
the camera to avoid a potential eye effect. The students in these pictures were engaged 
in studying, chatting, having lunch, etc., on campus. Our subject pool consisted of 
undergraduate students, thus the representations of their fellow university students 
could act as social cues that remind them of their own social group (Figure 5.2B, please 
note that faces have been obscured for publication purposes but were visible in the 
experiment). 
Finally, as a control, we used pictures of empty halls from university buildings (Figure 
5.2C). On the whole, the pictures from the three conditions did not differ much from 
pictures one could find on any university website and were similar to the pictures 
normally found on the ESE website. In addition to these condition specific pictures, the 
subjects also viewed two pictures of university buildings that were common to all 
conditions and were taken from the ESE website. Each subject was randomly allocated to 
one of the three conditions, and all of the tasks were carried out for real money for some 
randomly selected subjects after the experiment. 
During the experiment, the subjects completed four tasks: two tasks involved interaction 
between the subjects, and two tasks involved individual choices under uncertainty. The 
order of the tasks was randomized across subjects. The four tasks were selected on the 
basis of past research and were designed so that social cues can be expected to impact 
the subjects’ behavior. Each task and the corresponding predictions are described in 
detail below. 
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At the end of the experiment, the students answered a small questionnaire including 
demographic questions (gender, age, nationality, and education). For details we refer to 
Appendix 5.B. Some of the answers for the first task described below were missing. 
Approximately 60 subjects were asked to re-enter their answers, of whom 12 failed to do 
so. As this affected every condition equally, there was no reason to believe that it would 
affect our results. We nonetheless studied whether it had any effect on our results and 
found that it had none (see Appendix 5.C.3). For each task, we report simple non-
parametric tests for differences between conditions. The more advanced parametric 
statistical models that control for the subjects’ characteristics are reported in Appendix 
5.C. All of the results reported in this chapter are robust, and statistical significance is 
generally stronger in the more advanced analyses than in the simple analyses. 
Task 1: Joy of Destruction Mini-Game 
The first interaction task we used was the so-called Joy of Destruction mini-game (JoD) 
(Abbink and Herrmann, 2010). Although research on cooperation and social-preferences 
has traditionally focused on pro-social behavior, a recent and growing body of literature 
has begun to apply economic games to the study of anti-social behavior, such as the anti-
social punishment of cooperators in public good settings (e.g., Herrmann, Thöni, and 
Gächter, 2008; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Gächter, Herrmann, and Thöni, 2010). The 
JoD has been used in this literature to show that a considerable fraction of subjects is 
willing to pay money to destroy part of the payoff to another subject. In particular, the 
subjects destroyed their opponents’ payoffs only infrequently when their behavior could 
be perfectly observed and their opponents could find out with certainty what caused the 
destruction. However, when the scenario was altered so that their opponent could no 
longer find out with certainty whether the destruction was caused by nature or by 
intention, the subjects’ willingness to destroy markedly increased. Note that this 
difference occurred despite the complete anonymity of the subjects in both cases (Abbink 
and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 2010). 
To achieve a significant amount of destruction and thereby facilitate the investigation of 
possible differences between our conditions, we adopted the “hidden” setup of the JoD 
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in which it is unclear to the subjects what caused the reduction of their income. In our 
JoD variant, two subjects each received an endowment of €25. Then, unaware of each 
other’s identity, both subjects were asked whether they would be willing to pay €1 to 
destroy €10 of the other subject’s endowment. There was a 1/3 probability that €10 of 
the opposing subject’s endowment would be destroyed regardless of the subject’s 
decision, making it impossible for the opposing subject to tell what caused the 
destruction. 
In the JoD game, there is no compelling rationale behind destruction: it is harmful to 
others and costly to oneself. Previous findings on the JoD further suggest that destruction 
mainly occurs in situations in which the behavior cannot be perfectly observed. In light of 
these findings, and of past studies that have showed that eyes increase pro-social 
behavior in simple tasks, we consider this task a way to validate whether the effect of our 
eyes cues align with the past findings of eyes. Furthermore, the design of this task also 
allows us to compare the effect of the eyes to the peers condition in an interaction task. 
Task 2: Dictator Game 
The second interaction task was the dictator game, which is widely studied in economics 
and which demonstrates what is often deemed to be pure altruism on the part of the 
subjects (Camerer, 2003). In this game, one subject, the dictator, received a monetary 
endowment of €50 and was asked how much she would donate to another anonymous 
subject. The other subject simply received what had been donated to her, and nothing 
else. The pro-social action here was to donate some money to the receiver, but this 
would in return lower the dictator’s own income. We chose this task because the impact 
of eye-like stimuli on the dictator game has been studied before (Haley and Fessler, 2005; 
Rigdon et al., 2009; Oda et al., 2011; Nettle et al., 2013). These past studies found that 
donation rates were significantly higher in response to eye cues. Including this task in our 
experiment thus provides us with another opportunity to see whether we could replicate 
the eye effect in our web-based setup. Furthermore, it provided us with a second 
opportunity to compare the effect of the eyes to the effect of peers in an interaction task. 
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Task 3: Ellsberg’s Paradox  
The third task we employed was a variant of the standard ambiguity aversion task devised 
by Ellsberg (1961). The task included two bags containing black and red chips. In one bag 
(Bag K), the proportion of red and black chips was known, whereas in the second bag (Bag 
U), this proportion was unknown. The subjects were asked to choose a color (black or 
red) and a bag from which to draw a chip. If the color of the drawn chip matched the 
color that the subject had chosen, then the subject received €50.  
When the proportion of red and black chips is 50-50, Bag K and Bag U are normatively 
equivalent. Following Laplace’s argument that ignorance should be represented by a 
uniform probability distribution, Bag U should also be considered as a 50-50 bag. If the 
subjects do not follow this argument and believe that one of the colors makes up more 
than 50% of the balls in Bag U, then they should bet on this color and strictly prefer Bag 
U. Nevertheless, many studies have shown that a disproportionate number of people 
choose Bag K (Camerer and Weber, 1992). The distaste for the unknown bag is often 
referred to as ambiguity aversion, and, given that the bags are normatively equivalent, 
can be interpreted as a bias (see, for instance, Raiffa, 1961). 
In our experiment, we implemented the standard Ellsberg choice situation with a 50-50 
proportion of red and black chips in Bag K, however we also varied the proportion of red 
and black chips from 10%-90% to 90%-10% (i.e., 10%-90%, 20%-80%, 30%-70%…). For 
each possible proportion for Bag K, the subjects were asked to state which bag (K or U) 
they would prefer to draw a ball from. When the probability was different from 50%, the 
subjects overwhelmingly selected the normatively superior option, i.e., Bag K if the 
probability of winning in this bag was 60% or higher, and Bag U if the probability of 
winning in Bag K was 40% or lower. No clear differences between the conditions could 
therefore be detected in these scenarios (see Appendix 5.C.4). Hence, we report only our 
analysis of the traditional 50-50 case. 
Previous studies have shown that being observed by others matters for this task. Curley, 
Yates, and Abrams (1986) found that publicly experiencing the consequence of one’s own 
decision in an Ellsberg task generates more ambiguity aversion compared to the situation 
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where privacy was ensured (see also Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker, 2008, and 
Muthukrishnan, Wathieu, and Xu, 2009). These authors argued that subjects will fear a 
negative evaluation if the bet’s outcome is not in their favor, and the subjects will believe 
that choosing bag K is easier to justify due to its informational advantage (its content is 
known, unlike the one of bag U). Therefore, if our social cues (eyes and peers) trigger 
concerns of being monitored, we would expect more ambiguity aversion in those 
conditions compared with the control. 
Task 4: Simple vs. Compound Lotteries  
Bar-Hillel (1973) has shown that people show systematic biases when comparing simple 
gambles to compound gambles. To be more specific, people appear to overestimate the 
likelihood of conjunctive events (e.g., drawing, with replacement, four red chips from a 
bag with 10 black and 10 red chips) and underestimate the likelihood of disjunctive 
events (e.g., drawing, with replacement, at least one red chip from a bag with 9 black 
chips and 1 red chip when the subject is permitted four tries). The cause for this bias is 
often thought to be a realization of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). It is believed that, when the subjects evaluate the compound event, 
they think about the probability of drawing a particular chip, which then takes the role of 
an anchor. If the subjects do not adjust properly for the compound nature of the event, 
then they overestimate conjunctive events and underestimate disjunctive events. Thus, 
people overvalue the conjunctive gambles and undervalue the disjunctive gambles.  
In the final task, we investigated the effect of our cues on subjects’ evaluation of 
compound gambles. The subjects were asked to make six choices between simple and 
conjunctive (compound) gambles. The options presented to the subjects were similar to 
the ones proposed by Bar-Hillel (1973) and have previously been implemented by Vieider 
(2011). For instance, in a simple gamble, a subject extracted one chip from a bag that 
contained 10 red and 10 black chips. The subject received €50 if the chip was red. In the 
conjunctive, compound gamble, the subject extracted 7 times (with replacement) from a 
bag that contained 18 red and 2 black chips. The subject won €50 if the chip was red each 
time. In all of the choice-situations of this task, the probability of winning in the simple 
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gamble exceeded the probability of winning in the conjunctive, compound gamble. 
Although the simple gamble was thus objectively superior to the compound gamble, past 
research has showed that a significant number of people found the compound gamble 
more attractive (Bar-Hillel, 1973; Kruglanski and Fruend, 1983; Vieider, 2011). 
In line with the view that lowered anonymity leads to a desire to make better, more 
justifiable choices, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) and Vieider (2011) found that subjects 
who expected their choices to be evaluated later on were more likely to make the correct 
choice when deciding between simple and compound events. Therefore, if our social cues 
(eyes and peers) triggered the subjects’ concerns of being monitored, we would expect 
them to make fewer mistakes in these conditions compared to the control. 
5.3 Results 
Task 1: Joy of Destruction Mini-Game 
The overall destruction rate obtained in the JoD over the three conditions is similar to the 
findings in Abbink and Herrmann (2010). Over our entire sample, 24.84 percent of the 
subjects decide to destroy (N = 153), compared with 25.8 percent of the subjects in 
Abbink and Herrmann’s (2010) experiment. Across conditions, however, we observe 
sharp differences. 
In our control condition (N = 51), the subjects destroy 38.78 percent of the time (Figure 
5.3A). The destruction rate is halved in the eyes (N = 49) and peers (N = 53) conditions 
compared with the control condition, constituting a significant decrease (eyes: 17.65%, 
2(1) = 5.534, p = 0.019; peers: 18.87%, 2(1) = 4.959, p = 0.026). There is no significant 
difference between the eyes and the peers condition (2 (1) = 0.026, p = 0.872). 
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Figure 5.3: Results From the Interaction Tasks 
The graph in (A) shows the percentage of subjects who chose to destroy their opposing 
subject’s money in the JoD mini-game, while the graph in (B) shows the mean amount of 
money that was transferred in the dictator game for the different conditions. Error bars in the 
graph in (B) show ± 1 standard error of the mean.  
 
Task 2: Dictator Game 
The standard finding with respect to the dictator game is that over 60% of the subjects 
decide to give away money. The mean donation rate across all subjects is typically 20% of 
the endowment, although the rational, self-interested action is not to allocate any money 
to the other subject (Camerer, 2003). Across our entire sample, our findings are in line 
with the statistics presented above; a total of 63.64 percent of our subjects give away 
money, while the average amount transferred is €10.93, or approximately 22 percent of 
the €50 endowment (N = 165, 55 in each condition). 
In our control condition, the subjects give away €9.75 on average (Figure 5.3B). The 
pictures of eyes strongly increase donations to an average amount of €13.93  
(Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.047). By contrast, the average donation in the peers 
condition is not significantly different from the control (mean: €9.11,  
Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.414). The donations amounts are significantly different 
between the eyes and the peers condition (Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.013). 
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Figure 5.4: Results From the Individual Choice Tasks 
The graph in (A) shows the percentage of subjects who chose the ambiguous option (Bag U) 
over the risky option (Bag K), while the graph in (B) shows the percentage of subjects who did 
not make any errors in the final task. 
 
Regarding the probability of donating, we find the highest rates of donation in the eyes 
condition, in which 76.36 percent of the subjects donate some amount. In the control, 
the percentage of subjects who donate is considerably lower than in the eyes condition, 
at 63.64 percent, and the lowest rate of donation occurs in the peers condition, at 50.91 
percent. Here, however, neither the eyes nor the peers condition differ significantly from 
the control (2(1) < 2.121, p > 0.145). The eyes and peers conditions differ significantly 
from each other, in that the subjects in the eyes condition are significantly more likely to 
donate compared the subjects in the peers condition (2(1) = 7.700, p = 0.006). 
Task 3: Ellsberg’s Paradox  
In the Ellsberg task, the subjects choose between two bags. The probability of winning 
was known for Bag K (50%) and unknown for Bag U. In line with past findings, we observe 
that the majority of subjects choose Bag K in our control condition, while only a small 
fraction selected Bag U (N = 55, 14.45%, see Figure 5.4A). In contrast to the interaction 
tasks, we find no effect of eyes on the subjects’ bag choice (N = 55, 20%, 2(1) = 0.573,  
p = 0.449). In the peers condition, however, the subjects are significantly less likely to 
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show a bias against the ambiguous option than in the other conditions: more than a third 
of the subjects in this condition choose Bag U (N = 55, 34.55%, comparison with the 
control: 2(1) = 5.939, p = 0.015, comparison with the eyes: 2(1) = 2.933, p = 0.087). 
Task 4: Simple vs. Compound Lotteries 
The simple gamble is always preferable to the compound gamble; thus, we will refer to 
the choices that favor the compound gambles as errors. In the control condition (N = 55), 
fewer than a third of the subjects does not make any errors (Figure 5.4B). There is no 
difference between the eyes condition (N = 55) and the control condition (both 32.73%, 
2(1) = 0.000, p = 1). In the peers condition (N = 55), however, 49.09 percent of the 
subjects never make an error. The difference between the peers condition and the two 
other conditions is marginally significant when the other conditions are separate (both: 
2(1) = 3.046, p = 0.081) and significant at the five percent level when the other two 
conditions are combined (2(1) = 4.160, p = 0.041). 
The number of errors reveals a similar pattern to the results presented above. The 
median number of errors made is one out of six in the peers condition, compared with 
two out of six in the other two conditions. The mean number of errors made is 2.27 in the 
control, 1.98 in the eyes condition and 1.60 in the peers condition. Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate that the difference in the number of errors is marginally significant between the 
peers and the control conditions (Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.077). The eyes condition 
does not differ significantly from the two other conditions (p > 0.229).  
5.4 Conclusions and Discussion 
In the current chapter, we apply a dual strategy to better understand the effect of 
pictures of eyes on human behavior. First, to identify whether the eye effect is limited to 
interaction tasks, we expand the range of tasks to include individual choice tasks. Second, 
to ascertain whether eyes are special or are simply one among many social cues that may 
produce the same results, we compare the effect of eyes with the effect of another 
condition that presents the subjects with pictures of other students (peers). 
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In agreement with past findings, we find that pictures of eyes lead to more pro-social 
behavior in interaction tasks. Our results reveal that the subjects give more money to 
strangers and are less likely to destroy the endowment of others in response to eyes 
cues. However, we find that eyes do not influence subjects’ behavior in individual choice 
tasks, in which their choices do not influence the outcomes of others. This difference 
suggests that the eye effect is limited to situations that involve interaction, which is 
compatible with the view that this effect may be caused by a social exchange heuristic 
that works to establish mutual cooperation, as suggested by Oda et al. (2011). 
The differences between the eyes condition and the peers condition show that different 
social cues can have different behavioral implications. In the dictator game, the eyes 
promote giving, while the peers do not. Moreover, the peers influence behavior in the 
two individual choice tasks, while the eyes do not. The finding that different social cues 
can have different effects is important because it implies that care is required to avoid 
drawing overly general conclusions from the observed effects of one specific social cue. 
It is noteworthy that, in the individual choice tasks, the peers condition uniformly 
increases economic rationality. In that condition, we observe less ambiguity aversion and 
fewer mistakes in choices between simple versus compound lotteries. In the interaction 
tasks, we find that peers only influenced behavior in the JoD game, where the pro-social 
act of not destroying is also economically rational. By contrast, peers do not appear to 
influence behavior in the dictator game, in which the pro-social and the rational action 
misalign. In short, the criterion of economic rationality seems to play an important role in 
the peers condition. It is possible that this effect may be an artifact of our subject pool, 
which consisted of subjects who were all trained in economics and might fear negative 
judgment from their peers if they do not make a rational decision. However, it should be 
noted that this finding also agrees with the general tenet of the accountability literature 
that considering the judgment of others will encourage pre-emptive self-criticism and 
careful analysis of the problem to arrive at a more justifiable decision (Lerner and Tetlock, 
1999). While the finding of the peers condition in the ambiguity task contradicts the 
recent literature that suggests that considering others’ judgment will increase ambiguity 
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aversion, it is important to note that these papers have all focused on the observation of 
the actual outcome by others. The accountability literature suggests that expecting 
judgment based on the outcomes of one’s decisions generally hampers performance, 
while expecting judgment based on the decision process employed generally improves 
performance (Simonson and Staw, 1992; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates, 1996). It may be that 
being presented with pictures of peers during decision-making caused the latter, rather 
than the former, mechanism to operate. The latter mechanism can explain the results 
obtained in the present chapter. 
It is possible that an alternative mechanism, different from considerations about others’ 
judgment, may have caused the peers effect. For example, pictures that feature multiple 
people may trigger a competitive mindset, i.e., a desire to outperform others. 
Alternatively, the pictures in the peers condition, which displayed other people who did 
not look directly at the camera, may have made anonymity even more salient than the 
pictures in the control condition, which did not show any people at all. While the former 
explanation could account for the increased performance in individual choice tasks, it is 
not straightforward how the latter could do so. More importantly, both mechanisms fail 
to account for the findings in the interaction tasks. Competitive subjects should give less 
than other subjects in the dictator game, which we did not observe. Furthermore, both 
increased competitiveness and anonymity should be expected to increase destruction in 
the JoD game. In this game, subjects with a competitive mindset may attempt to improve 
their relative payoffs by destroying part of their opponents’ endowment, and increasing 
anonymity has been found to increase destruction rates in previous studies (Abbink and 
Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrman, 2010). By contrast, we find that destruction is 
significantly lower in the peers condition compared with the control.  
The influence of our subtle cues on the subjects’ behavior is remarkable, given that the 
pictures we employed were common pictures that can be found on any university 
website. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that we find significant effects for both of the 
social cues in a web-based experiment. Web-based experiments have the advantage of 
diminishing the participation costs for subjects because they do not need to come to the 
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laboratory and are free to participate at any time. Furthermore, these experiments allow 
subjects to make decisions in their natural environment. The obvious drawback is that the 
environment in which subjects make their decisions is less controlled than it would be in 
the laboratory. For our experiment, it was possible that subjects were in a public setting 
when they participated in the experiment, which could reduce the relative effectiveness 
of the social cues (Ernest-Jones, Nettle and Bateson, 2011; Ekström, 2012; Powell, 
Roberts, and Nettle, 2012). Therefore, using a web-based design instead of a carefully 
controlled anonymous laboratory setting potentially lowered our chances of finding 
statistically significant effects (i.e., increased type II errors). That we find statistically 
significant effects of eyes in both interaction tasks and peers in both the individual choice 
tasks and one of the interaction tasks suggests that reduction in control was not a major 
problem in our experiment. 
Interestingly, in another recent web-based study, Raihani and Bshary (2012) were unable 
to find an eye effect in a dictator game played online using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT). Our experiment differs from theirs in a number of ways, which makes it difficult to 
conclusively identify what caused the results to differ. Raihani and Bshary (2012) argued 
that interacting via AMT may have caused the subjects to feel truly anonymous and 
therefore be irresponsive to subtle social cues, similar to the argument put forth by 
Lambda and Mace (2010). This increased anonymity may explain the discrepancy 
between our findings and the findings from Raihani and Bshary (2012), as AMT ensures a 
larger degree of anonymity than our experimental setup. In our experiment, the subjects 
received personalized links to participate in the experiment and the payment of randomly 
selected subjects was conducted face-to-face so that the subjects could verify that the 
gambles in individual choice tasks were fairly resolved. Another explanation for the 
difference, however, may be that in our experiment the subjects played the game against 
fellow students from the same university, while the subjects in Raihani and Bshary’s 
experiment played against subjects from all over the world. In light of Mifune, Hashimoto, 
and Yamagishi’s (2010) finding that pictures of eyes make people act more altruistically 
only towards members from their own in-group, this provides another explanation for 
why we find a significant effect of eyes while Raihani and Bshary (2012) did not. 
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To study the eye effect in an unobtrusive manner, we used pictures of Erasmus’ eyes. 
Seeing Erasmus on the website would be normal for our subjects, who all studied at the 
Erasmus School of Economics. However, the image of a famous intellectual such as 
Erasmus could induce a desire to appear smart. Priming subjects with words such as 
“professor” has been found to improve subjects’ performance at answering trivia 
questions (Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1998). Nevertheless, we do not believe that 
our experiment was compromised in such a way. First, it should be noted that all of the 
subjects from the three conditions were, in a sense, primed with “Erasmus” because the 
name Erasmus was displayed at least four times on each screen for each condition (see 
Figure 5.1, at the top and at the bottom) and on the pictures that were common to all 
conditions. Moreover, the website that was used closely resembled that of the Erasmus 
School of Economics. Second, previous research showed that priming subjects with 
university-related concepts decreased the number of mistakes made by subjects 
(Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1998). In our experiment, such priming should mean 
that subjects should have made fewer errors in the individual choice tasks in the eyes 
condition. As we have observed, especially in the choices between simple and compound 
gambles, this reduction in errors did not occur. Pictures of eyes did not lead to better 
decisions. 
Observing that eyes do not influence behavior in our individual choice tasks does not 
guarantee that eyes will not influence behavior in any individual choice task. It could be 
argued that subjects react to pictures of eyes only when the task allows them to 
demonstrate positive qualities, such as being smart, conscientious, or successful, in an 
obvious manner and that our tasks did not allow them to do so. However, it is important 
to stress that both of the individual choice tasks were specifically selected to maximize 
the chance of observing an eye effect. For both tasks, past research indicates that 
manipulating anonymity in these tasks influences subjects’ behavior. Thus, people appear 
to consider the judgment of others while performing these tasks. Moreover, in the task 
that compared simple vs. compound lotteries, qualities such as intelligence or 
conscientiousness could be demonstrated by choosing the objectively superior gamble 
(all of our subjects had attended mathematical courses on probability theory). 
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To conclude, our findings suggest that eyes should be considered distinct from other 
social cues, such as reminders of peers. Although reminders of peers influence a broad 
range of tasks, the eye effect appears to be limited to triggering pro-social behavior in 
situations that involve interaction. Combined with findings from previous studies, these 
results are in line with the claim that responses to eyes are caused by a social exchange 
heuristic aimed at enhancing cooperative behavior among in-group members (Mifune, 
Hashimoto, and Yamagishi, 2010), mediated by increased expectations of future reward 
(Oda et al., 2011).  
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Appendix 5.A Recruitment Emails 
5.A.1 Recruitment e-mail 
 
Dear student, 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a web-based experiment on economic decision-
making, run by the "Behavioural Economics Group" at the ESE. The experiment is carried out 
online, so you can participate at any time and anywhere you like over the next two weeks. All you 
have to do is to use the link below and follow the instructions on the website. The experiment will 
take 10-15 minutes of your time, and in return you will get a chance to win up to 50 euros! We 
will randomly select 19 people among the participants and have a budget of 850 euros for this 
experiment. 
 
Your personal link to the experiment is: 
[PERSONALIZED LINK TO THE WEBSITE] 
 
You will not have to log into our website: this personal link will automatically register that you 
have participated in the experiment. 
 
The experiment will be online only 2 weeks, so if you want to have a chance of winning 50 euros, 
you should make sure to participate in the experiment very soon. 
 
Thank you for your interest in our experiments! 
 
Best regards,  
XXXXXXXXXXX 
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5.A.2 Reminder e-mail 
 
Dear student, 
 
There is only one week left to take part in our web-based experiment and to get a chance to win 
50 euros. 
 
Your personal link to the experiment is: 
[PERSONALIZED LINK TO THE WEBSITE] 
 
More information: 
This is a web-based experiment on economic decision-making, run by the "Behavioural Economics 
Group" at the ESE. The experiment is carried out online, so you can participate at any time and 
anywhere you like. All you have to do is to use the link above and follow the instructions on the 
website. The experiment will take 10-15 minutes of your time, and in return you will get a chance 
to win up to 50 euros! We will randomly select 19 people among the participants and have a 
budget of 850 euros for this experiment. 
 
You will not have to log into our website: this personal link will automatically register that you 
have participated in the experiment. 
 
The experiment will be online only 1 more week, so if you want to have a chance of winning 50 
euros, you should make sure to participate in the experiment very soon. 
 
Thank you for your interest in our experiments! 
 
Best regards,  
XXXXXXXXXXX 
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Appendix 5.B Experimental Instructions 
5.B.1 Welcome page 
 
Welcome and thank you for taking part in our experiment! 
You will be participating in a web-based experiment in economic decision-making. Based on the 
decisions that you make during the experiment, you might receive a monetary payment up to €50 
which will depend on your choices in the experiment.  
In the experiment, you will be asked to make seventeen choices distributed among four different 
tasks. Two of these tasks, each involving one choice, will require you to make decisions that will 
influence both your own and another participant's outcome. The other two tasks, involving the 
remaining fifteen choices, concern decisions regarding bets. 
At the end of the experiment, when all participants have submitted their answers, for each of the 
17 choice situations we will randomly select participants for whom this choice situation will be 
carried out for real money. For every choice situation we will select different participants. Thus, 
you have a chance that one choice situation will be carried out for real money for you. 
We have attempted to make the instructions of the experiment as clear as possible. However, if 
you still have trouble understanding a task after reading the instructions, have any other 
questions, or encounter technical difficulties, please contact XXXXX@ese.eur.nl. You can send an 
email, close the window, and continue the experiment after you have received a reply. 
Click next if you're ready to start the experiment. 
 
Next 
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5.B.2 Joy of Destruction Mini-Game 
 
In this task, you will be randomly matched with another participant in the experiment. We will 
refer to this other participant as "Player B". Both you and Player B will receive an endowment of € 
25. You have to decide whether to reduce Player B's income or to leave it as it is. If you pay € 1, 
you can reduce Player B's income by € 10. Player B will be asked to make the same choice 
regarding your income and will incur the same cost (€ 1) if (s)he chooses to reduce your income.  
After Player B and you have decided whether or not to reduce each other's income, a die will be 
thrown twice. Once for you and another time for Player B.  
Let us consider the throw concerning Player B's income. If the die shows 1 or 6 Player B's income 
will be reduced, independent of your decision. If the die shows any other number (2,3,4,5) then 
your decision will be realized: If you have decided to reduce Player B's income, the income will be 
reduced. If you have decided not to reduce Player B's income, the income will not be reduced.  
The same procedure will be applied to determine your income: first a throw of a die, then, if the 
die shows a 1 or a 6, your income will be reduced irrespective of Player B's decision. If the die 
does not show a 1 or a 6, Player B's decision regarding your income will be carried out.  
Please be aware that neither Player B nor you will learn about the outcome of the throws of the 
die. Therefore, if Player B's income is reduced by € 10, Player B will never learn what the reason 
for this reduction has been: your decision or the results of the throw of the die. Similarly, if your 
income is reduced, you will not know whether this is due to Player B's decision or the throw of the 
die. 
Please make your decision: Your endowment in this experiment is € 25. 
Do you want to pay € 1 to reduce Player B's income by € 10? 
 Yes 
 No 
Once you have made your decision, click next. 
 
 
Next 
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5.B.3 Dictator Game 
 
You have been allocated € 50. Your task is to decide how much of this amount to allocate to 
another individual. The other individual will receive this amount and you will keep the rest. 
The other individual will be a randomly selected participant of the experiment. This participant 
cannot be selected to be paid out for his or her own decisions in the experiment; hence, his or her 
payoff solely depends on your choice. If you happen to be the randomly selected participant 
whose choice will be paid out for real, we will make sure that you and the other participants will 
be invited to receive your payments on different days, so as to rule out any chance that you will 
meet the other participant. You will not learn the identity of the participant you are matched 
with, and likewise the other participant cannot learn your identity. 
You are now asked to state the amount you wish to allocate to the other participant. This must be 
a number (integer) between 0 and 50.  
Once you have made your decision, click next. 
 
Next 
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5.B.4 Ellsberg Tasks 
 
This task involves 9 choices. For each of these choices, one participant will be randomly selected, 
and his/her decision will be implemented for real, and the resulting outcome will be paid in euros. 
Please state your decision for each of the following choice tasks.  
You will have to pick a colour: red or black, and draw a chip from a bag containing red and black 
chips. If your colour is drawn you will win €50, but if the other colour is drawn, you will win 
nothing. You have to decide from which bag you would like to draw a chip: Bag A or Bag B.  
 In Bag A, there will be 10 chips. Each chip can only be black or red, but the proportion of 
each colour will be unknown. The bag will be ready before you choose your colour, but 
you will not be allowed to check what is in it before choosing a colour and drawing a chip.  
 
 In Bag B, we will put (in front of you) x chips of your colour and 10 - x chips of the other 
colour. 
If x were 0, Bag A would be more interesting because there could be at least one chip with your 
colour in this bag. If x were 10, Bag B would be more interesting because it would guarantee €50. 
For x=1, 2, ..., 9, you have to choose the bag from which you want to extract a chip so as to win 
€50 if you draw a chip of your colour. 
 
Once you have made your decision, click next.  
 
 
 
Choice 1 
x=1 
 
Choice 2 
x=2 
 
Choice 3 
x=3 
 
Choice 4 
x=4 
 
Choice 5 
x=5 
 
Choice 6 
x=6 
 
Choice 7 
x=7 
 
Choice 8 
x=8 
 
Choice 9 
x=9 
Bag 
A 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
unknown 
proportio
ns of red 
and black 
chips 
Bag 
B 
1 chip of 
your 
colour, 9 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
2 chips of 
your 
colour, 8 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
3 chips of 
your 
colour, 7 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
4 chips of 
your 
colour, 6 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
5 chips of 
your 
colour, 5 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
6 chips of 
your 
colour, 4 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
7 chips of 
your 
colour, 3 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
8 chips of 
your 
colour, 2 
chips of 
the other 
colour 
9 chips of 
your 
colour, 1 
chip of 
the other 
colour 
 A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B 
Next 
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5.B.5 Compound vs. Simple Lotteries 
 
This task involves 6 choices. For each of these choices, one participant will be randomly selected, 
and his/her decision will be implemented for real, and the resulting outcome will be paid in euros. 
Please state your decision for each of the following choice tasks. 
Each of the choice tasks involves choosing between an option that involves drawing one chip from 
a bag and another option that involves drawing multiple chips from a different bag. 
In case of drawing multiple chips from the bag, the poker chips you draw will be placed back in 
the bag and the chips in the bag will be mixed before you extract again, so as to keep the 
composition of the bag constant. This holds true for all choice situations below.  
Please pay attention to both the composition of the bags and the number of extractions, which 
both vary across tasks. 
In each choice situation, you have to choose between two options to win €50. 
 
 
 
Choice 1 
 
Choice 2 
 
Choice 3 
 
Choice 4 
 
Choice 5 
 
Choice 6 
Option 
A 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
10 red and 10 
black chips, win 
if red 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
5 red and 15 
black chips, win 
if red 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
5 red and 15 
black chips, win 
if red 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
2 red and 18 
black chips, win 
if red 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
4 red and 16 
black chips, win 
if red 
extract 1 time 
from a bag with 
6 red and 14 
black chips, win 
if red 
Option 
B 
extract 7 times 
from a bag with 
18 red and 2 
black chips, win 
if 7 times red 
extract 5 times 
from a bag with 
15 red and 5 
black chips, win 
if 5 times red 
extract 7 times 
from a bag with 
16 red and 4 
black chips, win 
if 7 times red 
extract 4 times 
from a bag with 
10 red and 10 
black chips, win 
if 4 times red 
extract 6 times 
from a bag with 
15 red and 5 
black chips, win 
if 6 times red 
extract 2 times 
from a bag with 
10 red and 10 
black chips, win 
if 2 times red 
 A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B A    B 
 
Once you have made your decision, click next.  
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5.B.6 Confirmation Screen and Additional Questions 
 
Confirmation 
Your choices have been registered. Please answer the following questions to validate your 
participation in the experiment.  
Read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic it is of you 
according to the following scale44: 
  
Not at all 
characteristic 
of me 
Slightly 
characteristic 
of me 
Moderately 
characteristic 
of me 
Very 
characteristic 
of me 
Extremely 
characteristic 
of me 
I worry about what other people will think 
of me even when I know it doesn't make 
any difference.  
     
I am unconcerned even if I know people are 
forming an unfavorable impression of me.  
     
I am frequently afraid of other people 
noticing my shortcomings. 
     
I rarely worry about what kind of 
impression I am making on someone. 
     
I am afraid that others will not approve of 
me.  
     
I am afraid that people will find fault with 
me.  
     
Other people's opinions of me do not 
bother me.  
     
When I am talking to someone, I worry 
about what they may be thinking about me. 
     
I am usually worried about what kind of 
impression I make.  
     
                                                     
44
 This questionnaire was intended to measure fear of negative evaluation (Leary, 1983). We have decided 
to disregard this questionnaire for two reasons. First, subjects complained about it in their comments after 
the experiment (whereas most of the other comments were positive). The main problems seemed to be 
that these were the only psychological questions we used, which made it overtly obvious to the subjects 
what we were trying to measure and that the Dutch version of the scale was completely unidirectional 
(none of the questions were reversely coded, a higher score always implied more fear). Therefore, subjects 
considered the questions to be suggestive and disliked providing answers. Second, and possibly related to 
the first point, we noticed in the website’s log files that many subjects preferred not to answer these 
questions and only did so when they were asked to do it for a second time. Therefore, it is very likely that 
they did not put much effort into answering the questions. 
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If I know someone is judging me, it has little 
effect on me. 
     
Sometimes I think I am too concerned with 
what other people think of me.  
     
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong 
things. 
     
 
Did you use a calculator to make some choices in the experiment? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
Please indicate you age, gender, year of study, and nationality. 
Age:   
 
Gender:  
  
Male 
  
Female 
 
Year of study:  
  
Bachelor 1 
  
Bachelor 2 
  
Bachelor 3 
  
Master 
  
Other 
 
Nationality:  
  
Dutch 
  
Other 
   
 
Any comment? 
(optional) 
   
 
5.B.7 Final Screen 
 
Thank you for your participation. Your answers have been recorded.  
When the experiment is over, we will let you know whether you have been selected to play one 
of your choices for real. 
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Appendix 5.C Additional Analyses 
5.C.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the 162 subjects that completed the 
questionnaire at the end of the experiment (three subjects neglected to do so). The 
majority of our subjects were male (68%), Dutch (65%), and in the second year of their 
bachelor’s degree (57%). Furthermore, around 14 percent were in their first year of the 
bachelor’s degree, 12 percent were in their third year, 16 percent were following a 
master’s program, and 1 percent did not fall into any of these categories. Both the 
average and the median age were 21, and age ranged from 18 to 33. It should, however, 
be mentioned that over 90 percent of our subjects was under the age of 25 (not in table). 
A considerable share of subjects admitted to having used a calculator during the 
experiment (45%). Note that using a calculator was by no means forbidden in the 
experiment. We simply asked this question since using a calculator would facilitate 
finding correct answers in one of the tasks. 
5.C.2 Joy of Destruction Mini-Game 
In the JoD mini-game, the subjects had the option to pay €1 to destroy €10 of another 
player’s endowment. As presented in the chapter, χ2-tests show that subjects are 
significantly less likely to destroy the endowment of the other subject in eyes condition 
and the peers condition, relative to the control. There is no difference between the eyes 
and the peers condition. In the current section we show that these results are robust 
when we apply Probit regressions and control for the effect of other variables. 
Furthermore, due to a technical problem, the decisions submitted by some of the 
subjects (58 out 165) were initially not recorded in the database. These subjects received 
an email telling them that they could go back to the website to fill in the missing decision 
and most of them (46 out of 58) did so. Here, we provide additional tests showing that 
there is no indication that this data problem influenced our results.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Subjects 
The table shows descriptive statistics for our sample of 162 subjects who participated in the experiment 
and answered the questionnaire (three subjects neglected to do so). Age is the subject’s age measured in 
years. Gender, Nationality, Calculator, Bachelor 1, Bachelor 2, Bachelor 3, Master, and Other are dummy 
variables indicating whether a contestant is female (Gender), Dutch (Nationality), indicates having used a 
calculator (Calculator), is a first year Bachelor student (Bachelor 1), a second year Bachelor student 
(Bachelor 2), a third year Bachelor student (Bachelor 3), a master student (Master), or indicates that she is 
neither in the first three years of her Bachelor, nor a Master student (Other), respectively. 
    Mean Median Stdev Min Max 
Age 21.10 21 2.06 18 33 
Gender (Female = 1) 0.32 0 0.47 0 1 
Nationality (Dutch = 1) 0.65 1 0.48 0 1 
Calculator (yes = 1) 0.45 0 0.50 0 1 
Year of study      
 Bachelor 1 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 
 Bachelor 2 0.57 1 0.50 0 1 
 Bachelor 3 0.12 0 0.32 0 1 
 Master 0.16 0 0.37 0 1 
  Other 0.01 0 0.11 0 1 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results for Probit modesl on the probability that a subject destroys 
the endowment of another subject; significance levels are based on robust standard 
errors. Furthermore, since coefficients in a Probit model do not offer intuitive 
interpretations in terms of effect size, we report marginal effects evaluated at the 
covariate means. Model 5.1 provides a simple comparison between conditions. In line 
with the χ2-tests, we observe that destruction rates both in the eyes (p = 0.01) and the 
peers (p = 0.02) conditions are significantly lower than in the control condition. There is 
no significant difference between the eyes and the peers condition (p = 0.87, 
untabulated). Adding our control variables (Table 5.2, Model 5.2), we find that only 
nationality has a significant influence on destruction. Dutch students are significantly less 
likely to destroy the other’s endowment (p < 0.01). The effect of both the eyes and the 
peers condition remain statistically significant (respectively p = 0.01 and p = 0.04). In 
short, these analyses show that the simple, non-parametric tests applied in the main 
chapter prove robust in more advanced analyses controlling for age, gender, nationality, 
education year, and the use of a calculator. 
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Table 5.2: Probit Regression Results on Destruction Rate in the JoD Mini-Game 
The table displays results from the Probit regression analyses of subjects’ decisions to destroy (1) or not 
destroy (0) part of another subject’s endowment. Eyes and peers are dummy variables taking the value 1 if 
subjects were in the eyes condition (Eyes) or the peers condition (Peers), respectively. Definitions of the 
other variables are as in Table 5.2. Model 5.1 is estimated on the entire sample of 153 subjects who 
successfully submitted a decision in the JoD mini-game. Model 5.2 and Model 5.3 are estimated on the set 
of 150 subjects who both successfully submitted a decision in the JoD mini-game and answered the 
questionnaire at the end of the experiment. Model 5.4 is estimated on the set of 104 subjects for whom the 
decision in the JoD mini-game was successfully recorded the first time round (i.e. not affected by technical 
problems) and who answered the questionnaire at the end of the experiment. For each explanatory 
variable, the marginal effect at the covariate means is shown. Robust standard errors are used and p-values 
are shown in parentheses.  
      Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
Condition dummies         
 Eyes -0.18 (0.01) -0.18 (0.01) -0.18 (0.01) -0.18 (0.03) 
 Peers -0.17 (0.02) -0.14 (0.04) -0.15 (0.03) -0.15 (0.08) 
Control variables         
 Age   -0.01 (0.50) -0.01 (0.55) 0.00 (0.90) 
 Gender (female = 1)   0.06 (0.46) 0.07 (0.40) 0.05 (0.64) 
 Nationality (Dutch = 1)   -0.26 (0.00) -0.26 (0.00) -0.30 (0.00) 
 Year of study       
  Bachelor 2   0.02 (0.86) -0.04 (0.76) -0.23 (0.24) 
  Bachelor 3   0.04 (0.80) 0.01 (0.93) -0.21 (0.00) 
  Master   0.18 (0.39) 0.14 (0.49) -0.04 (0.87) 
 Calculator (yes = 1)   -0.06 (0.43) -0.06 (0.42) 0.01 (0.93) 
 Second time (yes = 1)         -0.08 (0.27)   
Log pseudo-likelihood -82.15 -69.21 -68.74 -47.2 
N 153 150 150 104 
 
Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics on destruction rates depending on whether the 
subject’s decision was recorded the first time round or whether they had to record their 
decisions a second time due to the data storage problem. For the eyes and the control 
condition, the findings are highly similar in both cases. Subjects destroy the others’ 
endowment in 18.18 percent of the cases when recording their decision for the first time 
and 16.67 percent when recording it the second time in the eyes condition. These 
statistics are 39.39 percent and 37.50 percent, respectively, for the control condition. 
When investigating the peers condition the gap appears a bit larger, subjects destroy the 
other’s endowment in 21.95 percent of the cases when answering the question for the 
first time, and 8.33 percent of the cases when answering the question for a second time. 
A Fisher’s exact test, however, indicates that this difference is not statistically significant 
(p = 0.42).  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics on Destruction Rate 
The table shows descriptive statistics on destruction rate in the JoD mini-game depending on whether 
subjects’ decisions were recorded the first time the subjects submitted them, or whether subjects had to 
record their decisions for a second time due to a technical problem with the website. Results are shown for 
all conditions both separately and combined. Overall statistics are provided in the final column. 
  First time  Second time  Overall 
  N % destroy  N % destroy  N % destroy 
Eyes 33 18.18  18 16.67  51 17.65 
Peers 41 21.95  12 8.33  53 18.87 
Control 33 39.39  16 37.50  49 38.78 
Total 107 26.17  46 21.74  153 24.84 
 
Overall, the qualitative pattern seems to be the same independent of whether subjects 
recorded their decisions for the first or the second time: subjects in the eyes and peers 
conditions destroy at a similar rate, which is lower than the destruction rate in the control 
condition. Performing χ2-tests, we find that even for the subset of subjects who recorded 
the questions for the first time the differences between conditions approach significance 
(comparing eyes with control: p = 0.06; comparing peers with control: p = 0.10). The 
additional observations from the subjects who had to record their decision for a second 
time thus only strengthen the statistical evidence for an already apparent pattern. 
Table 5.2, Model 5.3 incorporates a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the decision had 
to be recorded a second time, 0 otherwise, into the full model. This analysis shows that 
being requested to answer the question a second time does not steer behavior in a 
particular direction. Model 5.4 reports the results of estimating the model on the subset 
of subjects whose decisions were successfully stored the first time round. While the 
significance levels drop a bit, we observe that the estimates of the marginal effects are 
not at all affected by leaving out these subjects. This provides further indication that the 
data storage problem did not affect our results in a meaningful way. 
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5.C.3 Dictator Game 
In the main chapter, we have shown that the results from non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
tests suggest that the amount donated in the dictator game differs significantly between 
conditions. In particular, subjects donate significantly more to the other subject in the 
eyes condition compared to the other two conditions. There is no significant difference in 
the amount donated between the peers and the control condition. Looking at the 
percentage of subjects who decide to give away money, χ2-tests indicate that neither the 
eyes nor the peers conditions differs significantly from the control, but that subjects in 
the eyes condition are significantly more likely to donate as compared to subjects in the 
peers condition. In the present section we will show that these results are robust, or even 
strengthened, by performing more advanced analyses and controlling for the effect of 
other variables on the willingness to donate money to a stranger. 
First, we analyze the amount donated by the Dictator by means of a Tobit model. We use 
a Tobit model to account for the fact that our dependent variable “Amount given” is 
censored between €0 and €50. Model 5.1 and Model 5.2 in show our results, significance 
levels being based on robust standard errors. Model 5.1 presents a simple test of the 
condition effects to compare the results from the (parametric) Tobit analyses with those 
of the (non-parametric) Mann-Whitney tests reported above. We observed that the 
difference between the eyes condition and the control condition decreases in significance 
due to the distributional assumptions made in the Tobit. Still, the difference between the 
eyes and the control conditions remains marginally significant (p = 0.08)—and is 
significant if we perform a one-sided test (p = 0.04). More importantly, however, adding 
our control variables (Model 5.2) the condition effect increases in significance, becoming 
significant at the 5 percent level in a two-sided test (p = 0.04). None of the control 
variables seems to have a strong influence on behavior, except that Dutch students seem 
less willing to donate money (p = 0.09).  
 
 
ON THE SOCIAL NATURE OF EYES 
 
150 
Table 5.4: Regression Results on Giving in the Dictator Game 
The table displays results from regressions on the subjects’ giving behavior in the dictator game. Model S4.1 
and Model 5.2 display results of Tobit regression analyses on the amount donated by the subjects. Model 
5.3 and Model 5.4 displays results of Probit analyses on the subjects’ decisions to either donate (1) or not 
(0). Definitions of the variables are as in previous tables. In the results of the Probit regressions we depict 
marginal effects at the covariate means. For both Tobit and Probit models, we apply robust standard errors. 
P-values are shown in parentheses.  
   Amount transferred  Probability giving 
      Model 5.1 Model 5.2  Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
 Constant 5.15 (0.06) -3.16 (0.91)      
Condition dummies          
 Eyes 6.31 (0.08) 7.41 (0.04)  0.13 (0.13) 0.18 (0.05) 
 Peers -2.91 (0.48) -2.81 (0.51)  -0.12 (0.18) -0.09 (0.38) 
Control variables          
 Age   0.88 (0.50)    0.01 (0.72) 
 Gender (female = 1)   -3.04 (0.37)    0.04 (0.64) 
 Nationality (Dutch = 1)   -5.62 (0.09)    -0.22 (0.01) 
 Year of study         
  Bachelor 2   -5.29 (0.29)    -0.10 (0.39) 
  Bachelor 3   -4.92 (0.39)    0.06 (0.73) 
  Master   -7.31 (0.35)    -0.17 (0.41) 
 Calculator (yes = 1)    -3.60 (0.31)       -0.02 (0.85) 
Sigma 18.80 18.51      
Log pseudo-likelihood -490.89 -474.73  -104.24 -97.92 
N 165 162   165 162 
 
Interpreting the parameters, an individual’s willingness to donate increases by about 
€7.41 euro’s in the eyes condition compared to the control condition. This difference is 
larger than the observed difference in money allocated between conditions due to the 
fact that the Tobit takes censoring in the data into account. As could be expected, the 
difference between the eyes condition and the peers condition is significant both in 
Model 5.1 and Model 5.2 (p < 0.02, untabulated). 
Model 5.3 and 5.4 show the results of Probit models on the probability that a subject 
allocates a non-zero amount to another subject. As before, we report marginal effects 
evaluated at covariate means and significance levels are based on robust standard errors. 
Model 5.3 provides a simple comparison between conditions. As suggested by the χ2-tests 
reported earlier, the Probit results shows that no condition differs significantly from the 
control condition, while the subjects in the eyes condition are significantly more likely to 
donate compared to those in the peers condition (p < 0.01, untabulated). Adding our 
control variables, however, increases the significance of the eyes condition sharply, 
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indicating that subjects in the eyes condition are significantly more likely to give a positive 
amount to another subject compared to the subjects in the control condition (p = 0.05). 
The size of this effect is impressive: the subjects in the eyes condition are almost 18 
percentage points more likely to donate money compared to the subjects in the control 
condition and more than 25 percentage points more likely to donate money compared to 
the subjects in the peers condition (p < 0.01). The difference between the peers condition 
and the control condition remains insignificant (p = 0.38). Again the only control variable 
that seems to matter is nationality, Dutch students are 22 percentage points less likely to 
allocate a positive amount to another subject (p = 0.01). 
In conclusion, using more advanced analyses and controlling for a range of other variables 
that can potentially influence giving behavior, we find that this only strengthens the 
conclusions drawn in the main chapter. It is interesting to note that while Dutch students 
acted less anti-social in the JoD mini-game, these same students acted less pro-social in 
the Dictator game. This suggests that this subcategory of students is not, in fact, more or 
less kind, but rather is less likely to deviate from the prediction of rational self-interest. 
5.C.4 Ellsberg Tasks  
Here we present a number of additional analyses regarding the ambiguity questions used 
in the experiment. First, we will show that the findings in the general Ellsberg tasks 
(Ellsberg, 1961) that are reported in the main chapter are robust if we use Probit analyses 
and control for the effect of other variables on the subjects’ decisions. Second, we will 
investigate the other questions posed to subjects. As mentioned in the main chapter, we 
implemented the standard Ellsberg choice situation with a 50-50 proportion of red and 
black chips in Bag K, but we also varied the proportion of red and black chips from 10%-
90% to 90%-10% (i.e., 10%-90%, 20%-80%, 30%-70%…). Here we will show that when the 
probability was different from 50 percent, subjects overwhelmingly select the 
normatively superior option, i.e., Bag K if the probability of winning in this bag is 60 
percent or higher, Bag U if the probability of winning in Bag K is 40 percent or lower. As a 
result, no clear differences between conditions can be detected in these scenarios. 
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Table 5.5: Probit Regression Results on Choosing Risk over Ambiguity 
The table displays results from the Probit regression analyses of subjects’ decisions to choose the risky Bag 
K (1) over the ambiguous Bag U (0). Definitions of the variables are as in previous tables. For each 
explanatory variable, the marginal effect is shown at the covariate means. Robust standard errors are used 
and p-values are shown in parentheses.  
      Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
Condition dummies      
 Eyes -0.07 (0.46) -0.11 (0.27) 
 Peers -0.21 (0.02) -0.19 (0.03) 
Control variables     
 Age   -0.03 (0.17) 
 Gender (female = 1)   0.11 (0.14) 
 Nationality (Dutch = 1)   0.06 (0.43) 
 Year of study    
  Bachelor 2   0.06 (0.58) 
  Bachelor 3   0.08 (0.49) 
  Master   0.03 (0.84) 
 Calculator (yes = 1)     0.05 (0.49) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -85.79 -81.58 
N 165 162 
 
 
As discussed in the main chapter, the standard Ellsberg question we employed involved 
two bags containing black and red chips; in one bag (Bag K) the proportion of red and 
black chips was known, whereas in the second bag (Bag U) this proportion was not 
known. The subjects were asked to choose a color and a bag to draw a chip from. If the 
color of the drawn chip matched the one they had chosen, they received €50. When the 
proportion of red and black chips is 50-50, Bag K and Bag U are normatively equivalent, 
but many studies have shown that a disproportionate number of people choose Bag K 
(Camerer and Weber, 1992). In line with this common pattern, we observe that 85.5 
percent of the subjects chose Bag K in our control condition. Using χ2-tests, we find that 
behavior does not differ between the eyes and the control condition. In the peers 
condition, however, subjects are significantly less likely to show a bias in favor of Bag K. 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics of the Ambiguity Aversion Index 
The table displays the descriptive statistics of the ambiguity aversion index over different conditions. We 
calculated the index by counting the number of times a subject prefers the risky prospect over all nine 
choice-tasks. The higher this index, the greater the degree to which the subject shows a preference for the 
risky prospect over the ambiguous one. 
   N Mean Median St.Dev. min max 
Eyes 55 5,11 5,00 1,29 0 9 
Peers 55 4,75 5,00 1,27 0 9 
Control 55 5,02 5,00 0,91 2 7 
Total 165 4,96 5,00 1,17 0 9 
 
 
To investigate the robustness of this finding, we perform Probit analyses on the likelihood 
of choosing Bag K. The findings are reported in Table 5.5. As before, we report marginal 
effects around covariate means and apply robust standard errors in order to calculate 
statistical significance. These analyses yield results that are perfectly in line with the χ2-
tests reported in the paper. That is, subjects are significantly less likely to show a bias 
toward bag K in the peers condition as opposed to the control condition (p < 0.03). The 
difference between eyes and peers is marginally significant in Model 5.1 (p = 0.09, 
untabulated), but drops in significance when background characteristics are accounted 
for (p = 0.32, untabulated). The difference between the eyes and the control condition 
does not reach significance in any of the models (p > 0.27). None of the control variables 
influences the choice for Bag K. These analyses thus show the effect of the peers 
condition, as compared to the control condition, to be a rather robust phenomenon, 
whereas there is no evidence for an effect of the “eye” condition.  
As mentioned above, we also asked subjects to choose between the ambiguous prospect 
and a range of risky prospects with a probability of winning of 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80, 
and 90 percent. We start by using these questions to create an index of “ambiguity 
aversion”, defined as the degree to which people tended to prefer the risky prospect to 
the ambiguous one. We generate this index by counting the number of times a subject 
prefers the risky prospect over all nine choice-tasks. The higher this index, the greater the 
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degree to which the subject shows a preference for the risky prospect over the 
ambiguous one. This index indicates, as shown in Table 5.6, that subjects in the peers 
condition were less attracted by the risky urn. This difference is significant in Mann-
Whitney tests (in comparison with the control: p = 0.05, comparison with the eyes 
condition: p = 0.05). The difference between the other two conditions is not significant  
(p = 0.98).  
An interesting point, however, is that the above effect seems to be caused entirely by the 
choice when the probability of winning in the risky prospect is 50 percent. When we leave 
out this choice in our construction of the index, we find no significant differences 
between groups (p > 0.21). Figure 5.5 illustrates this point: when it comes to the index, 
the major differences arise around a score of four or five. Most subjects (87.3%) act 
consistently; they stick to the ambiguous prospect until the probability of winning in the 
risky prospects becomes sufficiently high, and after this point they consistently choose 
the risky prospects and do not switch back to the ambiguous one. Therefore, the 
switching points at which subjects decides to give up the ambiguous prospect for the risky 
ones drive the difference in the indexes that we observe between the conditions. 
Switching at the 50 percent risky prospect implies a score of five, switching prior to it at 
the 40 percent prospect implies a score of six, and switching only at the 60 percent 
prospect implies a score of four. Therefore, as can be clearly seen in Figure 5.5, the choice 
at the 50 percent prospect is the main driving force behind the differences in the 
ambiguity index. 
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Figure 5.5: Ambiguity Index for the Three Conditions  
The ambiguity aversion index is calculated by counting the number of times a subject prefers 
the risky prospect over all nine choice-tasks. The higher this index, the greater the degree to 
which the subject shows a preference for the risky prospect over the ambiguous one. 
 
Finally, Figure S5 shows this finding by depicting the percentage of subjects who chose a 
risky prospect as a function of the probability of winning in that risky prospect. It is easy 
to see that when the probability of winning in the risky prospect is not 50 percent, most 
of the subjects show a strong preference for either of the two prospects: when the 
probability is lower than 50 percent, a strong majority of subjects choose the ambiguous 
prospect, and when it is higher than 50 percent, an overwhelming majority of subjects 
choose the risky one. Due to these strong majorities, we can no longer use χ2-tests to 
statistically test for differences between conditions in these tasks, as the χ2-test is not 
reliable when data is highly unbalanced. Therefore, we employ Fischer’s exact test to test 
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Figure 5.6: Choosing the Risky Prospect as Function of Winning Probability  
The figures display the percentage of subject selecting the risky prospect for each of the nine 
choice questions that vary the probability of winning from 10% to 90% by condition. The 
Figure in (a) displays results for the complete set of data. The Figure in (b) displays results 
excluding a few subjects who showed inconsistent preferences in this task. 
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for differences between conditions in the choice task. It should be noted that applying 
Fischer’s exact test does not alter our conclusions for choice regarding the 50 percent 
prospect, the difference between the peers and the control condition remains highly 
significant (p = 0.03), although the difference between the peers and the eyes condition is 
no longer significant (p = 0.13). For the other choice-tasks, neither the eyes nor the peers 
condition differs significantly from the control (p > 0.11). The only condition comparison 
that approaches significance is that between eyes and peers in the 90 percent choice task 
(p = 0.05). 
It should, however, be noted that this difference completely disappears when we only 
focus on those 87.3 percent of the subjects who behave completely consistent within this 
task. If we leave the inconsistent subjects out of the analyses, the eyes and peers 
condition yield the exact same propensity to choose the risky prospect in the 90 percent 
choice task (p = 1.00). Focusing on these consistent individuals, again only the difference 
between the peers and the control condition at the 50 percent choice becomes significant 
(p = 0.01), while the difference between the eyes and peers condition becomes 
marginally significant (p = 0.09). No further condition differences emerge (p > 0.11). This 
implies that the only robust pattern in the ambiguity aversion task is the finding that 
when choosing between an ambiguous prospect and a risky prospect with a 50 percent 
winning probability, subjects in the peers condition are significantly less likely to show a 
bias in favor of the risky prospect as compared to the subjects in the control condition. 
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5.C.5 Simple vs. Compound Lotteries 
As shown in the main chapter, we find that there are significant differences in the 
likelihood that subjects mistakenly choose the compound gamble over the superior 
simple gamble. While there is no difference between the eyes and the control condition, 
χ2-tests indicates that the likelihood of making such a mistake is marginally significantly 
lower in the peers condition as compared to the other two conditions separately, and 
significantly lower if we combine the other two conditions. Furthermore, looking at the 
number of mistakes reveals a similar pattern. Mann-Whitney tests indicate that subjects 
in the peers condition make marginally significantly fewer errors in the peers as opposed 
to the control condition, where the eyes condition does not differ significantly from the 
other two conditions. In the present section we will show that these results are robust, or 
even strengthened, when performing more advanced analyses and controlling for the 
effect of other variables on the likelihood of making errors. 
First, we perform a Probit analysis on the likelihood of making one or more mistakes. We 
consider four models: two in which we compare the eyes and peers condition to the 
control condition, and two in which we compare the peers condition to the other two. For 
both analyses we apply a simple model without control variables and a model that 
accounts for the effects of several control variables. Table 5.7 shows our results, again, 
using robust standard errors and reporting marginal effects evaluated at covariate means 
in order to give parameters a substantive meaning.  
As Table 5.7 clearly shows the standard condition only models (Model 5.1 and Model 5.3), 
are perfectly in line with the χ2-tests reported earlier; we observe no difference between 
the eyes and the control, a marginal significant difference between peers and the other 
two conditions separate (p = 0.08) and a significant difference between the peers 
condition and the two other conditions combined (p = 0.04). Adding the control variables 
(Model S7.2 and Model S7.4), we find that these results are robust and indeed increase in 
significance somewhat (respectively p = 0.06 and p = 0.01). Furthermore, females are 
more likely to make at least one error, Dutch student are less likely to do so, and the use 
of a calculator drastically decreases the likelihood of making an error. 
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Table 5.7: Probit Regression Results on the Likelihood of Making a Mistake 
The table displays results from the Probit regression analyses on the likelihood that subjects choose a 
compound gamble over a strictly better simple gamble at least once. Model 5.1 and Model 5.2 compare 
both the eyes and the peers condition to the control, Model 5.3 and Model 5.4 compare the peers 
condition to the two other conditions combined. Definitions of the variables are as in previous tables. For 
each explanatory variable, we report marginal effects evaluated at covariate means. Robust standard errors 
are used and p-values are shown in parentheses.  
 
 
 
  Control as reference  Control + eyes as reference 
      Model 5.1 Model 5.2  Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
Condition dummies           
 Eyes 0.00 (1.00) 0.08 (0.42)      
 Peers -0.16 (0.08) -0.23 (0.06)  -0.16 (0.04) -0.27 (0.01) 
Control variables          
 Age   0.00 (0.87)    -0.01 (0.80) 
 Gender (female = 1)   0.19 (0.02)    0.19 (0.02) 
 Nationality (Dutch = 1)   -0.20 (0.02)    -0.19 (0.03) 
 Year of study         
  Bachelor 2   0.05 (0.71)    0.05 (0.72) 
  Bachelor 3   -0.03 (0.87)    -0.02 (0.90) 
  Master   0.15 (0.41)    0.17 (0.33) 
 Calculator (yes = 1)     -0.58 (0.00)       -0.58 (0.00) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -107.66 -69.43  -107.66 -69.72 
N 165 162   165 162 
 
Secondly, we estimate an Ordinal Probit model where the dependent variable is the 
number of mistakes (0 through 6). Table S8 shows our results. We report coefficients with 
their significance levels. As in all previous analyses, significance levels are based on robust 
standard errors. Furthermore, we report marginal effects evaluated at covariate means 
for each possible outcome category (0 through 6 mistakes). We present two models: a 
basic condition model without control variables, and a full model, which includes control 
variables alongside the general condition effects. 
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Table 5.8: Ordinal Probit Regression Results on the Number of Mistakes 
The table displays results from Ordinal Probit regression analyses on the number of mistakes that subjects 
make. The Condition model only includes condition dummies, whereas the Full model includes all our 
controls. We report both coefficients and marginal effects on the likelihood that a person makes a specific 
number of errors evaluated at covariate means. Robust standard errors are used and p-values are shown in 
parentheses.  
      Coeff. 
. 
Marginal Effects 
        P(0) P(1) P(2) P(3) P(4) P(5) P(6) 
Condition 
Model 
          
Condition dummies          
 Eyes -0.15 (0.48) 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  Peers -0.43 (0.04) 0.16 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Log pseudo-likelihood -285.94               
N     165               
Full 
Model 
          
Condition dummies           
 Eyes -0.10 (0.63) 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 Peers -0.52 (0.02) 0.20 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
Control variables          
 Age -0.03 (0.66) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Gender (female = 1) 0.16 (0.40) -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 Nationality (Dutch = 1) -0.56 (0.01) 0.20 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 
 Year of study          
  Bachelor 2 -0.01 (0.97) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Bachelor 3 0.16 (0.64) -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  Master 0.14 (0.72) -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Calculator (yes = 1) -1.51 (0.00) 0.53 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 
Log pseudo-likelihood -239.70               
N 162               
 
As can be seen in Table 5.8, both models show that the subjects in the peers condition 
are significantly less likely to make errors (p < 0.04). The difference between eyes and 
peers is insignificant in the first model (p = 0.16, untabulated) and marginally significant in 
the second model (p = 0.06, untabulated). With respect to the control variables, we find 
that Dutch students are significantly less likely to make mistakes, supporting the idea that 
this sub-group behaves more in line with rationality based arguments. Naturally, subjects 
who use calculators are also significantly less likely to make mistakes. 
In conclusion, the non-parametric tests reported in the chapter are in line with the more 
advanced analyses including control variables reported here. In general, adding control 
variables seems to strengthen our results rather than weaken them. 
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Chapter 6  | Source-Dependence of Utility and Loss Aversion: 
A Critical Test of Ambiguity Models 
 
 
 
This chapter tests whether utility is the same for risk and for uncertainty. This 
test is critical for models that capture ambiguity aversion through a difference 
in event weighting between risk and uncertainty, like the multiple priors models 
and prospect theory. We present a new method to measure utility and loss 
aversion under uncertainty without the need to introduce simplifying 
parametric assumptions. Our method extends Wakker and Deneffe’s (1996) 
trade-off method by allowing for standard sequences that include gains, losses, 
and the reference point. It provides an efficient way to measure loss aversion 
and a useful tool for practical applications of ambiguity models. We cannot 
reject the hypothesis that utility and loss aversion are the same for risk and 
uncertainty, suggesting that utility primarily reflects attitudes towards 
outcomes. Utility is S-shaped, concave for gains and convex for losses and there 
is substantial loss aversion. Our findings support models that explain ambiguity 
aversion through a difference in event weighting and suggest that descriptive 
ambiguity models should allow for reference-dependence of utility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper “Source-Dependence of Utility and Loss Aversion: A Critical Test of Ambiguity Models”, 
co-authored by Mohammed Abdellaoui, Han Bleichrodt, and Olivier L’Haridon (Abdellaoui et al., 2013b). We gratefully 
acknowledge helpful comments from Aurélien Baillon, Ferdinand Vieider, Peter P. Wakker, and Horst Zank.  
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6.1 Introduction 
An extensive amount of empirical work, originating from Ellsberg's (1961) famous thought 
experiment, shows that people are not neutral towards ambiguity, as assumed by 
subjective expected utility. New models have been proposed to explain these ambiguity 
attitudes. Broadly speaking, these ambiguity models can be subdivided into two classes. 
The first class models ambiguity aversion through a difference in utility between risk 
(known probabilities) and uncertainty (unknown probabilities). The best-known model of 
this class is the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Other 
models that belong to this class were proposed by Nau (2006), Chew et al. (2008), Seo 
(2009), and Neilson (2010). The second class of models assumes that utility does not 
depend on the source of uncertainty and is the same for risk and uncertainty. Instead, 
ambiguity aversion is modeled through a difference in event weighting. This class includes 
the multiple priors models (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Jaffray, 1989; Ghirardato, 
Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2004) and modifications thereof (Gajdos et al., 2008; 
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006), vector expected utility (Siniscalchi, 2009), 
Choquet expected utility (Gilboa, 1987; Schmeidler, 1989), and prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
This chapter investigates whether utility is source-independent and the same for risk and 
uncertainty. We assume a general utility model, previously suggested by Miyamoto (1988), 
Luce (1991), and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001), that includes most of the ambiguity 
models of the second class as special cases, and generalize it to include sign-dependence to 
also cover prospect theory. We test the central condition underlying this model and obtain 
support for it. We measure utility for gains and for losses and also measure loss aversion. 
Previous evidence suggests that the distinction between gains and losses is relevant 
because ambiguity attitudes differ between gains and losses (e.g., Cohen, Jaffray, and Said, 
1987; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989; Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber, 2005; Du and 
Budescu, 2005) and loss aversion is crucial in explaining attitudes towards both risk (Rabin 
2000) and ambiguity (Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006).  
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Measuring loss aversion is complex, in particular if event weighting may be different for 
gains and losses. Previous measurements of loss aversion sidestepped this problem by 
introducing simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new method to measure loss aversion 
that imposes no simplifying assumptions and requires no complete measurement of utility. 
It can easily be applied, which may encourage the use of ambiguity models in decision 
analysis. Our method extends the trade-off method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996) by 
allowing standard sequences (sequences of outcomes for which the utility difference 
between successive elements is constant) to pass through the reference point. Our method 
also simplifies the axiomatization of ambiguity models as there is a close connection 
between measurements of utility using the trade-off method and preference conditions 
(Köbberling and Wakker, 2003).  
Our experimental data contain two messages. First, they provide support for models that 
explain ambiguity aversion through a difference in event weighting. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that utility and loss aversion are the same for risk and uncertainty. This suggests 
that utility is source-independent and primarily reflects attitudes towards outcomes.  
The second message is that descriptive ambiguity models should allow for reference-
dependence of utility. We obtain clear evidence that utility differs for gains and losses and 
there was sizeable loss aversion. Most ambiguity models do not allow for reference-
dependence and assume that ambiguity attitudes are the same for gains and losses. This 
assumption may be adequate for normative purposes, but, as our data clearly show, does 
not match behavior.  
6.2 Background 
Binary Prospect Theory 
Consider a decision maker who has to make a choice in the face of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
is modeled through a state space  . Exactly one of the states will obtain, but the decision 
maker does not know which one. Subsets   of   are called events and    denotes the 
complement of  .  
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Acts map states to outcomes. Outcomes are money amounts and more money is preferred 
to less. In our measurements, we will only use two-outcome acts    , signifying that the 
decision maker obtains €   if event   occurs and €   otherwise. If probabilities are known, 
we will write     for the act that pays €   with probability   and €   with probability    . 
We will refer to     as an uncertain act (meaning that probabilities are unknown) and to 
    as a risky act (meaning that probabilities are known).  
We use conventional notation to express the preference of the decision maker, letting  , , 
and  represent strict preference, weak preference, and indifference. Preferences are 
defined relative to a reference point   . Gains are outcomes strictly preferred to    and 
losses are outcomes strictly less preferred than   . An act is mixed if it involves both a gain 
and a loss. For mixed acts the notation     signifies that   is a gain and   is a loss. A gain 
act involves no losses (i.e. both   and   are nonnegative) and a loss act involves no gains. 
For gain and loss acts the notation     signifies that the absolute value of   exceeds the 
absolute value of  , i.e. if   and   are gains then     and if   and   are losses then    .  
Under binary prospect theory (PT) the decision maker’s preferences over mixed acts     
are evaluated by: 
(6.1a)      ( ) ( )    (  ) ( ) 
and preferences over gain or loss acts by: 
(6.1b)      ( ) ( )  (    ( )) ( ) 
where     for gains and     for losses.  is a strictly increasing, real-valued utility 
function that satisfies (  )   . The utility function is a ratio scale and we can choose the 
utility of one outcome other than the reference point.   is an overall utility function that 
includes loss aversion. In empirical applications   is often decomposed in a basic utility 
function, capturing the decision maker’s attitudes towards final outcomes, and a loss 
aversion coefficient   capturing attitudes towards gains and losses (Sugden, 2003; 
Köbberling and Wakker, 2005; Köszegi and Rabin, 2006). Our method does not require this 
decomposition.  
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The event weighting functions        , assign a number  ( ) to each event   such 
that 
  ( )    
  ( )    
   is monotonic:     implies  ( )     ( ). 
The event weighting functions   depend on the sign of the outcomes and may be 
different for gains and losses. They need not be additive. For gains, binary PT contains most 
transitive ambiguity models as special cases, as was pointed out by Miyamoto (1988), Luce 
(1991), and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). The ambiguity models only differ when the 
number of outcomes is at least three. Equations (6.1a) and (6.1b) represent the extension 
of these models to include sign-dependence. 
Binary PT evaluates mixed risky acts     as  
(6.2a)      ( ) ( )    (   ) ( ) 
and gain and loss risky acts     as 
(6.2b)      ( ) ( )  (    ( )) ( )      .  
   is a strictly increasing probability weighting function that satisfies   ( )    and 
  ( )    and again may differ between gains and losses. Hence, in the evaluation of risky 
acts the event weighting functions   are replaced by probability weighting functions    
Binary PT assumes that utility is the same for risk and uncertainty. Ambiguity aversion is 
modelled through a difference between   and  . 
Previous Evidence 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumed that utility differs between gains and losses and is 
S-shaped, concave for gains and convex for losses. In addition, they assumed that utility is 
steeper for losses than for gains, reflecting loss aversion. Nearly all the empirical evidence 
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on utility comes from decision under risk. There is much evidence that utility for gains is 
indeed concave (Wakker, 2010). For losses the evidence is more equivocal. While most 
studies found convex utility, some have also found linear or concave utility (e.g., Bruhin, 
Fehr-Duda, and Epper, 2010). The utility for losses is usually closer to linear than the utility 
for gains. 
Empirical evidence on utility under uncertainty is scarce. Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber 
(2005) measured utility under uncertainty and confirmed that it was concave for gains and 
slightly convex for losses. Their parametric estimates were close to those previously 
obtained under risk, but they did not directly measure utility under risk. Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011) and Vieider et al. (2013) measured utility under risk and under uncertainty for small 
stakes and under parametric assumptions about utility. They found that utility was linear 
both for risk and for uncertainty. This finding might be due to the small stakes used in 
these studies: for small stakes utility is usually close to linear (Wakker, 2010). 
Nearly all empirical measurements of loss aversion made simplifying assumptions about 
utility and probability weighting, typically assuming linear utility and either ignoring 
probability weighting (Pennings and Smidts, 2003; Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009; Baltussen, 
van den Assem, and van Dolder, 2013) or assuming equal weighting for gains and losses 
(Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann, 2010). The exception is Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and 
Paraschiv (2007) who imposed no simplifying assumptions on either probability weighting 
or utility. However, they measured loss aversion in decision under risk only and their 
method is not applicable in decision under uncertainty. 
Most studies found loss aversion coefficients around 2, meaning that losses weight 
approximately twice as much as absolutely commensurate gains (Booij, van Praag, and van 
de Kuilen, 2010). A difficulty in comparing the results of these studies is that they not only 
made different parametric assumptions, but also adopted different definitions of loss 
aversion.  
Finally, even though binary PT is consistent with much of the empirical data that has been 
collected on decision under risk and uncertainty and includes many ambiguity models as 
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special cases, there is some evidence challenging it. For example, Starmer and Sugden 
(1993) and Birnbaum (2008) reported event-splitting effects that violate binary PT and 
Birnbaum and Bahra (2007) and Wu and Markle (2008) obtained violations of binary PT for 
mixed acts. We, therefore, included a test of the main condition underlying binary PT in our 
experiment. This test is explained below. 
6.3 Measurement Method 
Our method for measuring utility and loss aversion consists of three stages and is 
summarized in Table 6.1. In the first stage, a gain and a loss are elicited that connect utility 
for gains (measured in the second stage) with utility for losses (measured in the third 
stage). The measurements in the second and in the third stage employ the trade-off 
method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996). Within each domain, we determine a standard 
sequence of outcomes such that the utility difference between successive elements of the 
sequence is constant. The trade-off method is commonly used in decision theory (Wakker, 
2010), but thus far it could only be used to measure utility for gains and utility for losses 
separately. It could not be used to measure loss aversion, which requires that the utility for 
gains and the utility for losses can be compared. Our method allows measuring utility for 
gains and utility for losses jointly and, consequently, it permits the measurement of loss 
aversion. In all the derivations presented below we impose no parametric assumptions on 
utility and the weighting functions   and        ,. Hence, our method is parameter-
free. 
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Table 6.1: Three-Stage Procedure to Measure Utility 
The third column shows the quantity that is assessed in each of the three stages of the procedure. The fourth 
column shows the indifference that is elicited. The fifth column shows the stimuli used in the experiment. ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡  
and 𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑡 were used to test for consistency (see Section 6.4 for explanation). 
 
  Assessed quantity Indifference Choice variables 
Stage 1  
            €     
   color of a ball drawn from an 
unknown Ellsberg urn,    ½ 
  
    
       
  
    
        
Stage 2 Step 1     
 
 
           €    ; 𝑘    
 𝑎𝑙𝑡  € ; 𝑘 𝑎𝑙𝑡     Step 2 to 𝑘    
    
 
 
      
 
 
  
Stage 3 Step 1       
         €   ; 𝑘𝐿     Step 2 to 𝑘𝐿   
      
        
  
 
 
First Stage: Elicitation of the Gauge Outcomes 
We start by selecting an event   that will be kept constant throughout the first stage and a 
gain  . Then we elicit the loss   for which       . It follows from equation (6.1a) that: 
(6.3)     ( ) ( )    (  ) ( )   (  )    
We next elicit certainty equivalents   
  and   
  such that   
       and   
       . The 
indifference   
       implies that 
(6.4)    (  
 )    ( ) ( ).      
The indifference   
        implies that 
(6.5)    (  
 )    (  ) ( ).      
Combining Eqs. (6.3) (6.5) gives 
(6.6)    (  
 )    (  
 ).       
Equation (6.6) defines the first elements   
  and   
  of the standard sequences for gains 
and losses that we will construct in the second and third stages. 
For choice under risk, the elicitation of   
  and   
  is similar except that the event   is 
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replaced by a known probability  , and that the weights  ( ) and  (  ) are replaced 
by  ( ) and  (   ), respectively. 
Second and Third Stage: Elicitation of Utility for Gains and Losses 
In the second stage, we elicit a standard sequence of gains. Let ℓ be a prespecified loss. We 
first elicit the loss   such that the decision maker is indifferent between the acts   
 
 
  and 
ℓ    , where   
  is the gain that was elicited in the first stage. We can take an event    
different from the event   used in the first stage, but, for simplicity, we applied the same 
event in all three stages in our experiment. The indifference   
 
 
  ℓ     implies that 
(6.7)      ( ) (  
 )    (  ) ( )    (  ) (ℓ).   
Rearranging Eq. (6.7) and using (  )    gives, 
(6.8)     (  
 )   (  )  
  (  )
  ( )
( (ℓ)   ( )).    
Next, we elicit the gain   
  such that   
 
 
    
 
 
ℓ. From this indifference we obtain after 
rearranging 
(6.9)     (  
 )   (  
 )  
  (  )
  ( )
( (ℓ)   ( )).    
Combining Eqs. (6.8) and (6.9) gives: 
(6.10)    (  
 )   (  
 )   (  
 )   (  ).      
We proceed by eliciting a series of indifferences   
 
 
      
 
 
ℓ       𝑘 , to obtain the 
sequence {     
    
       
 }. It is easy to see that for all  , (  
 )   (    
 )   (  
 )  
 (  ). For decision under risk, we apply the above procedure with the event   replaced by 
a probability  . 
The standard sequence of losses is constructed similarly. We select a gain   and an event   
and elicit the gain   such that     
      .45 We then proceed to elicit a standard 
                                                     
45
 Again, we could have selected an event    different from the events used in the first two stages, but we 
used the same event in our experiment. 
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sequence {     
    
       
 }  by eliciting a series of indifferences     
        
 , 
      𝑘𝐿   For risk, we replace the event   by a probability    
By combining the second and the third stages we elicit a sequence 
{   
      
       
       
 } that runs from the domain of losses through the reference 
point to the domain of gains and for which the utility difference between successive 
elements is constant. We can scale utility by selecting the utility of an arbitrary element. In 
the analyses reported below, we set  (   
 )    from which it follows that  (  
 )   𝑘 ⁄  
for       𝑘 , and (  
 )    𝑘 ⁄ , for       𝑘𝐿. 
6.4 Experiment 
Experimental Set-Up 
Subjects were 75 economics students of the Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam (29 
female, mean age of 20.7 years). Each subject was paid a flat fee of €10 for participation in 
the experiment. Before conducting the actual experiment, the experimental protocol was 
tested in several pilot sessions. 
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects answered the questions individually in 
sessions of at most two subjects. They first received instructions about the tasks and then 
completed five training questions. Subjects were told that there were no right or wrong 
answers and that they should go through the experiment at their own pace. They were 
instructed to approach the experimenter if they needed any advice concerning the 
experiment. A session lasted 40 minutes on average. 
The order in which utility under risk and uncertainty were measured was randomized 
between sessions. When a subject had completed the first part of the experiment, the 
experimenter would approach her to explain the next part. Within the risk and uncertainty 
elicitations, the second and third stage were also randomized; some subjects started with 
the elicitation of the gain sequence, others with the elicitation of the loss sequence. The 
first stage always had to come first because it served as an input for the other two stages. 
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We used sizeable monetary amounts because we were interested in studying both utility 
curvature and loss aversion. Utility is approximately linear over small intervals (Wakker and 
Deneffe, 1996) and we feared that it would be hard to detect differences between utility 
under risk and uncertainty for small stakes. Given that substantial losses were involved, all 
choices were hypothetical. It is impossible to find subjects willing to participate in an 
experiment where they can lose substantial amounts of money. We will provide a more 
detailed discussion of the use of incentives in the concluding section. 
We did not directly ask subjects for their indifference values, but, instead, used a series of 
binary choice questions to zoom in at them. Examples of such a zooming-in process can be 
found in  
Table 6.5 in Appendix 6.B. We applied a choice-based elicitation procedure as previous 
research suggests that it leads to more reliable results than directly asking for indifference 
values (Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce, 1990; Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 2004). 
Details 
To perform the elicitation described in Section 6.3, we had to specify a number of 
parameters, which are depicted in the final column of Table 6.1. We made the common 
assumption that the reference point    was equal to    In the risk condition, the outcome 
of an act was determined by drawing a ball from an urn containing five red balls and five 
black balls. Subjects could state which color they preferred to bet on with the chance of 
winning always equal to 50 percent. In the uncertainty condition, the outcome of an act 
was determined by drawing a ball from an urn containing ten balls, which were either red 
or black in unknown proportions. Again, subjects could select the color they preferred to 
bet on.  
Both for gains and for losses, we elicited six points of the utility function under both risk 
and uncertainty. Next to these elicitations, we performed a second smaller sequence in the 
domain of gains, varying the gauge amount ℓ. By definition ℓ needs to be smaller or equal 
to   . In the main elicitation we set ℓ       . Asking the question whether the elicited 
amounts would depend on the value of ℓ, we also elicited   
  and   
  using an alternative 
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gauge amount ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡     . Under binary PT the elicitations of   
  and   
  should not depend 
on the selected value of ℓ  This second elicitation was meant to test sign-comonotonic 
trade-off consistency (Köbberling and Wakker, 2003), the central condition underlying 
binary PT. 
Figures 6.4-6.6 in the appendix 6.A show the displays used under uncertainty. The screens 
under risk were similar, except that the two branches would simply say 50% rather than 
“Red” or “Black”. Figure 6.6 displays the typical decision that subject had to make. Subjects 
were faced with a choice between two acts denoted as options A and B. They could not 
state indifference. By choosing between the two acts, the subject narrowed down the 
interval in which her indifference value should fall.  
After narrowing down the interval thrice, we presented subjects with a scrollbar (Figure 
6.6). The scrollbar allowed subjects to specify their indifference value up to    precision. 
The starting point of the scrollbar was in the middle of the interval determined by their 
previous choices. The range of the scrollbar was wider than this interval, so that subjects 
could correct any mistakes they might have made. The data on the use of the scrollbar also 
give an indication of the quality of the data. If many subjects would provide answers that 
did not align with their previous choices, possibly even violating stochastic dominance, this 
might signal poor understanding of the task. After specifying a value with the scrollbar, 
subjects were asked to confirm their choice (Figure 6.7). If they cancelled their choice, the 
process started over. If subjects confirmed their choice, they moved on to the next 
elicitation. 
We included a number of repetitions to test for consistency. First, in each of the six 
standard sequences (the short and the long gain sequences and the loss sequence for both 
risk and uncertainty), we repeated the second-to-last iteration in the elicitation of 
  
        . Repeating the second-to-last iteration is a strong test of consistency, as 
subjects were probably close to indifference at the end of the iteration process. 
Furthermore, at the end of eliciting the long gain sequence, we elicited   
  again, for both 
risk and uncertainty. Together, these repetitions and the way in which subjects used the 
scrollbar allowed us to gain insight into the quality of the data. 
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6.5 Analyses 
Analyses of Utility Curvature 
We employ two different methods to investigate utility curvature. 46  For the first, 
nonparametric, method, we calculate the area under the utility function. The domain of   
is normalized to      , by transforming every gain   
  to the value   
   
 ⁄  and every loss   
  
to   
   
 ⁄ .47 If utility is linear, the area under this normalized curve equals ½. For gains, we 
consider utility to be convex [concave] if the area under the curve is smaller [larger] than ½. 
For losses, utility is considered to be convex [concave] if the area under the curve is larger 
[smaller] than ½.  
We also analyze the utility function by parametric estimation. We employ the power family, 
  , as it is the most commonly employed parametric family. For gains [losses]     
corresponds to convex [concave] utility,     corresponds to linear utility, and     
corresponds to concave [convex] utility. Estimation is done using nonlinear least squares. 
To test for robustness, we have also performed a mixed-effects estimation in which each 
individual parameter was estimated as the sum of a fixed effect, common to all subjects, 
and an individual-specific random effect. The results were similar. A potential problem in 
estimating a model like binary PT using nonlinear least squares is collinearity between 
utility and the event weights, which implies that the obtained estimates may not be 
uniquely identified. The trade-off method avoids this problem by keeping event weighting 
fixed, while eliciting utility and, hence, the obtained estimates are uniquely identified.  
Loss Aversion 
In the literature, loss aversion has been defined in a multitude of ways. Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) concluded that the definitions proposed by Kahneman and 
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 We have also used a third, nonparametric, method based on changes in the slope of utility. This method 
leads to similar conclusions. 
47
 One subject violated monotonicity so that   
  was not the largest loss. For this subject we transform losses 
  
  to   
     
      
  
  ⁄ . 
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Tversky (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005) were empirically most useful, and we 
will use these. Other definitions (Wakker and Tversky, 1993; Bowman, Minehart, and 
Rabin, 1999; Neilson, 2002) turned out to be too strict for empirical purposes, leaving many 
subjects unclassified. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) defined loss aversion as – (  )   ( ) for all    . To 
measure loss aversion, we compute – (   
 )  (  
 )⁄  and – (   
 )  (  
 )⁄  for  
       , whenever possible.48 Usually  (   
 ) and (   
 ) cannot be observed directly 
and has to be determined through linear interpolation. Some subjects occasionally violate 
stochastic dominance. As a result, their utility is not unique and one amount can have 
multiple utilities. For these amounts, we consider utility to be undefined. A subject is 
classified as loss averse if – (  )  ( )⁄    for all observations, as loss neutral if 
– (  )  ( )⁄    for all observations, and as gain seeking if – (  )  ( )⁄    for all 
observations. To account for response error, we also use a more lenient approach, 
classifying subjects as loss averse, loss neutral, or gain seeking if the above inequalities hold 
for more than half of the observations. 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) defined loss aversion as the kink of utility at the reference 
point (Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) suggested a similar definition). Formally, they defined 
loss aversion as  
 ( )   
 ( )⁄ , where  
 ( ) represents the left derivative and   
 ( ) the 
right derivative of  at the reference point. To operationalize this empirically, we compute 
each subject’s coefficient of loss aversion as the ratio of  (  
 )   
 ⁄  over  (  
 )   
 ⁄ , 
because   
  and   
  are the loss and gain closest to the reference point. Given that 
 (  
 )     (  
 )  this ratio is equal to   
    
 ⁄ . Hence, our method immediately gives an 
approximation of Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) loss aversion coefficient without the 
need to further measure utility. A subject is classified as loss averse if this ratio exceeds 1, 
as loss neutral of it is equal to 1, and as gain seeking if it is smaller than 1. 
                                                     
48
 These computations require that   
  is contained in [  
   ) and   
  in (    
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6.6 Results 
Three subjects violated stochastic dominance in the first stage of the measurement 
procedure. This undermines their subsequent answers and they are removed from the 
analyses. For the remaining 72 subjects, we can determine the entire utility function, for 
both gains and losses and under both risk and uncertainty. Of these 72 subjects, 14 violated 
stochastic dominance at least once. Violations of stochastic dominance potentially signal a 
lower degree of understanding or a lower degree of effort put in the task. We have, 
therefore, also analyzed the data including only the 58 subjects who never violated 
stochastic dominance, leading to similar conclusions. 
Consistency Checks 
Overall, consistency is satisfactory. Subjects make the same choice in 63.7 percent of the 
repeated choices. Reversal rates round ⅓ are common in the literature (Stott, 2006). 
Moreover, our consistency test is strict, as subjects are close to indifference in the 
repeated choice and, hence, reversals are more likely. There is no difference in consistency 
between risk and uncertainty.  
The correlation between the original measurement and the repeated measurement of   
  
is almost perfect. For risk, Kendall’s τ is 0.924, for uncertainty it is 0.938. 
As a final indication of consistency, we compare whether the final answer provided by 
using the slider fell within the interval as set up by the bisection procedure. Subjects 
provided answers that align with their original choices. Furthermore, when a subject’s final 
answer is outside the bisection interval, it typically only violated the final choice, probably 
indicating that they were close to indifference at this point. 
A Test of Binary PT 
As explained in Section 6.4, we elicited two sequences of gains, a longer one based on 
ℓ       , which we use in the main analysis, and a shorter one based on ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡    . If 
our subjects behave according to binary PT, then the values of   
  and   
  in the short 
sequence should be equal to those obtained in the long sequence.  
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We find support for binary PT, both for risk and for uncertainty. The correlation between 
the obtained values is substantial. Under risk, Kendall’s τ is 0.564 for   
  and 0.518 for   
   
Under uncertainty, these values are 0.694 for   
  and 0.625 for   
   All correlation 
coefficients are different from 0 (p < 0.001). Moreover, for uncertainty, we cannot reject 
the hypotheses that the values of   
  and   
  obtained in the short sequence are equal to 
those obtained in the long sequence (Mann-Whitney U test: both p > 0.684). For risk, the 
values of   
  differ marginally (p = 0.055), but the values of   
  do not differ (p = 0.138). 
Hence, even though   
  is chained to   
 , the marginal difference for   
  does not carry over 
to   
 . 
Ambiguity Aversion 
The measurement of   and   
  in stage 1 of our method provide insight into subjects’ 
ambiguity attitudes. Let    and    denote the elicited values of   for risk and uncertainty, 
respectively. Then,            and          . A subject is ambiguity averse if 
                . By transitivity,                 and, thus,      . This is true 
for 63.9 percent of our subjects (Binomial test:        ) and the median elicited value of 
   (        ) indeed exceeds the median value of    (     ) (Mann-Whitney U test:  
p = 0.012). Hence, we find evidence of ambiguity aversion in the measurement of  . 
Ambiguity aversion also predicts that     
 , the value of   
  measured under risk will exceed 
   
 , the value of   
  measured under uncertainty. This follows by transitivity from 
    
                      
 . However, this is only true for 44.4 percent of our 
subjects and we cannot reject the hypothesis that   
  was the same for risk and for 
uncertainty (Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.807).  
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Figure 6.1: Utility for Gains and Losses Under Prospect Theory Based on Median Data 
The figure displays the utility for gains and losses under prospect theory based on the median 
responses of our subjects. Panel A displays utility under risk. Panel B displays utility under 
uncertainty.  
 
The Utility for Gains and Losses 
Figure 6.1, Panel A displays the utility for gains and losses under risk, based on the median 
data. Figure 6.1, Panel B shows the same graph for uncertainty. Taken at face value, the 
utility functions seem similar. They are consistent with the typical finding of convex utility 
for losses and concave utility for gains. Furthermore, both utility functions appear 
considerably steeper for losses than for gains, indicating loss aversion. 
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Table 6.2: Classification of Subjects According to the Shape of their Utility Function 
The table classifies the subjects according to the shape of their utility function based on the area under the 
normalized utility function. Panel A displays the results under risk. Panel B displays the results under 
uncertainty. 
 
Panel A: Risk  
 Losses  
Gains Concave Convex Linear  Total 
Concave 13 31 1  45 
Convex 15 8 1  24 
Linear 2 0 1  3 
Total 30 39 3  72 
Panel B: Uncertainty 
 Losses  
Gains Concave Convex Linear  Total 
Concave 13 30 0  43 
Convex 18 10 2  30 
Linear 1 0 0  1 
Total 32 40 2  72 
 
 
To investigate these patterns more thoroughly, we move to the individual level analysis. 
Table 6.2 shows that the classification of subjects according to the shape of their utility 
function is very similar for risk and uncertainty and there are no differences in the overall 
distribution of classifications between conditions (Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.943). Utility 
under risk and uncertainty are related (Kendall’s τ = 0.389 for gains and 0.455 for losses,  
p < 0.001 in both cases) and the common pattern is that of an S-shaped utility function: 
concave for gains and convex for losses. Less than 20% of the subjects behave according to 
the traditional assumption in decision theory that utility is concave throughout. 
The parametric results confirm the above conclusions. Table 6.3 shows the estimated 
power functions at the individual level. Utility is mostly concave for gains and convex for 
losses. Under risk, 32 subjects have S-shaped utility. Under uncertainty, this is the case for 
30 subjects. 
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Table 6.3: Summary of Individual Power Coefficients for Gains and Losses 
The table depicts the results of fitting power functions on each subject’s choices individually. Shown are the m
edian and interquartile range (IQR) for the resulting estimates.  
 Risk  Uncertainty 
 Gains Losses  Gains Losses 
Median 0.857 0.924  0.937 0.898 
IQR [0.616-1.062]  [0.649-1.154]  [0.716-1.188] [0.675-1.356] 
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the relationship between individual estimates for the power coefficients 
under risk and uncertainty. The dashed lines correspond to the case where subjects have 
exactly the same coefficients in the two domains. Most estimates are relatively close to the 
dashed lines and there is no strong indication that subjects had different curvature under 
risk than under uncertainty. 
Mann-Whitney U tests on these power function estimates indicate that there is no 
difference in curvature for losses between risk and uncertainty (p = 0.866). There is some 
indication that utility for gains is more concave under risk (p = 0.027).49 The power 
coefficients of utility under risk and under uncertainty are moderately correlated: Kendall’s 
τ being 0.373 for gains and 0.423 for losses. 
 
                                                     
49
 The difference is not significant if we restrict our attention to the 58 subjects who never violate stochastic 
dominance. 
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Figure 6.2: Individual Power Coefficients under Risk and Uncertainty 
The figure depicts the relationship between individual power coefficients under risk and 
uncertainty. Panel A displays the power coefficients for gains. Panel B displays the power 
coefficients for losses. Subjects who had a power coefficient in excess of 2.5 are not shown in 
the graphs (4 for gains, 7 for losses). The dashed lines correspond to the case where subjects 
had exactly the same coefficients under risk and uncertainty.  
 
Loss Aversion 
Figure 6.3 displays the relationships between the medians of   
  and   
  under risk and 
under uncertainty. An advantage of our method is that it immediately reveals that there is 
loss aversion in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) when   
     
 .50 Hence, 
there is no need to measure the entire utility function to obtain insight into the presence or 
absence of loss aversion. As Figure 6.3 clearly shows,   
  is below   
  for all j, both under 
risk and under uncertainty. An estimate of the degree of loss aversion is obtained 
 
                                                     
50
 For a given j,   
  and   
   have the same utility by construction,  (  
 )    (  
 )  and, thus,   
     
  
implies that  (  
 )    (   
 ), consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s definition of loss aversion 
( ( )      (  ) for all x > 0). 
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Figure 6.3: Relationship Between Gains and Losses of Same Utility  
The figure depicts the relationship between median gains and median losses with the same 
absolute utility. Panel A displays the relationship between median gains and losses under risk. 
Panel B displays the same relationship under uncertainty. The dashed line corresponds to the 
case where gains and losses of the same absolute utility would be of equal size. The straight line 
 
 
by regressing the   
  on (   
 )   The     in Figure 6.3 display the coefficients from this 
regression. Both     (for risk and uncertainty) are different from unity (p < 0.001) and the 
values that we obtain are close to those observed previously for risk. We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the values of   are the same for risk and uncertainty (p = 0.431), which can 
be taken as an indication that loss aversion is similar under risk and uncertainty. 
Moving to the individual level, we find that   
     
  for all j (Wilcoxon tests, all p < 
0.001). Furthermore,   
    
 ⁄  does not differ between risk and uncertainty for any j 
(Mann-Whitney U tests: all p > 0.254).  
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Table 6.4: Results Under the Various Definitions of Loss Aversion 
The table depicts the results under the two definitions of loss aversion for both risk and uncertainty. The table 
displays how the coefficient is defined and the number of loss averse, gain seeking, and loss neutral subjects 
in both conditions. The numbers in parentheses for Kahneman and Tversky’s definition correspond with the 
case where response errors are not taken into account. Furthermore, the table depicts the median and 
interquartile range (IQR) for each measure of loss aversion under both definitions. 
 
Definition Coefficient Condition Median  
[IQR] 
Loss 
averse 
Gain 
seeking 
Loss 
neutral 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
  (  )
 ( )
 
Risk 
2.19  
[1.06, 5.59] 
58(46) 10(6) 1(1) 
Uncertainty 
2.48  
[1.10, 7.16] 
54(50) 16(10) 0(0) 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) 
  
 
   
  
Risk 
1.86  
[1.06, 4.47] 
56 13 3 
Uncertainty 
2.00  
[1.21, 6.50] 
57 14 1 
 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the individual analyses of loss aversion based on Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) measures. The table clearly 
shows evidence of loss aversion, irrespective of the definition used and regardless of 
whether we take response errors into account. According to both definitions, the median 
loss aversion coefficients for risk and uncertainty do not differ (Mann-Whitney U tests:  
p > 0.257 in both tests) and are moderately correlated (Kendall’s τ > 0.368, p < 0.001 in 
both tests). 
Finally, the two measures of loss aversion are substantially correlated. For risk, Kendall’s τ 
is 0.740 and for uncertainty it is 0.799 (all p < 0.001 in both cases). It is comforting to 
observe that these two distinct measures, one of a local nature and relying on a single kink 
in the slope of the utility function, and the other global and relying on different absolute 
utilities associated with the same absolute money amounts in the positive and negative 
domain, show a high degree of consistency in classifying subjects. 
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Figure 6.4: The Relationship Between Individual Power Coefficients for Gains and Losses 
Panel A displays the power coefficients under risk. Panel B displays the power coefficients 
under uncertainty. Subjects who had a power coefficient in excess of 2.5 are not shown in the 
graphs (6 for risk, 9 for uncertainty). The dashed lines correspond to the case where subjects 
had exactly the same coefficients for gains and losses. 
 
Reflection 
The aggregate findings reported earlier suggest that the power coefficients are similar in 
the gain and loss domains. This implies that the utility for losses is the mirror image of the 
utility for gains and is referred to as reflection.51 It is of interest to test whether reflection 
also holds at the individual level. Practically, this would allow us to infer utility for both 
gains and losses by only measuring it in one of these domains. Theoretically, it would 
provide support for the idea that utility in both domains is caused by the same 
psychophysical response to changes relative to the reference point. Reflection is a central 
                                                     
51
Reflection is also defined as risk [ambiguity] attitudes for losses being the mirror image of risk [ambiguity] 
attitudes for gains. As risk [ambiguity] attitudes are jointly determined by utility and event weighting under 
binary PT, it is clear that this definition differs from the one we use here. 
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result in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and is widely adopted in theoretical and empirical 
analyses based on prospect theory (e.g., Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001). 
We find little indication that reflection should be rejected. Based on the area measure, 
there was some, albeit marginal, difference in curvature between gains and losses (Mann-
Whitney U tests: p = 0.067). For uncertainty, there is no difference (Mann-Whitney U tests: 
p = 0.724). Reflection also implies that the power coefficients for gains and losses should be 
identical. We cannot reject this hypothesis, neither for risk (Mann-Whitney U tests:  
p = 0.128) nor for uncertainty (p = 0.814). 
On the other hand, both the area measure and the power coefficients, are only slightly 
correlated under uncertainty, and moderately correlated under risk. For the area measure, 
Kendall’s τ is 0.317 under risk (p < 0.001), and 0.191 under uncertainty (p = 0.018). For the 
power coefficients, Kendall’s τ is 0.325 under risk (p < 0.001), and 0.231 under uncertainty 
(p = 0.004). Figure 6.4 displays the relation between the power coefficients for both risk 
and uncertainty. The straight line corresponds to reflection. Both for risk and for 
uncertainty, reflection approximately held for most subjects, but for some it is a poor 
working hypothesis, particularly under uncertainty. 
6.7 Conclusions and Discussion 
Ambiguity models differ in whether they allow different utility functions for risk and 
uncertainty. Under binary prospect theory, which includes the multiple priors models and 
prospect theory as special cases, utility is independent of the source of uncertainty and, 
hence, the same for risk and uncertainty. Ambiguity aversion is modelled through a 
difference in event weighting. We test empirically whether the assumption of identical 
utility functions is justified and obtain support for it. We cannot reject the hypothesis that 
utility and loss aversion are the same under risk and under uncertainty. We also obtain 
convincing evidence for reference-dependence: utility is concave for gains, but convex for 
losses and there is substantial loss aversion. Finally, the elicited standard sequences are 
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similar for different stimuli supporting the central condition underlying binary prospect 
theory (Köbberling and Wakker 2003), which has not been tested before. 
Our findings pose a descriptive challenge for models that explain ambiguity aversion 
through a difference in utility curvature between risk and uncertainty alone, like the 
popular smooth ambiguity model. We observed that standard sequences are similar for risk 
and uncertainty. In Appendix C we show that this implies under the smooth model that the 
utility function under uncertainty cannot be a concave or convex transformation of the 
utility function under risk, even on small preference intervals. Hence, the transformation 
function has an irregular shape, which complicates its use in applications. 
It is interesting that loss aversion under risk and under uncertainty is similar. If loss 
aversion reflects the psychological intuition that losses loom larger than gains then one 
would expect that measurements of loss aversion are related across domains. Previous 
evidence of this correlation gave mixed results. Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2010) 
found a positive correlation between loss aversion in a risky and in a riskless task, but 
Abdellaoui et al. (2013a) found that loss aversion under risk and loss aversion in 
intertemporal choice were uncorrelated. Several studies have found that loss aversion is 
fickle and subject to framing (e.g., Novemsky and Kahneman 2005, Ert and Erev 2008, 
Abdellaoui et al. 2013a). We find that loss aversion is stable under risk and uncertainty if 
the elicitation method is held constant.  
In many decisions probabilities are unknown. People are often not neutral towards 
ambiguity and it is often important to take ambiguity attitudes into account. Our study 
contributes to the application of ambiguity models in empirical studies and decision 
analysis by providing a new parameter-free method to measure utility and loss aversion 
under uncertainty that is robust to event weighting and that can easily be implemented. 
Our method extends the trade-off method by allowing for standard sequences that contain 
both gains and losses and that go through the reference point. It provides a straightforward 
way of exploring whether decision makers are loss averse without the need to elicit the 
entire utility function. As stage 1 of our method shows, three elicitations suffice to measure 
SOURCE-DEPENDENCE OF UTILITY AND LOSS AVERSION 
 
186 
loss aversion in the sense of Köbberling and Wakker (2005) and with a few more 
measurements loss aversion in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) can be verified.  
Our conclusion that both utility and loss aversion are the same for risk and for uncertainty 
is not caused by the fact that subjects faced the same stimuli for risk and uncertainty. A 
simple heuristic that subjects might have used was to simplify the uncertain decision task 
by assuming that the probability of their preferred color in the ambiguous urn was ½. Then, 
the decisions under risk and uncertainty would be the same and our conclusions would 
naturally follow. Our data does not corroborate this hypothesis. The value of the loss   
stated in the first stage of our method is significantly lower under ambiguity (Mann-
Whitney U tests: p < 0.001), consistent with ambiguity aversion. Consequently, the 
subsequent choices that subjects faced were markedly different for risk and uncertainty. 
Even though the choices were different, the obtained utilities were similar for risk and for 
uncertainty. 
An easy response strategy in the trade-off method is to let the outcomes of the standard 
sequence increase by the difference between the gauge outcomes (  and ℓ  in the 
sequence of gains   and   in the sequence of losses). This would bias the results in the 
direction of linear utility. We checked for this heuristic but found little evidence to support 
it, even allowing for response error.  
The trade-off method is chained in the sense that previous responses are used in the 
elicitation of subsequent choices. Chaining may lead to error propagation, where errors 
made in one particular choice affect later choices. We checked for the impact of error 
propagation using the simulation methods developed by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and 
Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005) In both simulations, we confirmed the 
conclusions from those studies that the impact of error propagation was negligible.52 We 
also repeated the parametric analysis of utility accounting for serial correlation in the error 
                                                     
52
 Bleichrodt, Cillo, and Diecideu (2010) also concluded that error propagation was negligible in their 
measurements using the trade-off method. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
187 
terms.53 The estimates were identical to the ones reported in Section 6.5. Hence, we 
conclude that the chained nature of our measurements had no noticeable impact on the 
results either.  
We used hypothetical outcomes because we wanted to detect utility curvature. For small 
money amounts little utility curvature is usually observed and the equality of utility for risk 
and for uncertainty would then automatically follow. A second reason for not using real 
incentives is that we wanted to include losses. Ambiguity attitudes differ between gains 
and losses and loss aversion is important in explaining risk and ambiguity attitudes. 
Because we used substantial losses, we could not implement real incentives: it is 
impossible to find subjects willing to participate in an experiment in which they can lose 
substantial amounts of money. Given that all but one of the questions involved losses, we 
could not play out one of the gain questions for real either. Subjects would know 
immediately which question would be played out for real. The literature on the importance 
of real incentives is mixed. Most studies found that for small to modest stakes there was 
little or no effect of using real instead of hypothetical choices for the kind of tasks that we 
asked our subjects to perform (Bardsley et al., 2010). Therefore, we concluded that the 
limited potential advantage of using real incentives did not outweigh the advantages of 
being able to use larger outcomes and losses.  
A potentially more important problem in our analyses is that our design did not allow for 
obtaining non-parametric measurements of the weighting functions. Therefore, we are 
unable to test whether the weighting functions differ between risk and ambiguity, and 
cannot conclusively state that the ambiguity aversion that we observe is caused by 
differences in event weighting. Furthermore, one might worry that the lack of statistically 
significant results in our present study is due to decision errors (i.e., noise). In the current 
design, such errors work against models that model ambiguity aversion through differences 
in utility between risk and ambiguity, and in favor of models that model ambiguity aversion 
through differences in event weighting. In this sense, our choice for hypothetical choices 
                                                     
53
 We assumed that the error terms followed an AR(1) process  𝑡    𝑡    𝑡  with  𝑡 normally distributed 
with expectation 0 and variance    and estimated this using generalized least squares.  
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works in favor of the latter type of model, as real incentives tend to reduce variance (Smith 
and Walker, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). In the future, we plan to supplement our 
analyses with a second experiment that includes measurements on the weighting function 
and is conducted with a larger group of subjects to increase statistical power. 
While the final verdict will thus have to wait, the fact that the curvature and loss aversion 
parameters are very similar in an absolute sense does pose a descriptive challenge for 
models that capture ambiguity attitudes through a difference in utility between risk and 
uncertainty. In addition, our findings convincingly show that reference-dependence of 
utility is important both in modeling attitudes towards risk and in modeling attitudes 
towards ambiguity. In both conditions, utility is S-shaped, concave for gains and convex for 
losses and we observed clear evidence for loss aversion with most subjects being loss 
averse.  
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Appendix 6.A Display of the Experimental Questions 
 
Figure 6.5: Choice Screen Under Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Scrollbar Screen Under Uncertainty 
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Figure 6.7: Confirmation Screen Under Uncertainty 
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Appendix 6.B Illustrations of the Bisection Method 
 
Table 6.5: Example Elicitations of Indifferences using the Bisection Method Under Risk 
 Offered choices in  
elicitation   
Offered choices in  
elicitation  1
  
Offered choices in  
elicitation  2
  
1 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -2000) (2000,0.5;0) vs. 1000 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-700) 
2 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -1000) (2000,0.5;0) vs.   500 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-450) 
3 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -1500) (2000,0.5;0) vs.   750 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-325) 
Slider Start value: -1250 
Interval: [-2000,-500] 
Start value: 625 
Interval: [250,1000] 
Start value: -388 
Interval: [-576,-200] 
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Appendix 6.C: Proof Regarding the Smooth Model 
The following proof shows that equal utility midpoints for risk and uncertainty imply 
ambiguity neutrality or volatile ambiguity attitudes under the smooth model. In our 
experiment we ask indifferences   
 
 
       
 
 
ℓ. Under the smooth model this implies: 
∑   (   (  
 )  (    ) ( ))
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Suppose utility midpoints are the same for risk and uncertainty. Because the    sum to one, 
we also have 
∑  ((   (  
 )  (    ) ( ))  (   (    
 )  (    ) (ℓ)))
 
   
  
∑  ((   (  
 )  (    ) ( ))  (   (  )  (    ) (ℓ)))
 
   
   (  ) 
If  is strictly concave or strictly convex (A2) and (A3) can never be jointly true. Hence, 
either  is linear or it has both convex and concave parts on any interval [    
    
     
    𝑘 . 
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Chapter 7  | Conclusions 
 
This thesis employs natural and laboratory experiments to investigate decision making 
under risk and uncertainty, cooperative behavior, and bargaining. 
In Chapter 2 and 3, we find that many of the patterns found in the experimental laboratory 
carry over to the drastically different environment of TV game shows. In line with previous 
experimental results, we find evidence that contestants in TV game shows have reciprocal 
preferences, frame money amounts in relative terms, care about equity, and tend to stick 
to their promises. The fact that these findings emerge both in low stakes, relatively 
anonymous laboratory settings with student subjects as well as in high stakes, public game 
show settings with much more diverse subject pools, is a positive sign with respect to the 
generalizability of behavioral findings. 
At the same time, however, Chapter 4 and 5 show that varying the degree of public 
scrutiny or presenting subjects with subtle social cues can have a significant impact on 
behavior. In Chapter 4, we observe that contestants are considerably more risk averse 
when they make their decisions in the limelight as opposed a more anonymous laboratory 
setting. In Chapter 5, we observe that presenting subjects with pictures of eyes leads them 
act in a more social fashion, whereas presenting them with pictures of peers does not 
uniformly enhance social behavior but does trigger more rational behavior in individual 
choice tasks. 
Comparing these results to those of the first two chapters, this thesis provides a mixed 
message about the generalizability of findings between different environments. On the one 
hand, qualitative findings seem to be highly robust across different conditions. In our TV 
game shows, we observe behavioral patterns that resemble well-documental patterns from 
the laboratory. Similarly, in Chapter 4 we observe path dependence in risk behavior both in 
and out of the limelight. On the other hand, however, quantitative estimates appear to be 
more volatile. These findings are in line with recent studies suggesting that qualitative 
results generalize between laboratory and field settings even if quantitative results differ 
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(Kagel and Roth, 2000; Tenorio and Cason, 2002; Healy and Noussair, 2004; Isaac and 
Schnier, 2005; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; Östling et al., 2011; Bolton, 
Greiner and Ockenfels, 2013). 
Finally, Chapter 6 introduces a new method to measure utility and loss aversion under both 
risk and uncertainty without the need to introduce simplifying parametric assumptions. 
Using this method, we are unable to reject the hypotheses that both utility and loss 
aversion are the same for risk and uncertainty, suggesting that utility primarily reflects 
attitudes towards outcomes. Both under risk and uncertainty, utility is S-shaped, concave 
for gains and convex for losses, and there is substantial loss aversion.  
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Summary 
 
This thesis employs natural and laboratory experiments to investigate decision making 
under risk and uncertainty, cooperative behavior, and bargaining. 
Chapter 2 employs data form the British TV game show Golden Balls to study cooperative 
behavior. In this show, contestants play a variant on the prisoner’s dilemma for large and 
widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. In line with previous experimental results, 
we find evidence that contestants in TV game shows have reciprocal preferences, frame 
money amounts in relative terms, and tend to stick to their promises. We also find that 
young males are less cooperative than females and that this gender effect reverses for 
older contestants as men become increasingly cooperative if age increases. 
Chapter 3 uses data from the British TV game show Divided to study bargaining behavior. 
In this show, contestants bargain over a jackpot that is split into three unequal shares and 
ranges from about $10,000 to $185,000. In contrast to the commonly held view that 
fairness concerns will be unimportant when monetary incentives are sufficiently high, we 
find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: 
those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make 
concessions, and take home larger amounts. Threatening to play hardball is ineffective. 
Although contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to 
others, they do not secure larger absolute amounts and harm others. In addition, there is 
no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic 
characteristics matter. 
Together, these two chapters show that many of the patterns found in the experimental 
laboratory carry over to the drastically different environment of a TV game show. The fact 
that these findings emerge both in low stakes, relatively anonymous laboratory settings 
with student subjects as well as in high stakes, public TV game show settings with much 
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more diverse subject pools, is a positive sign with respect to the generalizability of 
behavioral findings. 
Chapter 4 and 5 investigate the effect of public scrutiny on behavior in both individual 
choice and interaction choice tasks. Chapter 4 examines whether risky behavior in the 
limelight differs from that under anonymity. In two experiments, we find that subjects are 
more risk averse when they make their decisions in the limelight. At the same time, 
however, their choices follow the same pattern of path dependence in and out of the 
limelight; subjects take more risk if the game develops either substantially worse or 
substantially better than expected. As a result, a simple prospect theory model with a 
path-dependent reference point provides a better explanation for subjects’ behavior than 
a flexible specification of expected utility theory. Additionally, our findings suggest that 
ambiguity aversion depends on being in the limelight, that passive experience has little 
effect on risk taking, and that reference points are determined by imperfectly updated 
expectations. 
Chapter 5 examines the effect of social cues, in particular pictures of eyes and pictures of 
peers, on decisions in both interaction and individual choice tasks. We find that the effect 
of pictures of eyes is limited to interaction tasks and that it is distinct from the effect of 
pictures of peers. Whereas pictures of eyes uniformly enhance pro-social behavior in our 
experiment, this is not the case for pictures of peers. Furthermore, pictures of peers 
trigger more rational behavior in individual choice tasks that have no moral component, 
whereas pictures of eyes do not affect behavior in such tasks. 
These two chapters suggest that public scrutiny and social cues can influence behavior, 
and that this influence is not limited to tasks that have a moral component. Together with 
the first two chapters, this thesis provides a mixed message about the generalizability of 
findings between different environments. On the one hand, qualitative findings seem to 
be highly robust across different conditions. In our TV game shows, we observe 
behavioral patterns that resemble well-documental patterns from the laboratory. 
Similarly, in Chapter 4 we observe path dependence in risk behavior both in and out of 
the limelight. On the other hand, however, quantitative estimates appear to be more 
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volatile. These findings are in line with recent studies suggesting that qualitative results 
generalize between laboratory and field settings even if quantitative results differ (Kagel 
and Roth, 2000; Tenorio and Cason, 2002; Healy and Noussair, 2004; Isaac and Schnier, 
2005; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; Östling et al., 2011; Bolton, Greiner and 
Ockenfels, 2013). 
In Chapter 6, we introduce a new method to measure utility and loss aversion under both 
risk and uncertainty without the need to introduce simplifying parametric assumptions. 
Our method extends Wakker en Deneffe’s (1996) trade-off method by allowing for 
standard sequences that include gains, losses, and the reference point. We employ this 
method to measure utility under both risk and uncertainty, and investigate whether 
utility takes the same shape for both conditions. This test is critical for models that 
capture ambiguity aversion through a difference in event weighting between risk and 
uncertainty, like the multiple priors models and prospect theory. 
We cannot reject the hypotheses that both utility and loss aversion are the same for risk 
and uncertainty, suggesting that utility primarily reflects attitudes towards outcomes. 
Utility is S-shaped, concave for gains and convex for losses, and there is substantial loss 
aversion. Our findings support models that explain ambiguity aversion through a 
difference in event weighting and suggest that descriptive ambiguity aversion models 
should allow for reference dependence of utility. 
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In dit proefschrift worden laboratoriumexperimenten en natuurlijke experimenten 
aangewend om risicogedrag, coöperatief gedrag, en onderhandelingsgedrag te 
bestuderen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 gebruikt data van de Britse TV spelshow “Golden Balls” om coöperatief 
gedrag te onderzoeken. In deze show spelen deelnemers een variant van het 
welkbekende gevangenendilemma voor grote en sterk variërende geldbedragen, 
gemiddeld meer dan 13 duizend Britse pond. In lijn met bevindingen uit experimenteel 
onderzoek vinden observeren we dat mensen wederkerig gedrag vertonen, zich aan hun 
beloftes houden, en dat deelnemers uitkomsten evalueren ten opzichte van een, 
normatief gezien, irrelevant referentiepunt. Tevens vinden we dat jonge mannen minder 
coöpereren dan jonge vrouwen, maar dat dit sekseverschil andersom ligt voor oudere 
deelnemers doordat mannen zich coöperatiever gedragen naarmate ze ouder zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt data van de Britse TV spelshow “Divided” om 
onderhandelingsgedrag te analyseren. In deze show onderhandelen deelnemers over een 
jackpot die in drie ongelijke delen wordt gesplitst. Het betreft ook hier hoge bedragen: de 
jackpot is gemiddeld meer dan 33 duizend Britse pond. In tegenstelling tot het 
veelgehoorde punt dat rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen niet van belang zullen zijn als 
monetaire prikkels hoog genoeg zijn, vinden we dat individueel gedrag en uitkomsten 
sterk worden beïnvloed door de mate waarin spelers hebben bijgedragen aan de jackpot: 
bij een hogere bijdrage claimt men een groter deel van de jackpot, is men minder geneigd 
concessies te doen, en neemt men een groter deel van de jackpot mee naar huis. 
Daarnaast vinden we dat het aankondigen van een agressieve onderhandelingsstrategie 
geen beter resultaat oplevert. Hoewel deelnemers die stellig aankondigen geen enkele 
concessie te zullen doen met een relatief groot deel van de jackpot naar huis gaan, 
incasseren zij geen groter bedrag in absolute zin en heeft hun gedrag een negatieve 
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impact voor anderen. Tot slot is er geen indicatie dat het voordelig is als eerste een claim 
op tafel te kunnen leggen, en zijn er weinig aanwijzingen dat demografische factoren 
verklarende kracht hebben. 
Tezamen geven deze twee hoofdstukken aan dat veel patronen uit het experimentele 
laboratorium generaliseren naar de drastisch verschillende omgeving van een TV 
spelshow. Het feit dat deze bevindingen uit de uiterst publieke omgeving van een TV 
spelshow, met hoge geldbedragen en een diverse groep “proefpersonen” stroken met 
bevindingen uit experimenten waar bedragen doorgaans laag zijn, studenten als 
proefpersoon fungeren en beslissingen een hoge mate van anonimiteit hebben, is een 
positief teken wat betreft de generaliseerbaarheid van bevindingen omtrent 
beslissingsgedrag.  
Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 onderzoeken het effect van bekeken worden op beslissingsgedrag, 
zowel waar het individueel gedrag als interactiegedrag betreft. Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt of 
risicogedrag anders is als mensen hun keuzes maken voor een groot publiek  (in de 
schijnwerpers staan) dan wanneer ze hun keuzes maken onder meer anonieme 
omstandigheden. In twee experimenten vinden we dat proefpersonen minder risico 
nemen wanneer ze in de schijnwerpers staan. Tegelijkertijd volgen de beslissingen een 
vergelijkbaar patroon van padafhankelijkheid: proefpersonen nemen meer risico als het 
spel zich substantieel beter of slechter ontwikkelt dan oorspronkelijk verwacht. Een 
eenvoudig prospect theory model met een padafhankelijk referentiepunt verklaart het 
gedrag van proefpersonen beter dan een flexibele specificatie van verwachte-
nutstheorie. Tevens vinden we dat ambiguïteitsaversie  sterker is als anderen meekijken, 
dat passieve ervaring met het spel weinig effect heeft op risicogedrag, en dat 
referentiepunten worden bepaald door onvolledige aanpassing van verwachtingen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt het effect van subtiele sociale stimuli op beslissingen in 
interactieve en individuele keuzesituaties, in het bijzonder van foto’s van ogen en foto’s 
van medestudenten. We vinden dat het effect van foto’s van ogen zich beperkt tot 
interactietaken en dat dit effect verschilt van dat van foto’s van medestudenten. Waar 
foto’s van ogen sociaal gedrag stimuleren in interactietaken, is dit niet altijd het geval 
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voor foto’s van medestudenten. Daarnaast zorgen foto’s van medestudenten voor meer 
rationeel gedrag in individuele taken zonder morele component. Foto’s van ogen hebben 
geen invloed in dergelijke taken. 
Deze twee hoofdstukken laten zien dat bekeken worden en zelfs subtiele sociale stimuli 
gedrag kunnen beïnvloeden, en dat deze invloed zich niet beperkt tot taken met een 
morele component. Samen met de eerste twee hoofdstukken schetst dit proefschrift een 
gemengd beeld wat betreft de generaliseerbaarheid van bevindingen tussen 
verschillende omgevingen. Aan de ene kant lijken kwalitatieve patronen robuust over 
verschillende condities. In onze spelshows vinden we gelijksoortige gedragingen als 
voorheen geobserveerd in het gedragslaboratorium. Tevens zien we in hoofdstuk 4 dat de 
padafhankelijkheid van risicogedrag niet anders is wanneer men in de schijnwerpers 
staat. Tegelijkertijd echter, blijken kwantitatieve resultaten minder robuust. Deze 
bevindingen bevestigen de uitkomsten van recente studies die laboratorium- en 
veldgedrag met elkaar vergelijken (Kagel and Roth, 2000; Tenorio and Cason, 2002; Healy 
and Noussair, 2004; Isaac and Schnier, 2005; Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh, 2009; 
Östling et al., 2011; Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels, 2013). 
In hoofdstuk 6 introduceren we een nieuwe methode om de nutsfunctie en verliesaversie 
te meten onder zowel risico en onzekerheid. Onze methode vereist geen simplificerende 
parametrische assumpties en bouwt voort op de trade-off methode van Wakker en 
Deneffe (1996) door het mogelijk te maken standaardreeksen op te zetten die zowel 
winsten, verliezen en het referentiepunt bevatten. We gebruiken deze methode om nut 
te meten onder risico en onzekerheid en onderzoeken vervolgens of de nutsfunctie 
verschilt tussen deze condities. Deze test is cruciaal voor modellen die 
ambiguïteitsaversie verklaren door verschillen in het wegen van gebeurtenissen tussen 
risico en onzekerheid, zoals het multiple priors model en prospect theory. 
We zijn niet in staat de hypotheses te verwerpen dat de nutsfunctie en verliesaversie 
hetzelfde zijn onder risico en onzekerheid. Dit resultaat suggereert dat de nutsfunctie 
puur attitudes ten opzichte van uitkomsten betreft. We vinden dat de nutsfunctie S-
vormig is, concaaf voor winsten en convex voor verliezen, en dat er sprake is van 
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aanzienlijke verliesaversie. Onze bevindingen ondersteunen modellen die 
ambiguïteitsaversie verklaren aan de hand van een verschil in de weging van 
gebeurtenissen. Daarnaast suggereren onze bevindingen dat descriptieve modellen voor 
ambiguïteitsaversie rekening moeten houden met het feit dat mensen uitkomsten 
evalueren met betrekking tot een referentiepunt. 
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